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It seems like an intuitively very plausible position that, if someone utters the sentence 
“Hannah knows that there is no life on Mars,” she thereby says that Hannah knows that 
there is no life on Mars. More generally, it seems that what is said, the proposition 
expressed, by knowledge ascribing sentences of the form “S knows that p” is the same in 
all contexts in which these sentences can be used; in all these contexts, “S knows that p” 
plausibly just says that S knows that p. I will call this position, or roughly this position, 
(epistemic) invariantism. Though intuitively very plausible, invariantism is far from 
universally accepted. Many philosophers reject invariantism and thus subscribe to 
(epistemic) contextualism, that is, roughly the view that knowledge ascribing sentences 
of the form “S knows that p” express different propositions in different contexts of use. 
What reasons are there to accept contextualism? 
Historically speaking, the interest in contextualist positions has been sparked by the idea 
that they at least promise to provide a plausible response to longstanding and fundamental 
epistemological problems, most importantly, the problem of skepticism. Contextualism 
can be employed to ward off skeptical challenges to our everyday knowledge attributions 
by confining the success of skepticism to contexts where the skeptic manages to impose 
epistemic standards that are far more demanding than the standards governing our 
ordinary discourse. Though issues of this sort still play an important role in the 
contemporary discussion of contextualism, it has also become apparent that, by weighing 
invariantism and contextualism against each other, there is a lot to be learned about very 
general and equally fundamental issues in the philosophy of language. For example, we 
have to ask what linguistic data can be adduced to substantiate a semantic position such 
as contextualism, we have to ask when such data can be explained away in terms of more 
general pragmatic mechanisms, we have to ask how exactly to formulate a position such 
as contextualism and how to distinguish it from other positions in the vicinity (such as 
relativism), etc. It is these latter questions that will take center stage in the present 
dissertation. 
The discussion will revolve around what seem to be the most important linguistic data 
put forward in support of contextualism, namely, our intuitions about scenarios such as 
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the so-called bank cases. When we consider the bank cases, it seems that the truth-value 
of sentences involving the term “knows” depends on the context in which these sentences 
are used, more specifically, on how much is at stake and which error-possibilities are 
salient for the knowledge ascribing subject. These data pose a challenge to invariantism 
because it is unclear how this seeming variability should be explained if not by assuming 
that the knowledge sentences in question express different propositions depending on the 
context in which they are used. 
The goal of my dissertation is to show that invariantists can meet this challenge. In 
particular, I will argue that the invariantist should respond to this challenge by appealing 
to a novel version of invariantism that I will call projective invariantism. Projective 
invariantism says that we evaluate the knowledge claims in the bank cases differently not 
because they express different propositions in the different scenarios but simply because 
the epistemic position of the subject in question differs between these scenarios. More 
precisely, projective invariantism has it that readers of the bank cases will project certain 
assumptions into the scenarios such that, given these assumptions, the subject’s epistemic 
position differs in the relevant way. 
As indicated already, the linguistic data from the bank cases are not the only possible 
objection to invariantism (skeptical arguments, for example, are another concern). So, 
even if my project succeeds, we cannot safely conclude that invariantism is correct. 
However, according to DeRose—one of the major proponents of contextualism—the data 
from the bank cases form the “best grounds” (2009: 47) for rejecting invariantism. So, if 
my project succeeds, we can at least be optimistic that a full defense of invariantism is 
forthcoming. 
In this introductory chapter, I will elaborate on the challenge from the bank cases and say 
in slightly more detail what the projective invariantist solution to this challenge looks 
like. I will conclude by outlining the chapters to come and delineating the scope of this 
dissertation. 
1.1. The Challenge to Invariantism 
Consider the following scenarios, the so-called bank cases. 
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LOW: Hannah and Sarah are driving home from work on a Friday afternoon. They 
plan to stop at the bank to deposit their paychecks, but as they drive past the bank they 
notice that the lines inside are very long. Although they generally like to deposit their 
paychecks as soon as possible, it is not especially important in this case that they be 
deposited right away. Hannah suggests that they drive straight home and return to 
deposit their paychecks on Saturday morning. She remembers driving by the bank last 
Saturday and seeing that it was open until noon. Sarah says, “Maybe the bank won’t 
be open tomorrow. Lots of banks are closed on Saturdays. Do you know the bank will 
be open tomorrow?” Hannah replies, 
⊕ “I know the bank will be open tomorrow.” 
⊖ “Well, no, I don’t know the bank will be open tomorrow.” 
It turns out that the bank is open on Saturday. 
HIGH: Hannah and Sarah are driving home from work on a Friday afternoon. They 
plan to stop at the bank to deposit their paychecks, but as they drive past the bank they 
notice that the lines inside are very long. Hannah and Sarah have just written a very 
large check, and if the money from their pay is not deposited by Monday, it will 
bounce, leaving them in a very bad situation with their creditors. And, of course, the 
bank is not open on Sunday. Hannah suggests that they drive straight home and return 
to deposit their paychecks on Saturday morning. She remembers driving by the bank 
last Saturday and seeing that it was open until noon. Sarah reminds Hannah of how 
important it is to deposit the check before Monday and says, “Maybe the bank won’t 
be open tomorrow. Lots of banks are closed on Saturdays. Besides, banks can always 
change their hours. Do you know the bank will be open tomorrow?” Hannah replies, 
⊕ “I know the bank will be open tomorrow.” 
⊖ “Well, no, I don’t know the bank will be open tomorrow.” 
It turns out that the bank is open on Saturday.1 
                                                 
1 This particular formulation of the bank cases diverges from their original formulation in (DeRose 1992) 
in that the bank cases above feature both a knowledge ascription and a knowledge denial in both LOW and 
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LOW and HIGH come in two versions, on the one hand, featuring a knowledge ascription, 
on the other, a knowledge denial. I will refer to the two versions of LOW as the low 
standards cases and to the two versions of HIGH as the high standards cases. What 
should we say about the truth-values of the knowledge ascriptions and denials in the low 
and the high standards cases? It may seem that the truth-value of these claims differs 
depending on whether they occur in the low or the high standards cases. In particular, the 
following data plausibly obtain. 
Hannah’s knowledge ascription seems true in the low standards cases but false in the 
high standards cases;2 and, correspondingly,  
Hannah’s knowledge denial seems true in the high standards cases but false in the low 
standards cases. 
Let’s refer to these data as the Contextualist Data. Some (or even all) of these data may 
be doubted. Since the Contextualist Data have been endorsed by many philosophers, 
however, I will just take them for granted for the purposes of this dissertation.3 
The Contextualist Data present a challenge for the invariantist for the following reason. 
Prima facie, at least, it may seem that there are only two ways to explain these data. First, 
we can say that Hannah’s epistemic position differs between the low and the high 
standards cases and that, for this reason, we evaluate the knowledge claims in the bank 
cases differently depending on whether they occur in the low or the high standards cases. 
(Hannah’s epistemic position, here, is supposed to be determined by all those facts that 
                                                 
HIGH. In the original bank cases, LOW only features a knowledge ascription and HIGH only features a 
knowledge denial. I have changed the scenarios in this way because intuitions about the knowledge 
ascriptions as well as intuitions about the knowledge denials will become relevant below. 
2 The assumption that Hannah’s knowledge ascription in the low standards cases seems true may be 
considered problematic on the following grounds. Hannah claims to have knowledge about whether the 
bank will be open, thus, she claims to have knowledge about the future. However, it is at least a theoretical 
option to hold that there are no future facts. And if there are no future facts, there can be no knowledge 
about future facts. Thus, on such views, Hannah’s knowledge ascriptions should turn out to be invariably 
false. For those who share these worries, I refer to (DeRose 2009: 4f) and (Hansen and Chemla 2013: 315f). 
These passages present bank case like scenarios that make no reference to future facts but equally trigger 
data like the Contextualist Data. (I don’t use these cases because the bank cases are most familiar.) 
3 Note that even if it turns out that the Contextualist Data cannot be sustained, it is interesting to discuss the 
theoretical options to explain these data. For, the challenge from the Contextualist Data for invariantism is 
just one instance of a so-called “context-shifting argument” that can be employed in all sorts of other 
domains. Much of what I say in what follows is general enough to have a bearing on all possible applications 




are relevant for the question of whether she knows that the bank will be open. What these 
facts are precisely will depend on one’s theory of knowledge. They could include facts 
about Hannah’s beliefs, her evidence, modal properties such as how easily she could have 
been mistaken, etc.) Second, we can say that the knowledge claims in the bank cases 
express different propositions in the low and the high standards cases and that, for this 
reason, we evaluate them differently depending on whether they occur in the low or the 
high standards cases. This would mean to adopt contextualism. More specifically, the 
idea here would be the following. First, the knowledge claims in the low standards cases 
express propositions to the effect that Hannah has or doesn’t have what we may call 
knowledgeL (low-standards-knowledge) that the bank will be open. Similarly, the 
knowledge claims in the high standards cases express propositions to the effect that 
Hannah has or doesn’t have what we may call knowledgeH (high-standards-knowledge) 
that the bank will be open. Second, Hannah knowsL but doesn’t knowH that the bank will 
be open in all bank cases. Thus, the knowledge ascriptions are true only in the low 
standards cases, and the knowledge denials are true only in the high standards cases. 
Clearly, the invariantist cannot accept the second account. For, as I said, this would mean 
to endorse contextualism and, thus, to give up invariantism. Can she accept the first 
account (according to which we evaluate the knowledge claims in the bank cases 
differently because Hannah’s epistemic position differs between these cases)? This 
account may also seem problematic. For, there may seem to be very general reasons (that 
have nothing to do specifically with invariantism) to reject this account. Let me elaborate. 
The low and the high standards cases seem to differ only in what is at stake for Hannah 
and Sarah and which error-possibilities are mentioned in their conversational context. 
These features, though, may seem to have no bearing on Hannah’s epistemic position, 
that is, on the question of whether she knows that the bank will be open. Thus, it may 
seem that Hannah’s epistemic position cannot differ between the low and the high 
standards cases. Given that, our varying evaluations of the bank cases cannot be explained 
in terms of such a difference. In sum, then, there may seem to be no way for the 
invariantist to explain the Contextualist Data. 
One possible response strategy to this challenge on the part of the invariantist is to hold 
that Hannah’s discussion with Sarah in the high standards cases makes a difference to her 
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epistemic position after all. Such a view could be spelled out in various ways. For 
example, so-called subject-sensitive invariantists argue that one’s epistemic position is 
partly determined by seemingly non-epistemic parameters such as how much is at stake 
in one’s context or which error-possibilities are salient. Similarly, we may hold that 
Hannah will stop believing that the bank will be open (and therefore fail to know that this 
is so) because her discussion with Sarah and the heightened stakes decrease her 
confidence in this belief. We will discuss these views in slightly more detail in a minute. 
For now, let me only point out, following DeRose, that all such responses are bound to 
fail once we consider so-called “third-person” versions of the bank cases. 
Third-person cases work just like the above “first-person” bank cases. The only difference 
is that Hannah does not ascribe or deny knowledge to herself but to a third party who is 
unaware of the conversation between Hannah and Sarah (in particular, the stakes and the 
mentioned error-possibilities in their conversation). More precisely, such cases look as 
follows. 
LOW3: Hannah and Sarah are driving home from work on a Friday afternoon. They 
plan to stop at the bank to deposit their paychecks, but as they drive past the bank they 
notice that the lines inside are very long. Although they generally like to deposit their 
paychecks as soon as possible, it is not especially important in this case that they be 
deposited right away. Hannah calls Bill and asks whether the bank will be open on 
Saturday. Bill tells her that the bank will be open and that he remembers driving by 
last Saturday seeing that it was open until noon. Hannah says, “Bill told me that the 
bank will be open. Let’s drive straight home and return to deposit the paychecks 
tomorrow morning.” Sarah responds, “Maybe the bank won’t be open tomorrow. Lots 
of banks are closed on Saturdays. Does Bill know the bank will be open tomorrow?” 
Hannah replies, 
⊕ “Bill knows the bank will be open tomorrow.” 
⊖ “Well, no, Bill doesn’t know the bank will be open tomorrow.” 
It turns out that the bank is open on Saturday. 
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HIGH3: Hannah and Sarah are driving home from work on a Friday afternoon. They 
plan to stop at the bank to deposit their paychecks, but as they drive past the bank they 
notice that the lines inside are very long. Hannah and Sarah have just written a very 
large check, and if the money from their pay is not deposited by Monday, it will 
bounce, leaving them in a very bad situation with their creditors. And, of course, the 
bank is not open on Sunday. Hannah calls Bill and asks whether the bank will be open 
on Saturday. Bill tells her that the bank will be open and that he remembers driving 
by last Saturday seeing that it was open until noon. Hannah says, “Bill told me that 
the bank will be open. Let’s drive straight home and return to deposit the paychecks 
tomorrow morning.” Sarah reminds Hannah of how important it is to deposit the check 
before Monday and says, “Maybe the bank won’t be open tomorrow. Lots of banks 
are closed on Saturdays. Besides, banks can always change their hours. Does Bill 
know the bank will be open tomorrow?” Hannah replies, 
⊕ “Bill knows the bank will be open tomorrow”. 
⊖ “Well, no, Bill doesn’t know the bank will be open tomorrow.” 
It turns out that the bank is open on Saturday. 
As before, we can ask whether Hannah’s knowledge claims seem true or false in the cases 
just described. And, also as before, the following response may seem plausible. Hannah’s 
knowledge ascription seems true in the third-person low standards cases but false in the 
third-person high standards case. Correspondingly, Hannah’s knowledge denial seems 
true in the third-person high standards cases but false in the third-person low standards 
cases. Let’s refer to these data as the third-person Contextualist Data. Again, these data 
may be doubted. But, as before, I will take them for granted because they have been 
endorsed by many philosophers. 
The third-person Contextualist Data are not amenable to the just proposed invariantist 
response strategies (according to which the discussion between Hannah and Sarah makes 
a difference to the relevant subject’s epistemic position). For, suppose we grant that Bill’s 
epistemic position depends, say, on how much is at stake for him. Even so, we cannot 
argue that there is a difference in Bill’s epistemic position between the third-person low 
and high standards cases. After all, even if Bill’s epistemic position depends on what is 
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at stake for him, it certainly does not depend on what is at stake for Hannah and Sarah. 
And the third-person bank cases differ only in what is at stake for Hannah and Sarah. 
DeRose puts the point in more general terms.  
In fact, our subject’s [Bill’s] situation is identical in our two third-person cases except for the 
difference that, far away from her, different conversations, which she is and will remain oblivious 
to, are taking place about her. So, [if the invariantist wants to maintain that the subject’s epistemic 
position differs between the third-person bank cases, she] must maintain that how strongly our 
subject is positioned with respect to the bank being open on Saturdays is substantially affected by 
such factors as what kind of far-away conversation is taking place about the subject. That’s quite 
implausible on its face. (DeRose 2009: 64) 
So, the challenge for the invariantist I want to address in this dissertation is the challenge 
to explain the third-person Contextualist Data. This challenge remains even if we grant 
that the discussion between Hannah and Sarah may make a difference to Hannah’s 
epistemic position. 
In order not to overload the terminology, I will from now on discuss only the third-person 
cases. Correspondingly, I will refer to the third-person low/high standards cases just as 
the “low/high standards cases.” And I will refer to the third person Contextualist Data 
simply as “the Contextualist Data.” What I say, however, should straightforwardly apply 
to the first-person cases as well. 
1.2. Projective Invariantism Outlined 
How can the invariantist respond to the challenge from the Contextualist Data? The goal 
of this dissertation is to defend projective invariantism as a response to this challenge. 
Projective invariantists hold that, even with respect to the third-person cases, the 
invariantist should claim that the epistemic position of the subject, in our case, Bill, differs 
between the low and the high standards cases. How can the projective invariantist 
substantiate this claim in the face of DeRose’s worry above? In a nutshell, the strategy 
goes as follows. First of all, we have to recognize that the bank cases are underspecified 
even along dimensions that should uncontroversially make a difference to Bill’s epistemic 
position. For example, it is left open how likely it is supposed to be that the bank has 
changed its hours. So, before we can evaluate whether Bill’s epistemic position is the 
same in the low and the high standards cases, we have to ask how readers of the bank 
cases will fill in these aspects of the scenarios, what assumptions they will project into 
the empty, yet relevant slots. Once we address this question, however, it becomes 
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apparent that the most plausible view is that readers will fill in these features differently 
in the low and the high standards cases. For example, the fact that it occurs to Sarah that 
the bank may have changed its hours in the high standards cases but not in the low 
standards cases will plausibly be taken as evidence that this possibility is supposed to be 
more likely in the high than in the low standards cases. Thus, Bill’s epistemic position 
will most likely be assumed to be weaker in the high than in the low standards cases. 
Projective invariantists claim, very roughly, that the Contextualist Data must be explained 
on the basis of mechanisms of this sort. 
1.3. Why not Contextualism? 
As I said, I will defend a specific form of invariantism in this dissertation. So, one may 
wonder why one should be interested in defending invariantism at all. What is the basic 
motivation for invariantism? What considerations speak against contextualism? 
Answering this question in detail would require another dissertation. Still, I want to 
indicate very briefly what I consider to be the main arguments against contextualism.4 
Contextualism, to repeat, is the negation of invariantism. Thus, contextualists hold, 
roughly, that sentences like “S knows that p” express different propositions in different 
contexts of use. We have seen above that contextualism provides a straightforward 
account of the Contextualist Data (in terms of the idea that the knowledge claims in the 
low standards cases are about knowledgeL, while the knowledge claims in the high 
standards cases are about knowledgeH). So, why don’t we just accept contextualism? 
I take the basic problem to be this. Even though the Contextualist Data speak for 
contextualism, there is a range of other data that pull into the direction of invariantism. 
The most prominent of these data, the Invariantist Data as I will call them, concern speech 
reports and disagreement. Let’s discuss them in turn. 
As for speech reports, it seems that in whatever context someone, S, asserts “S* knows 
that p,” it will at least be true to report this claim by saying “S said that S* knows that p.” 
For example, whatever context I now occupy, it would seem true for me to say about the 
                                                 
4 Let me briefly note here that I use the term “contextualism” in a fairly narrow sense. Contextualism, on 
my understanding, does not include views according to which propositional truth is relative to an epistemic 
standard (such as e.g. non-indexical contextualism and assessment or genuine or radical relativism). In this 
dissertation, such views will be considered forms of invariantism. More on this below. 
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low standards cases “Hannah said that Bill knows/doesn’t know that the bank will be 
open.” This datum seems problematic for the contextualist. For, suppose that my context 
relevantly differs from the context described in the low standards cases. Assume, for 
example, that my context is more like the context in the high standards cases, such that, 
say, someone just pointed out to me that the bank may have changed its hours. If so, 
contextualism plausibly entails that my report “Hannah said that Bill knows/doesn’t know 
that the bank will be open” expresses the proposition that Hannah said that Bill 
knowsH/doesn’t knowH that the bank will be open in the low standards cases. For, by 
assumption, my context is like the context in the high standards cases and, according to 
contextualism, “knows” expresses the relation of knowledgeH in such contexts. However, 
what Hannah in the low standards cases actually says, according to contextualism, is that 
Bill knowsL/doesn’t knowL that the bank will be open. So, my report will turn out false, 
not true as it intuitively seems. This is the objection from speech reports.5 
As for disagreement, it seems that two speakers disagree with, or contradict each other 
when the first speaker says “S knows that p” and the second speaker says “S doesn’t know 
that p.” And this seems to be so even if the two speakers occupy different contexts. For 
example, it seems that Hannah’s knowledge denial in the high standards cases contradicts 
her knowledge ascription in the low standards cases. Again, this is problematic for the 
contextualist. For, on this view, Hannah’s knowledge denial in the high standards cases 
expresses the proposition that Bill doesn’t knowH that the bank will be open, while 
Hannah’s knowledge ascription in the low standards cases expresses the proposition that 
Bill knowsL that the bank will be open. And these propositions are perfectly compatible. 
This is the objection from disagreement.6 
These objections have been discussed extensively and contextualists have put forward a 
whole battery of possible response strategies.7 This is not the place to evaluate these 
strategies. All I seek to establish is that there is a certain sort of pull towards invariantism. 
This pull should be undeniable. For, given invariantism, speech report and disagreement 
data are just exactly as we would expect them to be. My report “Hannah said that Bill 
knows/doesn’t know that the bank will be open” will, according to invariantism, express 
                                                 
5 See e.g. (Hawthorne 2004a: Sec. 2.7). 
6 See e.g. (Richard 2004: 215f). 
7 See e.g. (Blome-Tillmann 2008) and (DeRose 2009). 
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the proposition that Hannah said that Bill knows/doesn’t know that the bank will be open. 
And this is, indeed, what she says according to invariantism. Similarly, Hannah’s 
knowledge denial in the high standards cases will contradict her knowledge ascription in 
the low standards cases because, in the one case, she says that Bill knows that the bank 
will be open, while, in the other, she says that Bill doesn’t know that. These then are what 
I take to be the major reasons to look for invariantist alternatives to contextualism.8 
1.4. What was Invariantism Again?  
I have now answered the question of what I consider the basic motivation for 
invariantism. Another question that needs to be addressed is what exactly it is that makes 
a position a form of invariantism. So far, I have characterized invariantism as the view 
that sentences of the form “S knows that p” express the same proposition, or say the same 
thing, in all contexts of use, namely, that S knows that p. In the following paragraphs, I 
will correct and clarify this definition. 9 
First, a correction (or, maybe, a concession). As it stands, invariantism could be proven 
wrong by considerations that are entirely orthogonal to the epistemological issues 
addressed in this dissertation. For example, (semantic) eternalism might be true, that is, 
it may be that propositions have “eternal” truth-values. One straightforward consequence 
of this view would seem to be that sentences express different propositions at different 
times of use. For example, the sentence “Carla is hungry” as used at a given point in time 
will express the eternal truth (or falsity) that Carla is hungry at the time of the utterance 
of the sentence. If that is so, “S knows that p” will also express different propositions at 
different times of use. Hence, invariantism, as stated, turns out false. Similar problems 
arise if contextualism about vagueness is correct. According to this view, sentences 
containing vague terms express different propositions depending on how they are 
sharpened in the context of use. So, given that “knows” most plausibly is vague, 
invariantism stands refuted if contextualism about vagueness can be established. 
                                                 
8 In the appendix to this dissertation, I will discuss an entirely unrelated objection to contextualism, namely 
the factivity problem. I will argue that this objection should be dismissed. I should also mention Stanley’s 
(2005b) gradability objection to contextualism which, I think, is satisfactorily answered in (Blome-
Tillmann 2008). 
9 Note that I am assuming throughout that “S” and “p” do not contain context-sensitive expressions. 
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To deal with these problems, we have to modify our definition of invariantism along the 
following lines. Invariantists do not hold that sentences of the form “S knows that p” 
expresses the same proposition in all contexts of use, that is, that there are no two contexts 
of use such that “S knows that p” expresses different propositions in these contexts. More 
precisely, they say that there are no two contexts of use such that “S knows that p” 
expresses different propositions in these contexts due to a difference in epistemic 
standards. In brief, according to invariantism, the proposition expressed by “S knows that 
p” does not vary with the epistemic standard of its context of use.10 Here, the epistemic 
standard of a given context is supposed to be a parameter determined by features such as 
what is at stake in that context and which error-possibilities are salient. Thus, there will, 
for example, be a difference in epistemic standards between the low and the high 
standards bank cases. 11  We will say that such an epistemic standard becomes more 
demanding or higher the more is at stake and the more error-possibilities are salient. Thus, 
invariantism has it that “S knows that p” expresses the same proposition independently of 
how demanding or high the epistemic standard of its context of use. 
The above considerations allow us to meet the just stated challenge. For, even if the 
proposition expressed by “S knows that p” varies with, say, the time of its utterance, it 
does not follow that it also varies with the epistemic standard of the context of its 
utterance. Thus, eternalism, etc. no longer entail that invariantism is false. Note, however 
that, as before, invariantism does turn out false if the propositions expressed by Hannah’s 
knowledge claims in the bank cases vary between the low and the high standards bank 
cases. For, these cases differ precisely in the epistemic standard governing Hannah’s 
conversational context. 
It may be held that what I call “invariantism” here is not a genuinely invariantistic view 
because it allows for all sorts of contextual variations. Correspondingly, the above 
                                                 
10 I am grateful to Julia Zakkou for helpful discussion of this issue. 
11 What exactly epistemic standards are will not be relevant for the project at hand. In particular, we need 
not bother here about what exactly it means to be salient. For our purposes, it will suffice to say that an 
error-possibility is salient in a given conversation just in case it has been mentioned in that conversation. A 
more precise account would have to add further conditions. For example, it might be that an error-possibility 
is salient only if the participants in the conversation attend to that possibility or take the possibility seriously 
or don’t challenge the mentioning of this possibility, etc. Similar considerations hold for the idea that more 
or less is at stake in a given conversation. For our purposes, it suffices to know that the low and the high 
standards cases differ with respect to what is at stake for Hannah and Sarah. 
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considerations may be seen not as corrections of the definition of invariantism but rather 
as concessions to the effect that I will not be in a position to fully defend invariantism in 
this dissertation. I am happy to grant that and to postpone a discussion of genuine 
invariantism for another occasion. The view I am interested in here is invariantism as 
defined above, whether or not it genuinely deserves the label “invariantism.” 
We see that, with these caveats in place, it is no longer straightforward to specify the 
proposition that “S knows that p” expresses according to invariantism. If eternalism is 
true, for example, the proposition will not just be the proposition that S knows that p but 
something like the proposition that S knows that p at t. Similarly, if contextualism about 
vagueness is true, the proposition will be a proposition to the effect that S knowss that p, 
where the subscript “s” indicates a given sharping. However, for simplicity’s sake, I will 
sometimes still refer to this proposition just as the proposition that S knows that p, trusting 
that the reader will see how what I say could be made more precise.12 
Second, some clarifications. I have said that, according to invariantism, what is said or 
the proposition expressed by knowledge claims is invariant. These notions, however, 
have lots of possible meanings. So, let me briefly and very roughly say how they are 
supposed to be understood in the present context. First, I use “the proposition expressed” 
and “what is said” interchangeably. Second, what is said by a given utterance must be 
distinguished from what is merely conveyed or suggested by that utterance. For example, 
when I say “I am sick” in response to your question “Will you come to my party?” I 
suggest that I won’t come. But that is not what I say. I only say that I am sick. Third, and 
relatedly, what is said must be understood as what is literally said by a given utterance. 
When I hyperbolically say “I am dying of shame!” I literally say that I am dying (of 
shame) even though, of course, this is not at all what I mean. Finally, I don’t want it to be 
part of the definition that what is said is something that can be absolutely true or false (or 
                                                 
12 The above considerations were considerations to the effect that our original definition of invariantism 
was too strong. However, it may also be too weak. According to so-called content relativism, the 
proposition expressed by “S knows that p” does not vary with the epistemic standard of the context of use 
but with the epistemic standard of the context of assessment, that is, the context from which the sentence is 
evaluated. See (Cappelen 2008a, 2008b) for such a view. The resulting view should not count as a form of 
invariantism. Given the above definition, however, it does. So, to be even more correct, we would have to 
say that, according to invariantism, the proposition expressed by “S knows that p” neither varies with the 
epistemic standard of its context of use nor with the epistemic standard of its context of assessment. 
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even true or false only relative to a possible world). Hence, I do not want to rule out by 
definition the view that “S knows that p” expresses propositions with truth-values that are 
relative to an epistemic standard. Hence, relativism (which will be discussed in detail 
below) will be considered a form of invariantism. These stipulations may leave the notion 
of what is said unspecified along many further dimensions. However, I hope that these 
dimensions will not be relevant for the project at hand.13 
To repeat, invariantism is the view that the proposition expressed, or what is said by 
sentences such as “S knows that p” does not vary with the epistemic standard of their 
context of use. This is what I will consider the official characterization of invariantism in 
what follows. There is a slightly different characterization of invariantism, however, that 
I will also make use of on some occasions. According to this definition, invariantism is 
the view that the relation expressed by “knows” does not vary with the epistemic standard 
of its context of use. I will use this definition because it will sometimes help to simplify 
the discussion. Still, what I say in terms of this definition should be taken with a grain of 
salt. For, strictly speaking, the alternative definition is not correct. 
To see this, consider the following view on the semantics of “knows.” The relation 
expressed by “knows” is the same in all conversational contexts. It is a three-place 
relation, however, that has a context-dependent epistemic standard as one argument 
place.14 Such a view would entail that the proposition expressed by knowledge sentences 
varies with the epistemic standard of their context of use. Thus, it shouldn’t come out as 
a form of invariantism. The presently discussed alternative definition of invariantism, 
however, classifies it as form of invariantism. For, the view says that the relation 
expressed by “knows” does not vary with the epistemic standard of the context of use (it 
is always the same three-place relation). So, strictly speaking, the alternative definition 
                                                 
13 It may be somewhat unusual to consider relativism a form of invariantism. After all, relativism has it that 
the truth-value of knowledge propositions is by no means invariant. The rationale behind this classification, 
however, should be straightforward to appreciate. I have argued in the previous section that the basic 
motivation for invariantism are the data from disagreement and speech reports. At least on the face of it, 
these data can be explained once we hold that the proposition expressed by knowledge claims is invariant, 
whether or not the truth-value of this proposition is invariant as well. For example, if a sentence like “S 
knows that p” invariably expresses the proposition that S knows that p, then a use of this sentence on the 
part of S* can truly be reported as “S* said that S knows that p” in all contexts. This seems to be so whether 
or not the proposition that S knows that p has invariant truth-values. Analogous considerations seem to hold 
for the case of disagreement. So, if we take speech report and disagreement data to be the basic motivation 
for invariantism, it makes sense to classify relativism as a form of invariantism. 
14 Schaffer (2004a) defends such a position. 
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of invariantism is not correct. It should be straightforward, however, to translate what I 
say in terms of this definition into a terminology that uses only the official definition. 
1.5. Chapter Summary 
By now, we should have a relatively firm grasp on the basic motivation and the nature of 
invariantism. I have also outlined the specific form of invariantism I want to defend in 
this dissertation: projective invariantism. It remains to be seen what reasons there are to 
favor projective invariantism over its invariantistic rivals. I will lay out these reasons in 
the rest of this dissertation. The strategy will be the following. The first three chapters 
will be devoted to discrediting rival invariantistic accounts. In the last chapter, I will show 
that projective invariantism provides at least a plausible account of the Contextualist 
Data. Taken together, these results should yield a relatively strong case for projective 
invariantism. Here is a slightly more detailed description of the content of the chapters to 
come. (In the course of the subsequent discussion, it may be useful to refer to Figure 1 on 
p. 20, which provides a taxonomy of possible accounts of the Contextualist Data.) 
In the second chapter, I will discuss (epistemic) relativism as a first invariantist reaction 
to the Contextualist Data and the Invariantist Data. Relativists seek to accommodate these 
data by claiming that, even though sentences like “S knows that p” express the same 
proposition in all contexts of use, they have truth-values only relative to a given epistemic 
standard.15 I will argue that this view may succeed in explaining the data outlined so far. 
However, I will also argue that it cannot do justice to all manifestations of the invariantist 
pull. In particular, I will argue that it cannot explain cases of indirect testimony where 
one speaker comes to believe that S doesn’t know that p on the basis of the testimony “S 
said that she doesn’t know that p.” 
In the third and fourth chapter, I will discuss pragmatic invariantism as a second 
invariantist reaction to the above data. Pragmatic invariantists don’t appeal to relative 
propositions. Rather, they hold that assertions involving sentences like “S knows that p” 
implicate different propositions when used in contexts with different epistemic standards 
(even though the proposition they express remains constant). These flexible pragmatic 
                                                 
15 Relativism, as understood here, is supposed to include both non-indexical contextualism and genuine or 
assessment or radical relativism. See below. 
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contents, then, are supposed to account for the Contextualist Data. Pragmatic invariantism 
comes in two varieties depending on which part of the Contextualist Data they seek to 
explain in terms of implicatures. 
In the third chapter, I will discuss moderate pragmatic invariantism, according to which 
the data about the high standards cases must be explained in terms of implicatures. The 
idea here is that the knowledge ascription in the high standards cases seems false only 
because it has a false implicature, and that, correspondingly, the knowledge denial seems 
true only because it has a true implicature. I will argue that the demise of moderate 
pragmatic invariantism can be seen most clearly once we get clear on the nature of the 
implicature that is supposed to be doing the work here. In particular, I will distinguish 
additive from substitutional implicatures and show that, on either interpretation, moderate 
pragmatic invariantism must be rejected. 
In the fourth chapter, I will discuss skeptical pragmatic invariantism, according to which 
the data about the low standards cases must be explained in terms of implicatures. The 
idea here is that the knowledge ascription in the low standards cases seems true only 
because it has a true implicature, and that, correspondingly, the knowledge denial seems 
false only because it has a false implicature. I will argue that, contrary to appearance, 
skeptical pragmatic invariantism is a more promising position than moderate pragmatic 
invariantism by defending it against a range of familiar objections. However, I will also 
indicate a shortcoming of this view. In particular, I will show that we would have to be 
aware of the implicatures posited by the proponent of skeptical pragmatic invariantism in 
a way in which we are not. 
In the fifth and final chapter, I will show that projective invariantism can account for the 
Contextualist Data and defend it against potential objections. 
In an appendix, I will briefly come back to the question of how to argue against 
contextualism. In particular, I will sustain the thesis that the Invariantist Data form the 
best grounds to reject contextualism by showing that another familiar objection, the so-
called factivity problem, fails. Proponents of the factivity problem argue that 
contextualism must be rejected because it cannot be stated properly. The basic idea behind 
this charge is the following. On the one hand, contextualists seemingly have to say that 
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knowledge ascribing sentences like “S knows that S has hands” are true when used in 
ordinary contexts. On the other hand, they arguably aren’t allowed to say that because the 
sentences in question are not true by the standard of their own context. I will show that 
the argument to the factivity problem fails because it rests on the mistaken premise that 
contextualists are committed to the truth of particular ordinary knowledge attributions. 
1.6. Scope Limitations 
As the foregoing summary indicates, my dissertation is limited in two respects. First, I do 
not discuss all invariantist positions on offer. Second, I defend invariantism only against 
the challenge from the Contextualist Data but not against other challenges one might want 
to level against this view. Due to the vast literature on the topic, limitations of this sort 
seemed unavoidable to me. But, let me briefly describe what will be left out and why it 
will be left out.  
First, subject-sensitive invariantism will be left out. Subject-sensitive invariantists neither 
appeal to relative propositions nor to merely conveyed contents. Instead, they hold that a 
subject’s epistemic position depends on features such as what is at stake for the subject 
or which error-possibilities she has in mind (that is, they deny what has been called 
intellectualism, roughly the view that knowledge depends solely on truth-conducive 
features).16 On that basis, they explain the Contextualist Data with respect to the first-
person cases by simply pointing out that the subject’s epistemic position varies between 
these cases. 
The basic reason why I don’t discuss this view has been indicated already. In this 
dissertation, I set myself to the task of explaining the Contextualist Data about the first-
person as well as the third-person bank cases. Subject-sensitive invariantism, however, 
can only explain the data about the first-person bank cases: Even if Bill’s epistemic 
position depends on stakes and salient alternatives, it certainly does not depend on what 
is at stake for Hannah and Sarah or which error-possibilities they have in mind. Subject-
                                                 
16 Versions of this view are put forward e.g. in (Hawthorne 2004a) and (Stanley 2005b). 
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sensitive invariantism, thus, is no genuine alternative to the view I myself will put forward 
below.17 
The second invariantist position that will not be discussed in detail is the belief removal 
theory. This theory neither appeals to relative contents nor to merely conveyed contents 
nor to anti-intellectualism. Still, as regards the first-person bank cases, it argues that 
Hannah’s epistemic position varies between the low and the high standards cases. The 
reason is supposed to be that, in light of the heightened stakes and the mentioned error-
possibility in the high standards cases, she will stop believing that the bank will be open 
in these cases (even though her evidence would suffice for knowledge if she were to 
maintain that belief).18 As noted already, this strategy does not carry over to the third-
person cases either. For, there is no reason why Bill should stop believing that the bank 
will be open in light of the heightened standards in Hannah and Sarah’s conversation. As 
before, this is why I don’t discuss this view.19 
Finally, I don’t discuss psychological error-theories. This family of theories is united by 
the idea that one or the other judgment about the bank cases is mistaken and must be 
explained away by appeal to general psychological biases. These theories, if correct, do 
have a good claim to explain all the relevant data. The reason why I still don’t discuss 
them is that I have nothing to contribute to the recent debate. This debate increasingly 
focuses on results from psychology that I am not in a position to evaluate properly.20 
                                                 
17 Note that these considerations don’t show that subject-sensitive invariantism must be rejected. For, a 
subject-sensitive invariantist may apply her theory only to first-person cases and, at the same time, appeal 
to some other invariantist account to deal with third-person cases. Hawthorne (2004a: 162–166) and Stanley 
(2005b: 101–103), for example, supplement their theory with one or the other psychological error-theory 
to account for third-person cases. 
18 Bach seems to be the only proponent of this view. See e.g. (Bach 2005: Sec. 5). The label is taken from 
(Hawthorne 2004a: 169). 
19 Again, this does not show that the belief removal theory is wrong. For, as before, the proponent of the 
belief removal theory could apply her theory only to the first-person cases and explain the third-person 
cases in some other way. Bach, for example, freely admits that his theory is “a kind of error-theory” (2005: 
78) when it comes to third-person cases. 
20 The most prominent form of psychological error-theory appeals to the so-called availability heuristic and 
is put forward in  (Vogel 1990: 19f), (Feldman 2001: 76), (Hawthorne 2004a: 162–166, 2004b: 520ff) and 
(Williamson 2005a: 226). (The availability heuristic is a heuristic to evaluate the likelihood of given events 
on the basis of their cognitive “availability,” that is, very roughly, the ease with which they can be imagined 
or remembered. It allegedly leads us to overestimate the likelihood of error-possibilities once they are made 
salient.) Nagel (2010) forcefully criticizes this approach on the basis of psychological results that indicate 
that the availability heuristic will not have the effects it is supposed to have. However, more recent 
approaches seem unaffected by this criticism. See e.g. (Nagel 2010, 2011) and (Gerken 2011, 2012). 
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The scope of this dissertation is not only limited in that I leave out the just discussed 
forms of invariantism. It is also limited in that I consider only one of potentially many 
arguments against invariantism.21 Most importantly, I don’t discuss the idea that only 
contextualism provides a plausible response to certain kinds of skeptical arguments.22 A 
full defense of invariantism would have to address this issue. But, as will become apparent 
below, the discussion of skeptical arguments can plausibly be separated from my 
concerns here. So, it will be left for another occasion. 
                                                 
21 For an overview of further such arguments, see (Rysiew 2009). 
22 See e.g. (DeRose 1995). 
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Figure 1: Candidate accounts of the Contextualist Data. “S” can stand for “Bill knows that the bank will be open” or “Bill doesn’t know that the bank will be open” as used by Hannah in the bank cases. “*” marks 
positions I will discuss in detail in this dissertation. Reading the chart: Start at one of the leafs. Follow the arrows leading to that leaf up to the top box. The position named in the leaf entails all the claims you pass 
(insofar as the position is applied to deal with the Contextualist Data; as indicated already, subject-sensitive invariantists, for example, may (and should) refrain from applying their theory to these data). Some remarks. 
First, the claims leading to a given position do not provide necessary and sufficient conditions for this position. They only describe what this position would say about the bank cases to explain the Contextualist Data 
(insofar as it is applied to these data). Second, the chart rightly suggests that all invariantist positions discerned are in principle compatible. Clearly, though, many combinations make no sense because they would 
yield redundant accounts of the data. Fourth, the chart is not exhaustive. It is supposed to cover only the views that have been prominently defended in the literature (and my own view). Finally, the classification of 
my view, projective invariantism, is not entirely correct. For, it is somewhat misleading to say that, according to this view, Bill’s epistemic position differs between the low and the high standards scenario. More 




In this section, I will discuss epistemic relativism, for short, relativism. Relativism is a 
view that seeks to explain the Contextualist Data and, at the same time, to do justice to 
the pull towards invariantism, in particular, to the Invariantist Data. In order to explain 
the Invariantist Data, relativists endorse invariantism, that is, that the proposition 
expressed by sentences like “S knows that p” does not vary with the epistemic standard 
of their context of use. In order to explain the Contextualist Data, they further hold that 
this proposition has truth-values only relative to a given epistemic standard. In particular, 
relativists hold that the proposition that Bill knows that the bank will be open is true 
relative to the epistemic standard in the low standards cases but false relative to the more 
demanding epistemic standard in high standards cases.1 We need not bother about the 
details here because I will just grant that relativism, if true, can account for the 
Contextualist Data and the Invariantist Data.2  Instead, I will argue that relativism fails 
because it does not explain further manifestations of the invariantist pull. More 
specifically, I will argue that relativism cannot explain our reactions to certain cases of 
indirect testimony, that is, to reports of the form “S said that p.”3 Even more specifically, 
I will argue that relativism cannot explain the following datum: When we find ourselves 
in a low standards context and someone reports, “S said that she (S) doesn’t know that p,” 
it is appropriate to form the belief that S doesn’t know that p as a response.  
Here is an outline of the present chapter. First, I will briefly elaborate on the definition of 
epistemic relativism. Second, I will present the just mentioned datum from indirect 
testimony in more detail. Third, I will show that relativism is incompatible with this 
datum. Fourth, I will discuss and reject rejoinders to this objection. Finally, I will pick up 
some loose ends. In particular, I will discuss, first, why I neither apply the present 
objection to contextualism nor to other forms of relativism (such as relativism about 
                                                 
1 See e.g. (Richard 2004; 2008), (Kompa 2005, 2011), (Brogaard 2008) and (MacFarlane 2005b; 2011) for 
proponents of relativism. Readers familiar with the debate will realize that relativism, as understood here, 
is neutral between so-called non-indexical contextualism and assessment (or genuine) relativism. This is so 
because the distinction between these two kinds of relativisms is irrelevant for the purposes at hand. My 
subsequent argument equally applies to both these views. 
2 For further discussion particularly of the disagreement issue, see e.g. (MacFarlane 2014: Ch. 6). 
3 The terminology of “direct“ and “indirect” testimony is taken from (Lackey 1999: 479f). 
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what’s tasty). Second, I will explain why it is important for my case to consider indirect 
as opposed to direct testimony, why the reported knowledge claim must be a knowledge 
denial and why the report must be made in a low standards context. 
2.1. Relativism 
Relativism, to repeat, consists of the following two claims. First, the proposition 
expressed by “S knows that p” does not vary with an epistemic standard. It is always just 
the proposition that S knows that p. Second, this proposition has truth-values only relative 
to an epistemic standard. So, according to relativism, the proposition that S knows that p 
may be true relative to one standard but fail to be true relative to another. As a first pass, 
we can say that it will be true relative to a given standard just if S knows relative to that 
standard that p. What does it mean to know something relative to a given standard? The 
answer will depend on one’s theory of knowledge. For example, from the perspective of 
a relevant alternatives framework,4 to know that p relative to a given standard means to 
be able to rule out the set of alternatives to p that is determined by the given standard. 
Here, more demanding standards will determine larger sets of alternatives than less 
demanding standards. The objection I will present in what follows figures on a level of 
abstractness that does not make it necessary to settle on a specific interpretation of what 
it means to know something relative to a given epistemic standard. So, I will continue to 
speak of knowledge relative to a given standard, leaving it to the reader to fill in her 
preferred theory of knowledge. Much more could be said about the nature of relativism. 
But the further details will be irrelevant for my present concerns. So, I leave them for 
another occasion.5 
2.2. The Indirect Testimony Datum (ITD) 
Let’s now turn to the datum from indirect testimony, which I will later show to be 
incompatible with relativism. Consider the following scenario.  
Knowledge Testimony Case: John and his journalist friend Sally sit in the pub talking 
about a criminal who has recently been caught by the police. The criminal was caught 
hiding in an office building. Sally and John are wondering how the building came into 
                                                 
4 See e.g. (Lewis 1996). 
5 A thorough and wide ranging introduction into the topic can be found in (MacFarlane 2014: Ch. 1–6, 8). 
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the focus of the investigation. Sally was at a press conference where the police officer 
in charge was giving a statement and answered questions. She reports, “There was 
some evidence that the perpetrator would be in the building. But the police officer 
said that, when she gave the order to storm the building, she didn’t know that the 
perpetrator would be in there.” John reasonably considers Sally and the police officer 
sincere and well-informed (and everything else is normal). 
I take the following to be an intuitive, pretheoretical datum that any theory of knowledge 
must accommodate. In the above scenario, it would be perfectly appropriate for John to 
respond to Sally’s report by forming not only the belief that the police officer said that 
she didn’t know that the perpetrator would be in the building but also the belief that the 
police officer did in fact not know that the perpetrator would be in the building. (At the 
very least, I take it, this is what ordinary speakers in John’s situation would often do. So, 
insofar as we do not want to say that ordinary speakers are mistaken in this behavior, we 
should grant that this behavior is appropriate.6) Let’s refer to this datum as the “Indirect 
Testimony Datum” (ITD). If we use “P” to refer to the proposition that the perpetrator 
was in the building, we can restate the (ITD) in the following way:  
(ITD) In the Knowledge Testimony Case, it would be appropriate for John to form the 
belief that the police officer didn’t know that P in response to Sally’s report (for 
short, it would be appropriate for John to accept Sally’s indirect testimony). 
To be clear, let me emphasize that the Knowledge Testimony Case is described such that 
John has good reasons to believe that the police officer and Sally are sincere and well-
informed (and everything else is normal). The (ITD) is supposed to obtain only if these 
assumptions are in place. So, I am not denying that there are many circumstances in which 
we should not accept the indirect testimony of somebody else. For example, it would 
clearly be inappropriate for John to accept Sally’s testimony if, say, he had reasons to 
consider Sally or the police officer insincere or ill-informed. To repeat, this observation 
is perfectly compatible with the (ITD). For, this datum is supposed to obtain only in cases 
                                                 
6 One possible response to my objection to relativism would be to endorse an error-theory according to 
which people would form the belief above, but mistakenly so. Relativists, however, are fairly reluctant to 
endorse such error-theories. See e.g. (MacFarlane 2005b: 215f). So, I will ignore this response strategy 
throughout this chapter. Let me also note that even those who want to endorse an error-theory must provide 
an account of why we commit the relevant kind of error. It seems not at all trivial to provide such an account. 
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were the relevant speakers can be assumed to be sincere and well-informed. (The 
normality condition is supposed to rule out scenarios where John is not even listening to 
what Sally says or doesn’t speak her language, etc. In such situations, it would also be 
inappropriate for John to form the relevant belief. But, again, this is perfectly compatible 
with the (ITD).) 
A further clarificatory remark: It may seem that Sally somehow suggests that she thinks 
that the police officer is not to be trusted. For, this might seem to be the most 
straightforward explanation for why she only reports the police officer instead of directly 
endorsing what the police officer said. This, in turn, may seem to make it inappropriate 
for John to come to accept what the police officer supposedly said. Note, though, that we 
can happily grant that Sally suggests, for example, that the police officer wasn’t sincere. 
As long as John considers the police officer sincere (and does not change his judgment 
in response to Sally’s suggestion), he should still come to accept what the police officer 
said. We may imagine, for example, that John is already aware of the fact that Sally 
considers the police officer insincere but finds that the only evidence she has for this claim 
is preposterous. Under these assumptions, the (ITD) should hold. 
To see the intuitive plausibility of the (ITD) more clearly, it is useful to consider the 
following comparison. Suppose the police officer hadn’t said that she didn’t know that 
the perpetrator would be in the building. Suppose, instead, that what she said had been a 
clearly non-relativistic proposition. For example, suppose that the police officer had said 
that there was some evidence that the perpetrator would not be in the building. And 
suppose further that Sally had reported this assertion in the following way, “There was 
some evidence that the perpetrator would be in the building. But the police officer said 
that there also was some evidence that the perpetrator would be somewhere else.” In this 
case, it should clearly be appropriate for John to form not only the belief that the police 
officer said that there was some evidence that the perpetrator would be somewhere else 
but also the belief that there in fact was some evidence that the perpetrator would be 
somewhere else (assuming, as before, that John considers the police officer and Sally 
sincere and well-informed). The (ITD) is based on the idea that, intuitively, the situation 
is exactly the same when Sally makes the report she makes in the Knowledge Testimony 
Case above, that is, when she reports, “There was some evidence that the perpetrator 
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would be in the building. But the police officer said that she didn’t know that the 
perpetrator would be in there.” In this case as well, it would be perfectly appropriate for 
John to form not only the belief that the police officer said that she didn’t know that the 
perpetrator would be in the building but also the belief that the police officer did in fact 
not know that the perpetrator would be in the building. 
To see the distinctiveness of the (ITD), it is also useful to compare the Knowledge 
Testimony Case to a scenario where no such datum obtains. Suppose, for example, that 
John and Sally are wondering whether to go to an Indian restaurant that has opened 
recently. They haven’t been there before. Sally says, “My sister said the food there is 
tasty.” Now, it seems very clear that, even if John considers Sally and her sister sincere 
and well-informed, he will still not form the belief that the food at the Indian place is 
tasty, and it would also not be appropriate for him to so. At best, John will form a belief 
to the effect that the food at the Indian place is supposed to be tasty. After all, it remains 
to be seen whether John and Sally’s sister share a taste in food. So, in the taste case, we 
don’t obtain a datum like the (ITD). 
So much for the (ITD). By now, this datum should seem acceptable (if it doesn’t, see 
section 2.4 below). But before we go on to address the question of why the (ITD) should 
be problematic for the relativist, let me emphasize that some aspects of the Knowledge 
Testimony Case that may seem accidental are, in fact, crucial for my case. I will explain 
later why these aspects are crucial. For now, let me only point out what these aspects are 
in order to forestall potentially distracting objection. First, the Knowledge Testimony Case 
involves indirect as opposed to direct testimony, that is, Sally does not herself endorse 
what the police officer said but only reports that the police officer said it. Second, what 
the police officer said is a negated knowledge claim. Third, Sally and John find 
themselves in a low standards situation where nothing is at stake and no error-possibilities 
are salient. To repeat, all these aspect are crucial for my case. Thus, I am happy to grant 
that the objection I will develop does not arise if we modify the Knowledge Testimony 
Case in any of these respects. 
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2.3. An Argument Against Relativism Based on the (ITD) 
We will now turn to the question of why the (ITD) should be problematic for the relativist. 
In a nutshell, the argument for this conclusion goes as follows. First premise: Assuming 
relativism, John can appropriately form the belief that the police officer didn’t know that 
P only if he is in a position to justify the belief that it is true relative to his (John’s) 
epistemic standard that the police officer didn’t know that P. Second premise: John is not 
in a position to justify the belief that it is true relative to his (John’s) epistemic standard 
the police officer didn’t know that P. (The only belief in the vicinity that he would be in 
a position to justify is the belief that it is true relative to the police officer’s epistemic 
standard the police officer didn’t know that P.) Conclusion: Assuming relativism, John 
cannot appropriately form the belief that the police officer didn’t know that P. Thus, 
relativism is incompatible with the (ITD), according to which John can appropriately 
form that belief. In what follows, I will discuss the two premises of the above argument 
in more detail. Let’s start with the first. 
A Relativistic Justification Norm for Belief 
To repeat, this premise has it that, assuming relativism, John can appropriately form the 
belief that the police officer didn’t know that P only if he is in a position to justify the 
belief that it is true relative to his (John’s) epistemic standard that the police officer didn’t 
know that P. I take this premise to be relatively uncontroversial.7 So, in what follows, I 
will only very briefly motivate why one might be willing to accept it. In particular, I will 
first state a very general norm for the appropriateness of beliefs, namely, the justification 
norm. Then I will modify this norm so that it fits the relativist semantics. Finally, I will 
derive the above premise as an instance of the relativistic justification norm. 
Consider the appropriateness of beliefs in general. Under what conditions does a belief 
count as appropriate? It should be relatively uncontroversial that speakers commit at least 
some sort of mistake if they come to believe what they cannot justify. So, given that 
mistaken beliefs aren’t appropriate, it should also be relatively unproblematic to endorse 
a principle along the following lines. 
                                                 
7 See FN 9 for references. 
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One can appropriately form a given belief only if one is in a position to justify that 
belief. 
Let’s refer to this principle as the justification norm (for belief). In what follows, I will 
take it for granted that a norm at least along the lines of the justification norm obtains. 
The question I want to address is how to adapt the justification norm to the relativist 
semantics. 
To begin with, note that the relativist (and maybe others as well) will most likely hold 
that the level of justification required for appropriate belief depends on the context. So, 
to be more precise, we should substitute the justification norm by the following thesis. 
In a given context, one can appropriately form a given belief only if one is in a position 
to provide a justification for that belief that satisfies the epistemic demands of the 
context. 
This kind of contextualization, however, will not be relevant for my concerns. So, to 
simplify the discussion, I will just pretend that the standard of justification is the same in 
all contexts. So far, then, the relativist can stick to the justification norm as initially stated. 
Assuming relativism, however, another issue has to be addressed: We have to understand 
what it means to justify a belief that has a relativistic content. Let’s consider this issue in 
more detail. The justification norm as initially stated has it that one can appropriately 
form a belief only if one would be in a position to justify that belief. But suppose the 
belief in question has a relativistic content. Suppose, for example, that the belief has a 
content, call it “r,” that is expressed by a knowledge sentence. Now, what does it mean 
to say that one would be in a position to justify the belief that r? Given that r is a 
relativistic content, r can be true relative to one epistemic standard but false relative to 
another. Correspondingly, one can be in a position to justify the belief that r is true relative 
to one epistemic standard even if one would not be in a position to justify the belief that 
r is true relative to another epistemic standard.8 Thus, it is not at all clear to which of these 
                                                 
8 Note that this is so even if the level of justification required for both beliefs is the same, that is, even if 
we accept the simplification made in the previous paragraph. The reason why one can be justified in holding 
one of the beliefs in question even if one would not be justified in holding the other is just that the beliefs 
in question have different contents. One of the beliefs is about whether r is true relative to one epistemic 
standard, the other belief is about whether r is true relative to another epistemic standard. 
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claims one is committed when one just plainly says that someone is in a position to justify 
the belief that r. So, the justification norm as initially stated allows for different 
interpretations when we consider beliefs about relativistic contents. Somewhat differently 
put, the relativist can accept the following neutral version of the justification norm: 
One can appropriately form a belief that r only if one is in a position to justify the 
belief that r is true relative to the epistemic standard(s) X. 
The question she needs to answer, however, is which epistemic standard(s) “X” is 
supposed to denote. 
In principle, relativists can answer this question in various ways. In what follows, 
however, I will assume that the relativist says what seems most straightforward and most 
plausible, namely, that it is one’s own epistemic standard that is relevant for the 
appropriateness of one’s beliefs. Given that, we arrive at the following relativist version 
of the justification norm. 
One can appropriately form a belief that r only if one is in a position to justify the 
belief that r is true relative to one’s own epistemic standard. 
An instance of this norm is the following claim. John can appropriately form the belief 
that the police officer didn’t know that P only if he is in a position to justify the belief 
that it is true relative to his (John’s) epistemic standard that the police officer didn’t know 
that P. So, we have derived the first premise of the argument against relativism above.9 
                                                 
9 I have said above that this premise should be relatively uncontroversial among relativists. Admittedly, 
though, relativists haven’t yet considered the justification norm for belief and, correspondingly, haven’t 
directly endorsed the relativistic justification norm above. Still, relativists tend to accept a truth norm for 
belief that straightforwardly leads to the relativistic justification norm above. Let me elaborate. Relativists 
generally endorse (or at least express sympathies to) the following truth norm for belief. One can 
appropriately form a given belief only if that belief is true relative to one’s own epistemic standard. (See 
e.g. (Kölbel 2003: 70, 2004: 309) and (MacFarlane 2014: 116). Egan et al. (2005: 153) and Brogaard (2008: 
448) endorse this norm at least for the case of assertion.) If the relativist accepts this norm, she will also 
have to accept that people commit at least some sort of second order mistake if they form a belief without 
being in a position to justify that this belief is true relative to their own epistemic standard. Thus, relativists 
who accept the just stated truth norm will also have to accept the relativist justification norm described in 
the main text. So, given that most relativists accept the truth norm, the relativist justification norm should 
be fairly uncontroversial as well. 
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Failing to Satisfy the Relativistic Justification Norm 
Let’s now turn to the second premise of my argument against relativism. To repeat, this 
premise has it that John is not in a position to justify the belief that it is true relative to his 
epistemic standard that the police officer didn’t know that P. In this section, I will provide 
the first steps to defending that premise. To begin with, however, let me introduce some 
straightforward abbreviations that hopefully help to make the subsequent discussion more 
tractable. 
I will say that the police officer didn’t know-E that P just in case it is true relative to a 
given epistemic standard, E, that the police officer didn’t know that P. I will refer to 
John’s epistemic standard as “J” and to the police officer’s epistemic standard as “O.” 
Thus, I will say that the police officer didn’t know-J that P just in case it is true relative 
to John’s epistemic standard that the police officer didn’t know that P. Correspondingly, 
I will say that the police officer didn’t know-O that P just in case it is true relative to the 
police officer’s epistemic standard that the police officer didn’t know that P. 
Given these abbreviations, the premise we are trying to establish amounts to the following 
claim. John is not in a position to justify the belief that the police officer didn’t know-J 
that P. Why should this premise hold? The basic reason to accept this premise is this. 
We can stipulate, I think, that before Sally makes her report, John has no information 
about the epistemic position of the police officer. Thus, if John is in a position to justify 
the belief that the police officer didn’t know-J that P, this justification must somehow 
stem from Sally’s report. But what can John learn from that report? Given Sally’s report, 
John presumably is in a position to justify the belief that the police officer said that she 
didn’t know that P. After all, Sally just told him that this is so. It may also be that John 
would therefore be in a position to justify the belief that the police officer didn’t know-O 
that P. For, if the police officer said that she didn’t know that P, it seems reasonable for 
John to assume that this claim was true relative to the police officer’s epistemic standard, 
O.10 However, even if John would be in a position to justify the belief that the police 
officer didn’t know-O that P, it just doesn’t follow that John would also be in a position 
                                                 
10 I am assuming here that assertions are governed by a justification norm corresponding to the justification 
norm for beliefs derived above, that is, that one may assert that p only if one is in a position to justify the 
belief that p is true relative to one’s own epistemic standard. 
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to justify the belief that the police officer didn’t know-J that P. For, it may be that O and 
J differ. In particular, it may be that O was more demanding than J. (Remember that 
John’s epistemic standard, J, is supposed to be very low.) And if that is so, it may be that 
the police officer didn’t know-O that P even if she did know-J that P. Thus, it is very 
much unclear how John could come to be in a position to justify the belief that the police 
officer didn’t know-J that P on the basis of Sally’s report. Hence, it is very much unclear 
how John could come to be in a position to justify that belief at all. 
Admittedly, John would be in a position to justify the belief that the police officer didn’t 
know-J that P if he were in a position to justify the belief that his epistemic standard, J, 
and the police officer epistemic standard, O, are the same (or differ only marginally, I 
take this qualification to be tacitly understood throughout). For, if John would be in a 
position to justify that J and O are the same, then he could derive that the police officer 
didn’t know-J that P from his arguably justified belief that the police officer didn’t know-
O that P.11 However, it is very much unclear how John could come to be in a position to 
justify the belief that J and O are the same. After all, Sally does not tell him what was at 
stake or which error-possibilities were salient when the police officer made her assertion, 
and John wasn’t at the press conference himself. 
So, to sum up the discussion up to now, the objection I want to raise against relativism is 
this. Relativism is incompatible with the (ITD). According to this datum, it is appropriate 
for John to form the belief that the police officer didn’t know that P in the Knowledge 
Testimony Case. However, relativism entails that it should be inappropriate for John to 
form this belief. For, relativism entails that this belief is appropriate only if John is in a 
position to justify the belief that the police officer didn’t know-J that P. And John is not 
in a position to justify the belief that the police officer didn’t know-J that P. The basic 
reason for this last claim, in turn, seems to be that John is not in a position to justify the 
belief that his and the police officer’s epistemic standard are the same. 
In what follows, I will address possible rejoinders to the present argument against 
relativism. In particular, I will address ways of rejecting the second premise of this 
                                                 
11 In fact, it would even suffice if John was in a position to justify the belief that either O and J are the same 
or O is less demanding than J. For, if O is less demanding than J, then one can arguably derive knowledge-O 
from knowledge-J. But, to simplify the discussion, let’s just assume that John’s epistemic standard, J, is as 
low as it can get. Given that, we can ignore the possibility that O is less demanding than J. 
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argument (according to which John fails to be in a position to justify that the police officer 
didn’t know-J that P). Before that, however, I will turn to those who still do not feel fully 
convinced by the (ITD), the datum on which the argument above is based. In particular, 
I will show that, in addition to the (ITD), there is a closely related and maybe more 
straightforward datum that could equally well be used to underwrite my argument. 
2.4. An Alternative to the (ITD) 
In what follows, I will briefly state the just mentioned alternative datum and indicate why 
it leads to the same problems as the (ITD) above. 
Consider the Knowledge Testimony Case again. Remember Sally’s following report. 
Sally: There was some evidence that the perpetrator would be in the building. But the 
police officer said that, when she gave the order to storm the building, she didn’t 
know that the perpetrator would be in there. 
Suppose you reject the (ITD) and thus hold that John would refrain from forming the 
belief that the police officer didn’t know that P in response to Sally’s report. Even so, I 
take it, you may still be happy to grant that it would be very weird for John to indicate his 
unwillingness to form this belief by responding to Sally in any of the following ways. 
#John: But was the police officer’s epistemic standard the same as ours? 
#John: But maybe the police officer considered more error-possibilities than we do. 
#John: But I guess the issue was more important for the police officer than it is for us 
now. 
So, I take it as another datum that any of these responses on the part of John would be 
inappropriate. 
This datum leads to trouble for the relativist for more or less the same reasons as the 
(ITD). Here is why. As argued already, relativism entails that John can appropriately form 
the belief that the police officer didn’t know that P only if John is in a position to justify 
the belief that the police officer didn’t know-J that P. However, as also argued already, 
John only is in a position to justify the belief that the police officer didn’t know-O that P. 
So, given relativism, at least one reason for John to refrain from accepting Sally’s 
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testimony is that, for all he knows, his epistemic standard, J, and the police officer’s 
epistemic standard, O, differ relevantly. The above responses are straightforward ways to 
articulate this reason. So, they should be perfectly appropriate if relativism holds. Thus, 
relativism seems incompatible with the idea that the responses above are inappropriate. 
One might want to respond that, even if a difference in epistemic standards would indeed 
be a good reason for John not to accept Sally’s testimony, it does not follow that we would 
find it appropriate for John to articulate this reason. Such a response, however, seems 
strangely ad hoc. Suppose, for example, that John thought the police officer was insincere 
(contrary to the stipulation in the scenario). In that case, it would clearly be natural for 
him to respond to Sally’s report by saying something along the following lines, “But she’s 
a liar. I don’t believe a word of what she says.” Or suppose that John considered the police 
officer ill-informed (again, contrary to the stipulation in the scenario). In that case, it 
would clearly be natural for him to say something along the following lines, “But she 
certainly just forgot the pictures taken by the drones. The perpetrator was clearly visible 
there.” So, whatever reason John has for not accepting Sally’s testimony, it seems 
perfectly appropriate for him to articulate it. So if, as the relativist has it, one reason for 
John not to accept Sally’s testimony is that his and the police officer’s epistemic standard 
may have differed, then it should seem perfectly appropriate for him to respond to Sally’s 
testimony by pointing this out. 
This last point can be further corroborated by considering the case of taste again. 
Remember the scenario where John and Sally talk about the Indian restaurant and Sally 
says, “My sister said the food there is tasty.” I mentioned already that John should be 
unwilling to respond to this report by forming the belief that the food at the Indian 
restaurant is tasty. I have also indicated that the reason for this is that his and Sally’s 
sister’s taste may differ. Correspondingly, it is perfectly appropriate for John to articulate 
that reason in response to Sally’s report. For example, it seems perfectly sensible for him 
to respond by saying things like this. 
John: But does she like the same things as I do? 
John: Then I guess she likes coriander? I hate it. 
John: But I doubt that we have the same taste in food. 
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So, we have a further case in point to substantiate the general idea that it is perfectly 
appropriate to respond to testimonial reports by indicating why one is unwilling to accept 
them. 
Given that we accept this general principle, we thus have an argument against relativism 
that is based on the same premises as the argument developed above, with the only 
difference that it does not appeal to the (ITD), but to the datum that it would be 
inappropriate for John to respond to Sally’s report by pointing out that his and the police 
officer’s epistemic standard may have differed. The discussion in the rest of this chapter 
will be couched in terms of the (ITD). But everything I say should apply mutatis mutandis 
to the datum presented in this section. 
2.5. Replies and Rejoinders 
Let us now turn to potential rejoinders to my above argument. As I said, the argument 
crucially depends on the premise that John is not in a position to justify the belief that the 
police officer didn’t know-J that P. We have seen that this premise, in turn, is based on 
the assumption that John is not in a position to justify the belief that J equals O. So, one 
general strategy to respond to my argument is to reject the idea that John is not in a 
position to justify the belief that J equals O. In what follows, I will address and reject 
various ways to substantiate this response strategy. 
John Can Take it for Granted that O equals J 
The relativist could argue that, even though it is possible that O was relevantly more 
demanding than J, this is very unlikely. Thus, John can simply take it for granted that J 
equals O.12 Such a response could be substantiated in various ways. For example, the 
relativist could hold that epistemic standards only change when certain institutional 
settings change, say, when we move to the court of law. Alternatively, she might want to 
say that epistemic standards change only when the philosopher enters the scene and 
presents alternatives that would otherwise be ignored. 
                                                 
12 See e.g. (Bach 2005: 61) for a proposal along these lines on behalf of the contextualist as a response to 
certain aspects of the objection from speech reports, in particular, that we seem happy to disquotationally 




These responses are possible. In the present dialectical context, however, they can be 
ignored. The basic reason is that, if we accept these responses, relativism will no longer 
have a bearing on the Contextualist Data. Let me elaborate. Clearly, the high standards 
bank cases neither involve a special institutional setting nor a philosopher who raises far-
fetched error-possibilities. More generally, these cases do not seem to describe situations 
that are particularly unlikely to obtain. Certainly, John cannot just take it for granted that 
the police officer wasn’t in a comparable situation. For example, it seems indeed quite 
likely that the whereabouts of the perpetrator were very important for the police officer. 
And it also seems quite likely that the reporters at the press conference questioned the 
evidence the police officer was presenting, thus making error-possibilities salient that 
John and Sally ignore. So, if the relativist wants to maintain that there is a relevant shift 
in epistemic standards between the bank cases, she cannot say that John can just take it 
for granted that there was no difference between his and the police officer’s epistemic 
standard. Thus, if the relativist wants to explain the Contextualist Data, she must reject 
the responses above. So, since we are considering relativism qua account of the 
Contextualist Data, these responses can be ignored. 
Sally Conveys that O equals J 
Here is an alternative strategy to motivate the idea that John is in a position to justify the 
belief that O equals J. One might want to say that John is in a position to justify that belief 
because Sally somehow conveys that O equals J. Again, this proposal could be 
implemented in various ways. For example, we could say that Sally conversationally 
implicates that O equals J. Alternatively, we could say that she conventionally implicates 
or presupposes this proposition. 
Even if we abstract away from the specific implementations of this proposal, however, a 
very general problem arises. Let’s stipulate that, in the Knowledge Testimony Case, the 
stakes at the press conference were very high and that the reporters had raised error-
possibilities that Sally and John do not consider. Given these stipulations, it should be the 
case that O does not equal J, in particular, O should now be significantly more demanding 
than J. Now suppose that, as stated above, Sally conveys that O equals J when she reports 
the police officer. It would follow that, in the situation just described, Sally’s report 
should sound misleading. For, her report would now convey a falsehood. I would think, 
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however, that Sally’s report would not sound misleading at all. To the contrary, it would 
sound just perfectly fine. So, the above account makes wrong predictions about the 
appropriateness of speech reports. 
That said, I fully agree that Sally’s report would indeed sound misleading if the police 
officer’s standard had been excessively high. Suppose, for example, that the police officer 
had been discussing skepticism. In such a case, a qualified report along the following 
lines would sound much more appropriate than Sally’s original report, “The police officer 
said that she didn’t know that the perpetrator would be in the building. But she also said 
that she didn’t know she has hands because she might be living in the Matrix. So, don’t 
bother.” But, even if Sally’s original report sounds weird when the police officer’s 
epistemic standard is assumed to be excessively high, it does not follow that it also sounds 
weird when the police officer’s epistemic standards is assumed to be high but not 
excessively high. 
Let me also note that I only want to maintain that a knowledge claim can be appropriately 
reported without qualification in cases where the reported knowledge claim is a denial 
and the reporting context is less demanding than the reported context (that is, cases such 
as the Knowledge Testimony Case). There are asymmetries depending on whether the 
reported claim is a knowledge ascription or a knowledge denial and on whether the 
reporting context is more demanding or less demanding than the reported context. 
DeRose  (2009: 170f), for example, argues that “in cases of large, noticeable, and 
important shifts in standards” unqualified speech reports seem wrong. However, the only 
case he considers to substantiate this thesis is one where a knowledge ascription is 
reported without qualification in a case where the reporting context is more demanding 
than the reported context. I agree with DeRose that, in such a case, the unqualified report 
would seem somewhat wrong. But I deny that this observation generalizes.13 
Sally Implicates that O equals J 
We now have a very general objection to the proposal just mentioned, according to which 
Sally conveys that O equals J. The proposal leads to further problems once we specify its 
                                                 
13  The asymmetries here seem closely linked to the idea that high-standards contexts are generally 
considered to be more “enlightened” contexts. See e.g. (Hawthorne 2004a: 164). More asymmetries of this 
kind will be discussed below. 
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details. Suppose, for example, that we want to hold that Sally conveys that O equals J in 
terms of a conversational implicature. Given this assumption, two further problems arise. 
The first problem is this. People are normally aware of what they implicate. Note the 
corresponding naturalness of the following exchanges where B’s first utterance has a 
certain implicature that A then makes explicit. 
A: Will you come to the party? 
B: I am sick. 
A: So, you mean that you won’t come? 
B: Exactly. 
A: Where does C live? 
B: Somewhere in the south of France. 
A: So, you don’t know where exactly? 
B: Right. 
Natural conversations of this type seem to be available for all kinds of implicatures. But 
now suppose that John were to make explicit the alleged implicature that J equals O of 
Sally’s report. The resulting dialogue would go as follows: 
Sally: The police officer said that, when she gave the order to storm the building, she 
didn’t know that the perpetrator would be in there. 
#John: So, you mean that 
 her epistemic standard was the same as ours? 
 the issue is as important for us as it was for her? 
 she didn’t consider potential mistakes we are not considering right now? 
#Sally: Exactly. 
John’s questions just as well as Sally’s response seem very weird. This makes it very 
unlikely that Sally should implicate that J equals O. 
The second problem is this. Implicatures are cancelable. However, even if Sally were to 
cancel the implicature that J equals O, John would still accept her testimony. In detail: 
Suppose that Sally would use one of the following claims to report the police officer. 
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Sally: Another failed operation would have meant the end of her career. Still, the 
police officer said that, when she gave the order to storm the building, she didn’t 
know that the perpetrator would be in there. 
Sally: In the course of a thorough evaluation of the evidence and its potential 
deficiencies, the police officer said that, when she gave the order to storm the 
building, she didn’t know that the perpetrator would be in there. 
I take it that, even if Sally were to use one of these sentences to report the police officer, 
it would still be appropriate for John to form the belief that the police officer didn’t know 
that P as a response. (In fact, I think that, intuitively at least, the information that the issue 
was important for the police officer or that the police officer thoroughly evaluated the 
evidence should give John even more reason to accept Sally’s testimony.) However, the 
sentences strongly suggest that the stakes or the error-possibilities relevant for the police 
officer were very different from John’s corresponding context features. Given that, they 
plausibly also suggest that the police officer’s epistemic standard was different. So, the 
implicature that the police officer’s epistemic standard was the same as John’s should be 
canceled. Thus, the implicature proposal cannot explain John’s reactions to these 
sentences. 
Sally Presupposes that O equals J 
One may think that at least the last problem does not arise when we assume that Sally 
conveys that O equals J not in terms of a conversational implicature but in terms of a 
presupposition. After all, presuppositions aren’t cancelable. 14  The presupposition 
proposal, however, leads to other problems. Baker (2012) collects a range of tests for the 
presence of a presupposition. The alleged presupposition that J equals O fails all these 
tests. Let’s briefly discuss them in turn. 
First, there is the “Hey, wait a minute!” test. According to this test, if “𝜋 is presupposed 
by S, then it makes sense for an audience previously unaware of 𝜋 to respond to an 
utterance of S by saying ‘Hey, wait a minute, I didn’t know that 𝜋.’” (Baker 2012: 117f) 
Example, 
                                                 




A: The mathematician who proved Goldbach’s Conjecture is a woman. 
B: Hey, wait a minute. I had no idea that someone proved Goldbach’s Conjecture. 
It seems clear that our present putative presupposition fails that test. For, the following 
dialogue wouldn’t seem to make sense, 
Sally: The police officer said that, when she gave the order to storm the building, she 
didn’t know that the perpetrator would be in there. 
#John: Hey, wait a minute. I had no idea that 
 the police officer’s epistemic standard was the same as ours. 
 the issue was as important for her as it is for us now. 
 she didn’t consider potential mistakes we are not considering right now. 
Second, there is the “… and what’s more …” test. According to this test, if “S generates 
a presupposition that 𝜋, then it is infelicitous to follow S up with ‘… and what’s more, 
𝜋,’ or ‘and what’s more, S*’ where S* contains no more information than the conjunction 
of S and 𝜋.” (Baker 2012: 118) Example, 
#A: Sarah regrets smoking last night. And what’s more, she smoked last night. 
Again, the putative presupposition that J equals O fails that test. It seems perfectly 
felicitous for Sally to say, 
Sally:  The police officer said that when she gave the order to storm the building she 
didn’t know that the perpetrator would be in there. And what’s more, 
 her epistemic standard was the same as ours. 
 the issue was as important for her as it is for us now. 
 she didn’t consider potential mistakes we are not considering right now.15 
                                                 
15 Admittedly, there may well be something puzzling about Sally’s above claims in that I wouldn’t be 
surprised if ordinary speakers just couldn’t make sense of why Sally would want to communicate that, say, 
the issue was as important for the police officer as it is for her and John. They might well not see the 
relevance of this claim. This, however, is clearly not the kind of infelicity we are looking for. The above 
utterance by A is certainly not infelicitous because one fails to see the relevance of the “what’s more” claim. 
Rather, something (which is clearly relevant) is presented “as if it were new information” (Baker 2012: 
119) even though it has been presupposed already in the foregoing sentence. 
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Third, there is the awkward cancellation test. According to this test, if “I assert S and 
presuppose 𝜋, then an immediate denial of 𝜋 makes my collective utterance puzzling.” 
(Baker 2012: 119) Example, 
#A: John has stopped leaving towels on the floor, although he never left towels on the 
floor. 
But compare, 
Sally: The police officer said that when she gave the order to storm the building she 
didn’t know that the perpetrator would be in there. But 
 her epistemic standard wasn’t the same as ours. 
 the issue was more important for her than it is for us now. 
 she considered potential mistakes we are not considering right now. 
These utterances don’t seem particularly puzzling. So, again, our presupposition fails the 
awkward cancelation test.16 (Given that conventional implicatures are not cancellable 
either, this last problem also arises if we hold that Sally conveys that O equals J in terms 
of a conventional implicature.) 
Sally’s Report Shifts the Epistemic Standard 
Here is the final potential response to the effect that John is in a position to justify the 
belief that J equals O. One might want to argue that, as soon as a knowledge claim is 
reported, the epistemic standard of the reporting context adapts (or at least may adapt) to 
the epistemic standard of the reported context. This would mean that, in virtue of Sally’s 
report, John’s epistemic standard, J, changes and becomes identical to the police officer’s 
standard, O. One could now say that John will be in a position to justify the belief that J 
equals O because he is aware of this context-shifting mechanism.17 
                                                 
16 Again, Sally’s claims may be somewhat puzzling because the relevance of the denial of the putative 
presupposition may remain unclear. As before, though, this is clearly not the kind of puzzlement involved 
in cases where a presupposition is denied. In these cases, we are certainly not puzzled because we don’t see 
the relevance of the denial of the presupposition but rather because there seems to be a tension between the 
denial of the presupposition and what has been said before. 
17 Cohen (2005b: 203) suggests a similar proposal on behalf of the epistemic contextualist as a response to 
the speech report objection. 
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The difference between this proposal and the proposals above can be brought out as 
follows. The proposals above have it that John’s epistemic standard is the same before 
and after Sally’s report. Before and after the report, the epistemic standard is very 
undemanding. They go on to argue that, through Sally’s report, John comes to be in a 
position to justify the belief that the police officer’s epistemic standard also was very 
undemanding. Thus, they conclude, John is in a position to justify the belief that his and 
the police officer’s epistemic standard are the same. The present proposal, however, says 
the following. John’s epistemic standard is not the same before and after Sally’s report. 
Before Sally’s report, it is very undemanding. After Sally’s report, it is identical to the 
epistemic standard of the police officer, whatever the police officer’s epistemic standard 
was. Correspondingly, John does not come to be in a position to justify the belief that his 
and the police officer’s epistemic standard are the same because he learns that the police 
officer’s epistemic standard was as undemanding as his. Instead, he comes to be in a 
position to justify that belief because he is aware of the fact that Sally’s report has changed 
his epistemic standard in such a way that it equals the police officer’s epistemic standard, 
whatever this standard was. 
There is an immediate problem with this proposal. The proposal allows us to claim that 
John is in a position to justify the belief that his epistemic standard (after Sally’s report) 
is the same as the police officer’s. Correspondingly, it allows the relativist to say that it 
would be appropriate for John to form the belief that the police officer didn’t know that 
P after hearing Sally’s report. However, it implausibly entails that John should abandon 
this belief as soon as he moves on to a conversation where no context-shifting occurred 
and the epistemic standard is undemanding. Let me elaborate. 
Even given the above proposal, John has no clue whether the police officer’s epistemic 
standard was demanding or undemanding (as indicated in the second to last paragraph). 
So, John would not be in a position to justify the belief that it is true relative to an 
undemanding epistemic standard that the police officer didn’t know that P. (For all that 
John knows, the police officer may fail to know only relative to a very demanding 
standard.) Hence, given the relativistic justification norm, John must abandon the belief 
that the police officer didn’t know that P once he finds himself in a context where the 
epistemic standard is undemanding (and no context-shifting occurs). This, however, 
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seems like a very implausible prediction. Suppose, for example, that, subsequent to the 
discussion with Sally, John joins the neighboring table where a discussion is raging about 
the police officer’s conduct. In this situation, it would seem perfectly fine for John to 
think to himself, “The police officer didn’t even know that P!” Relatedly, John would not 
start worrying that the police officer’s epistemic standard may have differed from the 
epistemic standard that governs his new conversation.18 
2.6. Concluding Remarks 
To conclude, let me raise a very general challenge for the relativist who wants to adopt 
one of the above responses to my objection in spite of the problems just pointed out. We 
have seen that all of the above responses mimic strategies that contextualists have 
employed to respond to the challenges from speech reports and disagreement. So, if the 
relativist defends and employs these strategies herself, she will thereby at least partly 
undermine her position vis-à-vis the contextualist, who should now be allowed to employ 
these strategies as well. To what extent the relativist position is undermined will depend 
on the particular strategy she adopts and how much weight must be put on the data that 
she thereby grants to the contextualist. It may be an open question whether such a 
discussion would yield problematic results. However, I take it to be on the relativist to 
show that it would not. Less cautiously put, the (ITD) is not a random datum the relativist 
fails to predict. Rather, the (ITD) seems to be just another manifestation of the invariantist 
pull (already familiar in terms of disagreement and speech report data) that contextualism 
allegedly fails to accommodate and relativism is designed to explain. Thus, insofar as the 
relativist starts piling on the epicycles to deal with the (ITD), the suspicion arises that she 
hasn’t gotten to the heart of the problem in the first place. Relativism begins to seem like 
a treatment of only some of the symptoms of a much deeper rooted disease. If we want to 
take seriously the pull towards invariantism, it seems, we should go for genuinely 
invariantistic positions, according to which not only the proposition expressed by 
knowledge claims remains constant but also their truth-value. We will turn to such views 
in the following chapters. Before that, however, let me pick up some loose ends. 
                                                 
18 Bach (2005: 61) suggests that there is a similar worry for the contextualist who wants to employ the 
context-shifting strategy to explain speech reports. 
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Appendix 1: Scope Limitations 
In this appendix, I want to briefly indicate why I present the above objection as an 
objection to epistemic relativism but neither to other forms of relativism (such as 
relativism about taste) nor to epistemic contextualism. 
I present the objection as an objection to epistemic relativism because I don’t think it 
applies in other domains where relativism has been proposed. In particular, I don’t think 
we obtain data like the (ITD) in these other domains. Consider, for example, the case of 
taste. Taste relativists claim that sentences like “This is tasty” express propositions that 
have truth-values only relative to the taste of a given speaker (or a given group of 
speakers). Thus, analogous to the knowledge case above, taste relativists must hold that 
it would be inappropriate for John to come to believe that the food at the Indian place is 
tasty when Sally says, “My sister said the food there is tasty.” But, as indicated already, 
this prediction is borne out precisely by the data: It seems to be a plain fact that John 
cannot appropriately form that belief. Similar considerations may hold for other domains 
where relativism has been applied. Consider, for example, the case of ethics. I take it that 
it happens only very rarely that we come to believe that a certain action is good merely 
because someone (is said to have) said that the action is good. Thus, again, moral 
relativism would make the right predictions. It is unclear to me whether similar 
observations carry over to all other domains where relativism has been proposed. The 
given examples, however, should suffice to make my point. 
Let’s now turn to the question of why I present the objection only as an objection to 
epistemic relativism but not contextualism. There are two related reasons for this. First, 
even given that my objection applies to relativism, it seems quite difficult to evaluate 
whether it also applies to contextualism. For, we would first have to know how the 
contextualist treats knowledge sentences when embedded under “said that” and “believes 
that” operators. For example, the contextualist would have to tell us which proposition 
Sally is supposed to express when she reports, “The police officer said that she didn’t 
know that P.” One possibility would be that she expresses the proposition that the police 
officer said that she didn’t know relative to Sally’s epistemic standard that P. Another 
possibility would be that she expresses the proposition that the police officer said that she 
didn’t know relative to the police officer’s epistemic standard that P. Similar problems 
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arise when we try to understand the (ITD), according to which it would be appropriate 
for John to form the belief that the police officer didn’t know that P. Again, the 
contextualist would have to tell us how she thinks the knowledge sentence behaves once 
embedded under the “believes that” operator. These questions are difficult to answer.19 
Still, it should be apparent that they have to be answered before we can evaluate whether 
the above objection applies to contextualism. Second, I am not at all sure whether it would 
be an interesting result if the above objection did apply to epistemic contextualism. For, 
I am not at all sure that an objection along these lines would add any further complications 
to the already familiar objections from disagreement and speech reports.20 
Appendix 2: The Case Design 
In this appendix, I will briefly explain the design of the Knowledge Testimony Case. So 
far, I have only stated that the following three aspects of the Knowledge Testimony Case 
are crucial for my case against relativism. First, the Knowledge Testimony Case involves 
indirect as opposed to direct testimony. Second, what the police officer said is a negated 
knowledge claim. Third, Sally and John find themselves in a low standards situation 
where nothing is at stake and no error-possibilities are salient. In what follows, I will 
explain why these aspects are crucial. 
Consider, first, the fact that the Knowledge Testimony Case involves indirect as opposed 
to direct testimony. The reason for this is that relativists may be in a position to explain 
cases of direct testimony. To see this, let’s modify the Knowledge Testimony Case so that 
it involves direct testimony. In particular, let’s assume that Sally had herself endorsed the 
police officer’s claim by saying something along the following lines, “There was some 
evidence that the perpetrator would be in the building. But, when she gave the order to 
                                                 
19 For further discussion of contextualism and the problem of embedded knowledge sentences, see e.g. 
(Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009: Ch. 2). 
20 I should note here that, as argued in (MacFarlane 2005a), subject-sensitive invariantism may also get into 
trouble once it is embedded into a theory of testimony. The problem described in the aforementioned paper, 
however, seems to be different from the problem discussed in the present chapter. In particular, I don’t 
think that we can derive an objection to subject-sensitive invariantism on the basis of the (ITD). The basic 
reason for this is that the proponent of subject-sensitive invariantism need not relativize the justification 
norm discussed above in any way. She can just accept the standard formulation we started out with (or, 
maybe more plausibly, the first modified version, where we acknowledged a certain variability in the level 
of justification required for appropriate belief). Given this norm, we get a straightforward account of the 
(ITD) once we accept the plausible principle that, at least when our interlocutors are sincere and well-
informed, testimony to the effect that p justifies us (at least to the degree relevant for John in the Knowledge 
Testimony Case) in believing that p. 
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storm the building, the police officer didn’t know that the perpetrator would be in there.” 
As before, I take it, we obtain the (ITD): It would be appropriate for John to form the 
belief that the police officer didn’t know that P in response to Sally’s claim. (This should 
be even clearer than in the case of indirect testimony.) This time, however, it is not at all 
clear whether the relativist cannot explain this datum. For example, it may be possible for 
the relativist to explain the datum as follows. Given that John considers Sally well-
informed, it seems reasonable for him to assume that the she didn’t make a mistaken when 
she said that the police officer didn’t know that P. Thus, it seems reasonable for John to 
assume that it is true relative to Sally’s epistemic standard that the police officer didn’t 
know that P. It does not trivially follow that it is also true relative to John’s epistemic 
standard that the police officer didn’t know that P. But it is at least an option for the 
relativist to adopt what DeRose calls a “single scoreboard semantics.” On this view, 
“there is a single scoreboard in a given conversation” and the epistemic standard of each 
participant of the conversation is determined by the epistemic standard registered on this 
conversational scoreboard.21 Given this view, Sally and John necessarily have the same 
epistemic standard because they participate in the same conversation. Thus, John can infer 
that it is true relative to his epistemic standard that the police officer didn’t know that P 
from his arguably justified belief that it is true relative to Sally’s epistemic standard that 
the police officer didn’t know that P. Hence, there is at least a case to be made that, even 
according to relativism, John can happily form the belief that the police officer didn’t 
know that P. 
Admittedly, the single scoreboard view is not entirely uncontroversial.22 So, it is not 
entirely clear whether the relativist can adopt the above response strategy after all. 
However, this is not the place to adjudicate on the single scoreboard view. So, I will just 
grant this view to the relativist and, thus, grant as well that the relativist can explain cases 
of direct testimony. For those who reject the single scoreboard view, the problem for the 
relativist discussed in this chapter may arise already in the case of direct testimony. 
Whether the problem in fact arises will presumably depend on what exactly one proposes 
as the alternative to the single scoreboard view. But this is a topic for another occasion. 
                                                 
21 See (DeRose 2009: 135). 
22 See e.g. (DeRose 2009: Ch. 4) for further discussion. 
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Let’s now turn to the question of why Sally is reporting a negated knowledge claim and 
why John and Sally find themselves in a low standards context. The Knowledge 
Testimony Case is designed in this way because, again, I don’t think the above objection 
goes through if we change the scenario in one of these respects. More specifically, some 
of these changes will make the (ITD) disappear, others leave the (ITD) intact but allow 
the relativist to explain this datum. Let me elaborate. 
In the original Knowledge Testimony Case, John finds himself in a context with very low 
standards. No error-possibilities and no heightened stakes are mentioned. The situation 
of the police officer, on the other hand, is open. Her context may well have been more 
demanding. Furthermore, Sally reports a knowledge denial. In this constellation, it seems 
natural for John to accept Sally’s indirect testimony and, thus, we obtain the (ITD). But 
let’s turn the situation around. Suppose John finds himself in a high standards situation 
and Sally reports a knowledge ascription. Consider, for example, the following scenario. 
John is scrutinizing the evidence that led to the storming of the building. There is a photo 
where you can see the shape of a person in one of the windows. John considers the 
possibility that the shape is just a cardboard cutout and concludes that the police officer 
didn’t know that the perpetrator would be in the building. Now reporter Sally comes 
along. She says, “You know, I was just talking to the police officer in the pub. She said 
that she knew that the perpetrator would be in the building.” It seems quite clear that, in 
response to this contention, John will not form the belief that the police officer did know 
that the perpetrator would be in the building. Instead, he would most likely react by asking 
whether the police officer considered the possibility that the shape in the window was just 
a cardboard cutout. In this case, then, we don’t obtain a datum like the (ITD). Hence, 
relativism seems to make the right predictions. 
So far, we have considered a case where John finds himself in a low standards situation 
and Sally reports a knowledge denial and a case where John finds himself in a high 
standards context and Sally reports a knowledge ascription. What if we let Sally report a 
knowledge ascription in the low standards case and a knowledge denial in the high 
standards case? I take it that, in both cases, John could happily come to believe that the 
police officer knew or didn’t know that P respectively (other than in the high standards 
case considered in the previous paragraph). Thus, in both cases, we would obtain a datum 
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like the (ITD). But I also think that these data are unproblematic for the relativist. Let’s 
consider the low standards case in detail. 
Suppose that John finds himself in a low standards context and Sally reports, “The police 
officer said that she knew that the perpetrator would be in the building.” As I said, I take 
it that John could happily come to believe that the police officer knew that P in response 
to this claim. However, the relativist has a straightforward explanation for that. It goes as 
follows. Analogous to the original Knowledge Testimony Case, John is in a position to 
justify the belief that the police officer knew-O that P on the basis of Sally’s report that 
the police officer said that she knew that P. Given that John’s epistemic standard, J, is 
assumed to be very low, the police officer’s standard, O, presumably was equally or more 
demanding than his. Correspondingly, knowledge-O presumably entails knowledge-J. 
Thus, John can derive that the police officer knew-J that P from his already justified belief 
that the police officer knew-O that P. Hence, even given relativism, it is perfectly fine for 
John to form the belief that police officer knew that P in the present scenario. Analogous 
considerations hold for the high standards case where a knowledge denial is reported. So, 
again, these cases cannot be used to get the above objection going. The situation is 
summarized in the tables below. 
data low high 
ascription   
denial   
Table 1: Data concerning the question of whether John can appropriately form the belief 
that the police officer knew/didn't know that P in response to Sally's respective indirect 
testimony depending on whether John finds himself in a low or a high standards situation. 
predictions low high 
ascription   
denial   
Table 2: Relativist predictions concerning the question of whether John can appropriately 
form the belief that the police officer knew/didn't know that P in response to Sally's 





3. Moderate Pragmatic Invariantism 
Remember the bank cases and the corresponding Contextualist Data. In the bank cases, 
Hannah and Sarah wonder whether Bill knows that the bank will be open on the next 
Saturday. Bill has just informed Hannah on the phone that he was at the bank two weeks 
ago on a Saturday and that the bank was open then. Now the question is whether Hannah 
can truly ascribe or deny knowledge to Bill. The Contextualist Data say that the answer 
to this question depends on Hannah’s context. In the high standards cases (where much 
is at stake and Sarah mentions the error-possibility that the bank has changed its hours) 
Hannah can truly say “Bill doesn’t know that the bank will be open.” In the low standards 
cases (where not much is at stake and no error-possibility is mentioned) Hannah can truly 
say “Bill knows that the bank will be open.” The respective negations seem false.  
In the previous chapter, I have rejected the relativist account of these data. In the next two 
chapters, I will discuss and reject the pragmatic invariantist account. Just like the 
relativist, a pragmatic invariantist endorses invariantism to explain the Invariantist Data 
(the data about disagreement and speech reports). However, to account for the 
Contextualist Data, she appeals to pragmatically conveyed contents, in particular, 
conversational implicatures, instead of relative truth-values.1 The basic idea is that we 
evaluate the knowledge claims in the bank cases differently depending on whether they 
occur in the low or the high standards cases because they implicate different propositions 
in these respective contexts. Let me spell out this view in a little more detail. 
Pragmatic invariantism comes in different guises depending on how demanding the 
knowledge relation invariantly expressed by “knows” is considered to be. In this chapter, 
I will be concerned with what I will call moderate pragmatic invariantism (MPI). 
According to this view, “knows” invariably expresses an undemanding relation such that 
                                                 
1 In principle, pragmatic invariantists could appeal to other kinds of pragmatically conveyed contents (such 
as conventional implicatures or semantic presuppositions). So far as I can see, such views haven’t been 
defended. Still, they are criticized and rejected in (Leite 2005: Sec. 2.2.1), (Fantl and McGrath 2007: 585ff) 
and (Blome-Tillmann 2013b: Sec. 6). Another potential form of pragmatic invariantism that will not be the 
direct target of my discussion is the view defended in (Pritchard 2010). This view seeks to explain the 
contextual variation of knowledge claims not on the basis of implicatures but on the basis of context-
sensitive norms of assertion. Some of the subsequent objections may carry over to this version of pragmatic 
invariantism. But I will not address this issue here. 
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the knowledge ascriptions in the bank cases turn out to express a truth, while the 
knowledge denials turn out to express a falsity. For the proponent of MPI, it is relatively 
straightforward to explain the data about the low standards cases, that is, why the 
knowledge ascription in the low standards cases seems true, while the denial seems false. 
For, these data just reflect the truth-values of the propositions the respective knowledge 
claims express according to MPI. It is a challenge for the proponent of MPI, however, to 
explain the data about the high standards cases. For, when confronted with these 
scenarios, we tend to say that the knowledge ascription is false and the knowledge denial 
is true, contrary to the truth-value of the propositions allegedly expressed by these claims. 
A proponent of MPI endorses the following response to this challenge. The knowledge 
ascription in the high standards cases seems false because it implicates a falsity. 
Correspondingly, the knowledge denial in the high standards cases seems true because it 
implicates a truth. What is the content of these respective implicatures? We need not settle 
on a specific answer to this question for the purposes at hand. But one candidate idea 
would be that the knowledge ascription in the high standards cases implicates the falsity 
that Bill can rule out the salient alternative that the bank has changed its hours, while the 
knowledge denial in the high standards cases implicates the truth that Bill cannot rule out 
this alternative. The position is summarized in the table below.2 
MPI what is said what is implicated 
“Bill knows that the 
bank will be open.” 
(as uttered in the high 
standards cases) 
Bill knows that the bank 
will be open. 
Bill can rule out the 
salient alternative that 
the bank has changed its 
hours (e.g.). 
true false 
“Bill doesn’t know that 
the bank will be open.” 
(as uttered in the high 
standards cases) 
Bill doesn’t know that 
the bank will be open. 
Bill cannot rule out the 
salient alternative that 
the bank has changed its 
hours (e.g.). 
false true 
Table 3: A schematic depiction of the commitments of MPI. To be precise, the table presents only what I will 
call “the semantic/pragmatic thesis” of MPI. See below. 
                                                 




In the present chapter, I will argue that MPI, as just defined, should be rejected. To 
structure the discussion, it is useful to split up MPI into the following two subtheses. On 
the one hand, MPI entails that the knowledge ascription in the high standards cases 
expresses a truth but implicates a falsity and, correspondingly, that the knowledge denial 
in the high standards cases expresses a falsity but implicates a truth (see Table 3). Let’s 
refer to this claim as the semantic/pragmatic thesis. This thesis by itself does not yield an 
account of the data about the high standards cases. It yields such an account only in 
combination with a very general claim to the effect that truth-value judgments often track 
the truth-value of the implicatures of the claim in question. More specifically, proponents 
of MPI must endorse a thesis along the following lines. There is at least a subclass of 
implicatures to which the alleged implicatures in the bank cases belong such that, if a 
claim has a false implicature of this sort, then the claim seems false (even if it expresses 
a truth) and, if a claim has true implicature of this sort, then the claim seems true (even if 
it expresses a falsity). Let’s refer to this principle as the bridging thesis (because it bridges 
the gap between the semantic/pragmatic thesis and the data about the high standards 
cases). Now, the structure of the present chapter is as follows. 
First, I will introduce a distinction between two kinds of implicatures, namely, the 
distinction between what I will call additive and substitutional implicatures. Second, I 
will argue that, if the proponent of MPI appeals to additive implicatures in her account of 
the data about the high standards cases, then the corresponding bridging thesis turns out 
to be mistaken. Third, I will argue that, if the proponent of MPI appeals to substitutional 
implicatures in her account of the data about the high standards cases, then the 
corresponding semantic/pragmatic thesis turns out to be mistaken (though the relevant 
bridging thesis may be correct). The basic idea in this latter context will be that the 
implicatures posited by the proponent of MPI are not properly calculable if they are 
construed as substitutional implicatures. The upshot of these considerations is that, 
whether the proponent of MPI appeals to additive or to substitutional implicatures, at least 
one of the claims that make up her view turns out to be mistaken. Given that the distinction 
between substitutional and additive implicatures is exhaustive, we can thus conclude that 
MPI is mistaken.  
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3.1. Conversational Implicatures: Additive and Substitutional 
In this section, I will briefly elaborate on the notion of a conversational implicature to 
then introduce the distinction between additive and substitutional implicatures. The 
distinction should be relatively uncontroversial. It is a distinction, however, that is rarely 
made explicit. So, let me spend some paragraphs on laying it out.3 
To begin with, let us get clear about what conversational implicatures, for short, just 
implicatures, are. I will not attempt to provide a general definition here. Instead, let me 
state three principles that should fairly uncontroversially apply, if not to implicatures in 
general, then at least to those implicatures that are supposed to play a role in the bank 
cases.4 First, the conversational implicatures of a given utterance are contents the speaker 
wants her audience to come to believe by making the utterance, for short, they are contents 
the speaker wants to convey (or, even shorter, conveys). Second, conversational 
implicatures are distinct from what is said (and other semantically encoded information 
such as conventional implicatures and semantic presuppositions).5 Third (and relatedly), 
conversational implicatures are calculable, that is, roughly, it must be possible for ones 
audience to “calculate” or “work out” their presence on the basis of the assumption that 
the speaker cooperatively engages in the conversation at hand (more on this below).6 For 
example, suppose I utter “I am sick” in response to your question of whether I will come 
to your party. I will thereby conversationally implicate that I will not come to your party. 
Correspondingly, this is something I want to convey without saying it. And my audience 
will normally be able to work out that this is something I want to convey because, very 
roughly, they will realize that, in the present context, my contribution makes most sense 
on this assumption. So much for the general notion of an implicature. 
                                                 
3 The labels “additive” and “substitutional” are taken from (Meibauer 2009: 374), where these terms are 
used in passing to mark a distinction that corresponds to the distinction I want to draw in this section. 
Bach’s (1994) distinction between what he calls “implicatures” and “non-literal contents” also seems to 
correspond to my distinction between additive and substitutional implicatures. 
4 For a more complete discussion of the notion of a conversational implicature, see e.g. (Grice 1989), 
(Levinson 1983) and (Blome-Tillmann 2013a). All of the subsequent examples are taken from one or 
another of these publications. 
5 It is a consequence of this, I take it, that, at least in general, implicatures can be canceled. Cancelability, 
however, will not play a role in the discussion to come. So, I don’t include it in the above list. 
6 Note that Davis (2007: 413), a proponent of a skeptical version of pragmatic invariantism, rejects the last 
assumption. However, note also that, first, calculability won’t play a role in my case against skeptical 
versions of pragmatic invariantism. And, second, that Davis’ concerns are far from universally shared. See 
e.g. (Blome-Tillmann 2013a: 176f) for what seems to be a promising response to these concerns. 
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Here is the distinction between additive and substitutional implicatures. A given utterance 
has an additive implicature if it says one thing, implicates another and is used to convey 
both of these claims. For example, suppose I utter “I am sick” in response to your question 
whether I will come to your party, thereby saying that I am sick and implicating that I 
will not come to your party.  This is a case of an additive implicature. For, I will most 
naturally intend to convey both that I am sick and that I will not come to your party by 
making my assertion; I will most naturally want you to come to believe both these 
propositions. Similarly, when I respond to your question “Where does Frankie live?” by 
saying “Somewhere in the south of France,” I will say that Frankie lives somewhere in 
the south of France, implicate that I have no more specific information and most naturally 
convey both propositions at once (assuming that more specific information would be 
relevant in the conversation at hand). 
A given utterance has a substitutional implicature if it says one thing, implicates another 
but conveys solely the implicature. Suppose, for example, that I utter “The plane was a 
mile long.” What I say here is that the relevant plane was literally a mile long. What I 
most likely convey, however, is only that the plane was huge (I do not want you to come 
to believe that the plane was literally a mile long by making my assertion). So, this is a 
case of a substitutional implicature. Similarly, suppose I say “Either John will come or he 
won’t.” What I say here is that John will or will not come, what I most likely convey, 
however, is only that, say, there’s nothing we can do about John’s absence. As before, I 
do not want you to come to believe that John will or will not come by making my 
assertion. (To the contrary, I will most likely presume that you antecedently believe that 
this is so and, thus, are able to figure out that I want to convey something more 
informative.)7 
This is the distinction between additive and substitutional implicatures. Given this 
distinction, we can ask: Are the implicatures posited by the proponent of MPI supposed 
to be additive or substitutional? In what follows, I will argue that, on either assumption, 
MPI must be rejected. In particular, I will argue, first, that, if we assume that the 
                                                 
7 I should note that, here, I don’t follow Grice (1989: 87) in his assumption that everything that is said must 
also be conveyed (or, in Gricean terms, “meant”). For Grice, cases of substitutional implicatures would be 
cases where speakers only “make as if to say” (1989: 34). It seems very common, though, not to follow 
Grice in this respect. See e.g. (Bach 1994: 143). 
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implicatures in question are additive, then the bridging thesis cannot be sustained 
(according to which, roughly, truth-value judgments are often guided by the truth-value 
of implicatures). Second, I will argue that, if we assume that the implicatures in question 
are substitutional, then the semantic/pragmatic thesis cannot be sustained (according to 
which, roughly, Hannah’s knowledge claims in the bank cases have the relevant 
implicatures). The basic reason for this latter claim will be that the implicatures posited 
by MPI cannot be calculated in the way in which substitutional implicatures are 
calculated. 
3.2. Additive Implicatures and Seeming Truth-Values 
Let’s assume that the implicatures appealed to by the proponent of MPI are supposed to 
be additive. In what follows, I will argue that, given this assumption, the bridging thesis 
entailed by MPI cannot be sustained. Recall what the bridging thesis amounts to: There 
is at least a subclass of implicatures to which the alleged implicatures in the bank cases 
belong such that, if a claim has a false implicature of this sort, then it seems false and, if 
a claim has true implicature of this sort, then it seems true. First, I will discuss the first 
part of the bridging thesis (according to which, roughly, a claim can seem false because 
it has a false implicature). I will argue that, when construed in terms of additive 
implicatures, this thesis may not be clearly wrong. Still, it is far from clear that it is true. 
Second, I will discuss the second part of the bridging thesis (according to which, roughly, 
a claim can seem true just because it has a true implicature). I will argue that this thesis 
is clearly wrong when construed in terms of additive implicatures. 
Before we start, let me note that many authors just assume the first part of the bridging 
thesis. Even DeRose says that “a true assertion will be inappropriate, and may seem false, 
if it generates a false implicature” (2009: 114, my emphasis).8 But why should we believe 
that this is so? Consider the above example again where you ask me whether I will come 
to the party. Suppose I am indeed sick but plan to (and will) come to the party anyway. 
Will not my claim “I am sick” seem true even if it now has the false additive implicature 
that I won’t come to your party? 
                                                 




Alan Hazlett seeks to respond to this challenge by presenting the following two cases. 
You know Katie didn’t drive drunk last night. Slanderous Sammy is telling everyone: “Katie got 
drunk and drove home.” “That’s a lie!”, you say, and it does seem to you that Sammy is speaking 
falsely. (Indeed, you think to yourself: Katie didn’t get drunk and drive home! She drove home 
and got drunk.) But in fact it’s true that Katie got drunk and drove home, just not in that order. 
You pull into a small town, your tank almost empty, and ask a local if there is a gas station nearby. 
“There’s a gas station around the corner” he says, and directs you to it. But when you get there it 
turns out the gas station has been closed for years. You think to yourself: that local lied to me! 
He then goes on to say about these cases: 
You intuit that Sammy and the local spoke falsely, but they didn’t—their utterances were merely 
infelicitous. (Hazlett 2009: 610) 
Let’s focus on the case of Slanderous Sammy. I am inclined to agree that, in a given 
conversation, we would be prone to respond to the claim “Katie got drunk and drove 
home” by saying “That’s false! (It was the other way round.)” But does this suffice to 
establish the bridging thesis under discussion? 
I don’t think so. The bridging thesis under discussion says, roughly, that claims can seem 
false when they have a false implicature. How should we understand the idea that a given 
claim “seems false” in this context? We cannot understand it as the thesis that, in the 
context of a given conversation, we would react to the claim by saying “That’s false!” 
Instead, we must understand it as the thesis that we would judge the claim to be false if 
the claim was presented in the context of a scenario description that settles all the relevant 
facts. After all, the proponent of MPI is trying to explain the Contextualist Data. And 
these are data not about how we react to knowledge claims in a given conversation but 
when confronted with these claims in the context of a scenario description that 
(supposedly) settles all the relevant facts. So, Hazlett’s example is a good one only if we 
would judge Slanderous Sammy’s claim to be false, not only when confronted with it in 
the context of a given conversation, but also when it is embedded into a case description 
that settles all the relevant fact. This does not seem to be the case, however. Consider the 
following case description. 
Katie drove home. Then she got drunk. Slanderous Sammy is telling everyone, “Katie 
got drunk and drove home.” 
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Suppose now that we asked whether Slanderous Sammy’s claim is true. Grice at least 
claims, after discussing a range of similar examples, that “most people would, I think, on 
reflection have a more or less strong inclination to say that to apply the word or phrase 
[in question] would be to say something true […], however misleading it would be to 
apply the word or phrase thus.” (Grice 1989: 9)9 I fully agree with Grice on this point. If 
I am correct, Hazlett’s example cannot be used to underwrite the bridging principle 
required for the truth of MPI.10 
Now, it may well be that Hazlett would just deny my (and Grice’s) verdicts. And, if so, it 
is not entirely clear how to adjudicate who’s correct. However, it seems at least plausible 
that our dispute ultimately comes down to the question of what competent speakers in 
general would say about cases like the one just described. To answer this question, it 
seems reasonable to consult empirical studies. The results of such studies, however, are 
squarely on my side. Larson et al. (2009a) conducted experiments just like the one just 
proposed for the conjunction case above. But only about 25% of their subjects judged the 
conjunction to be false. So, at least in general, people do not seem to share Hazlett’s 
judgments. Consequently, it would seem dubious at least to use his case to underwrite the 
bridging thesis under discussion.11 
                                                 
9 See (Blome-Tillmann 2013b: 4313n) for the same verdict. 
10 One may wonder why our verdicts in a conversation differ from our verdicts about claims embedded in 
a case description. I do not have a specific theory to offer. To me, it just seems clear that there is such a 
difference. And this should suffice to make my point. Still, let me indicate two possible starting points for 
an account of why there is a difference. One idea might be that, by stating the facts that make the relevant 
claim literally true in the case description, we somehow prime readers on the literal content. Thus, they 
evaluate the literal content when asked for the truth-value of the claim in question.  In a conversation, no 
such priming occurs. Thus, speakers may be more liberal in their evaluations. Another idea could be that a 
use of “That’s false” in a conversation may be acceptable even though it is literally false because it can be 
used to convey that the claim in question only conveyed something false. For example, if it is obvious that 
the claim in question is true, the speaker can count on the hearers to figure out that a use of “That’s false” 
is only meant to convey that the claim in question conveyed something false. When people are presented 
with a case description, however, they will, I take it, assume that precision is required. Thus, they will say 
“That’s false” about a given claim only if, strictly speaking, the claim in question is false. Both of these 
account sketches would have to be spelled out in much more detail to be properly evaluable. This, however, 
is a topic for another occasion. 
11 Let me describe the just quoted study in some more detail. The precise question the participants of the 
study were asked was “Given the FACT, the underlined sentence is true/false?” In our conjunction case, 
the “FACT” would be the sentences stating that Katie first drove home and then got drunk. The “underlined 
sentence” in our case would be Slanderous Sammy’s claim, “Katie got drunk and drove home.” See (Larson 
et al. 2009a: Sec. 4.3.3). To be precise, this was only one of three related questions the subjects were asked. 
Another question they were asked was whether the sentence was “literally” true or false. Yet another 
question they were asked was whether the fictitious character “Literal Lucy” would say the sentence is true 
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Maybe there are other cases. For example, it has been suggested that, in many cases of 
so-called scalar implicatures, we intuitively judge claims to be false just because of their 
false implicatures.12 Here are some examples that have been used (where “+>” precedes 
the relevant implicatures). 
Gradable Adjectives: A likes B. +> A doesn’t love B.13 
Quantifiers: Some Fs are Gs. +> Not all Fs are Gs.14 
Cardinals: A has two rackets. +> A doesn’t have more than two rackets.15 
In all these cases, it is claimed, we may intuitively judge the relevant claim to be false 
even if only its implicature is false. Again, I grant that we may judge these claims to be 
false in the context of a given conversation. The question at issue, however, is whether 
we would judge them to be false once they are embedded into a case description of the 
relevant sort. As before the results from (Larson et al. 2009a: Sec. 5.2) are extremely 
helpful when it comes to this latter question. Only 12% of their subjects judged the claims 
involving gradable adjectives to be false in the context of a corresponding case 
description. Similarly, only 33% judged the quantifier claims to be false. But, 
                                                 
or false. (Literal Lucy is previously described to them as, roughly, a person who tends to take everything 
too literally.) See (Larson et al. 2009a: Sec. 4.3.1 and 4.3.2). The 25% mentioned above are the median 
percentage of people who said that the sentence in the conjunction case was false across all question types 
just described. See (Larson et al. 2009a: Sec. 5.2). Unfortunately, Larson et al. do not provide the numbers 
only for the first question type (which would be of primary interest here). But their Figure 2 indicates that 
the differences between the question types were relatively small. 
It may be worried that, by asking about the truth-value of a given sentence (as opposed to, say, a claim, an 
utterance, etc.) the subjects were specifically directed to evaluate only the literal content of the claims in 
question. It would be no wonder, then, that their evaluations are unaffected by implicatures. To obtain data 
relevant for the explanation of the Contextualist Data, it might be argued, we would have to ask the subjects 
whether they consider the claim (or the utterance, etc.) in question to be true. First of all, though, I see no 
reason to accept this thesis. I would be surprised if the empirical results appealed to above would be 
relevantly altered if we changed the question in the just proposed way. (Philosophers may (reasonably) 
draw distinctions between sentences, claims, utterances, assertions, etc. I don’t think, however, that 
ordinary speakers do, at least as long as they are not specifically primed to heed these distinctions.) Second, 
even if the thesis is granted, it will be of no avail to the proponent of MPI. For, at least the Contextualist 
Data should remain unaltered if we asked whether the sentences Hannah uses in the bank cases are true or 
false. So, we could still conclude that the sentence based Contextualist Data cannot be explained in terms 
of implicatures. Thus, it would still follow that MPI is bound to fail. 
12 See e.g. (Levinson 1983: 132ff) for a partly introductory discussion of the relevant scalar implicatures. 
Levinson  (1983: 127) also endorses the thesis that these scalar implicatures “will be hard to distinguish 
from the semantic content of linguistic expressions, because such implicatures will be routinely associated 
with the relevant expression in all ordinary contexts.”  
13 See (Fantl and McGrath 2009: 42). 
14 See (Davis 2007: 430). 
15 Rysiew (2001: FN 32) refers to (Bach 1987: 78) where this example is used. 
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interestingly enough, 75% of their subjects said that the claims involving cardinals are 
false. So, implicatures of the cardinals type seem to be such that, if a claim has a false 
implicature of this sort, then that claim seems false in the relevant way.16 
Does this result suffice to underwrite the bridging thesis under discussion? Not quite. 
Remember that, to be precise, this principle has it that there is a relevant class of 
implicatures to which the alleged implicatures in the bank cases belong such that, if a 
claim has a false implicature of this sort, then it seems false. To fully substantiate this 
thesis, the proponent of MPI still has to show that the alleged implicatures in the bank 
cases are of the cardinals type and not of any of the other types of implicatures where 
truth-value judgments are (more or less) unaffected by the truth-value of the implicature. 
As Fantl and McGrath (2009: 42) put it, “it is not adequate merely to remark that we do 
sometimes confuse or run together the semantic content and the propositions 
pragmatically implied. Why do we do it here rather than there?”17 It seems very much 
unclear, however, whether a plausible answer to this question is forthcoming. So, we 
should consider it an open question at best whether additive implicatures can be used to 
sustain the bridging principle under discussion.18 
Let’s turn to the second part of the bridging principle that says, roughly, that claims can 
seem true just because they have a true implicature. We do not need to consider examples 
to see that additive implicature cannot be used to underwrite this principle. There is a 
systematic reason that they can’t. In a nutshell, a true additive implicatures can never 
make a literally false claim seem true because adding a truth to a falsity will lead to just 
another falsity. Let me elaborate. Consider the bridging thesis in its most general form, 
according to which the seeming truth-value of a given claim can be determined by the 
truth-value of its implicatures. The initial plausibility of this claim is certainly grounded 
                                                 
16 See (Larson et al. 2009b) for related results. 
17 See also (Blome-Tillmann 2013b: 4313n). 
18 It is often held that the implicatures of knowledge claims will be part of the intuitive truth-conditions of 
the claims in question because they are “generalized” or “standardized” or “default” implicatures, that is, 
roughly, because they are implicatures that are normally carried by a given sentence. See e.g. (Rysiew 
2001), (Leite 2005: 110) and the Levinson quote in FN 12. But this is not sufficient. For, all of the above 
mentioned implicatures are highly generalized and, even so, most of them are not generally incorporated 
into the intuitive truth-conditions of the relevant claims. Besides, it is not at all clear why we should think 
that the implicatures of the knowledge claims in the bank cases are generalized implicatures. After all, they 
are supposed to vary whenever the epistemic standard changes. And it does seem that epistemic standards 
change quite a lot. 
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in the following idea. When we evaluate whether a given claim is true, we often evaluate 
not whether the proposition this claim expresses is true, but whether the proposition this 
claim conveys is true. The truth-value of the proposition that a given claim conveys, 
however, is at least partly determined by the implicatures of this claim (for they are part 
of the conveyed content). Thus, the truth-value of an implicature will often shape the 
truth-value we assign to a given claim. Given that this is the idea that grounds the bridging 
thesis, it follows directly that a claim that expresses a falsity will never seem true merely 
because it has a true additive implicature. To see this, consider some claim that expresses 
a falsity but additively implicates a truth. Suppose now that, as the above account has it, 
we evaluate whether the claim is true by evaluating whether the proposition it conveys is 
true. If so, the claim should definitely seem false (not true, as would be required). For, 
given that the claim has an additive implicature, the conveyed content of the claim will 
be the combination of the implicature and the proposition expressed. And, given that the 
proposition expressed is false, the combination of the implicature and the proposition 
expressed will also be false (whether or not the implicature is true). We thus have a very 
general reason to think that additive implicatures can never be used to underwrite the idea 
that a claim can seem true just because it has a true implicature. 
In sum, at least the second part of the bridging thesis required for the truth of MPI cannot 
be sustained in terms of additive implicatures. Whether the first part can be sustained is 
an open question at best. What if we appeal to substitutional implicatures? Can these 
implicatures be used to underwrite the bridging thesis? Before we turn to this question, 
let me briefly discuss a potential rejoinder to the above considerations on the part of the 
proponent of MPI who wants to stick to additive implicatures. 
Denying the Data 
Instead of trying to substantiate the bridging thesis by providing examples of additive 
implicatures that shape our truth-value intuitions, the proponent of MPI could also just 
reject the troubling data about the high standards bank cases. In the present dialectical 
context, we are just assuming that these data obtain. So, we need not bother too much 
about this response strategy. Still, it should be addressed briefly, just to make clear that it 
does not provide an altogether easy way out for MPI. 
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At first sight, it may seem that it does. First, the proponent of MPI could say that the 
knowledge ascription in the high standards cases doesn’t seem false but only 
inappropriate. This putative datum can easily be explained in terms of additive 
implicatures. For, even a true claim seems inappropriate if it has a false additive 
implicature. For example, it will be inappropriate to say “I am sick” in response to your 
question whether I will come to your party if I plan to come in spite of my sickness. 
The same strategy will not be available in the case of the seeming truth of Hannah’s 
knowledge denial. For, true additive implicatures do not only fail to explain why a claim 
seems true. They also cannot explain why a claim seems appropriate. As DeRose puts it, 
“we want to avoid falsehood both in what we implicate and (especially!) in what we 
actually say” (2009: 114). (This is true, of course, only for additive implicatures.) 
Suppose, for example, that you ask me whether I will come to your party. Suppose further 
that I plan not to come even though I am in perfectly good health. In this case, it will 
certainly be inappropriate to respond to your question by falsely saying “I am sick” even 
though this claim has the true additive implicature that I won’t come.19 
However, second, the proponent of MPI may even be happy to say that Hannah’s 
knowledge denial in the high standards cases seems neither true nor appropriate. In fact, 
this is what many proponents of MPI do. Pritchard (2010: 88f), for example, writes that 
“in skeptical conversational contexts it seems inappropriate and false either to assert that 
an agent has knowledge or to assert that the agent lacks knowledge”.20 If that is so, 
additive MPI yields a perfectly plausible account of the data: The knowledge ascription 
in the high standards cases seems inappropriate because it has a false additive implicature. 
The knowledge denial in in the high standards cases seems inappropriate because it is 
literally false. 
                                                 
19 For this objection see also (MacFarlane 2005b: 208) and (Fantl and McGrath 2009: 41f). The objection 
goes through only if we assume that the above utterance of “I am sick” is not an instance of what has been 
called a (potentially appropriate) “white lie.” For a critical discussion of the idea of explaining the bank 
case data on the basis of white lies, see e.g. (Fantl and McGrath 2009: 41f).  
20 See also (Leite 2005: 123f), (Black 2005: 336) and (Hazlett 2009: 616). 
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As before, it seems difficult to criticize these responses because we just seem to have one 
intuitive verdict against the other. But, also as before, it may be useful to refer to the 
results of pertinent empirical studies.21 
Hansen and Chemla (2013) asked subjects about the truth-value of the knowledge 
ascriptions and denials in the (first-person) bank cases (and some related scenarios). The 
subjects “were given the flexibility to provide their answers within a continuous range of 
options between false and true, by setting the right end of a red line between these two 
extreme anchors” (2013: 297f). The results are shown in the subsequent figure. (The 
“false” anchor was to the left, the “true” anchor to the right.) 
 
Figure 2: Mean responses to the bank cases. 
Taken from (Hansen and Chemla 2013: 305). 
As indicated in the figure, Hansen and Chemla found the following not particularly strong 
but still statistically significant effect: 
The Contextualist Datae(mpirical): 
The knowledge ascription in the low standards cases is, on average, judged as more 
true than the knowledge ascription in the high standards cases. 
                                                 
21 Blome-Tillmann (2013b: 4307) thinks that the above data denial response is bound to fail independently 
of empirical results. He holds that “Black and Pritchard [still need] an explanation for why the remaining 
theorists in the field” judge the knowledge denial in the high standards cases to be appropriate. However, 
this objection seems dubious to me. Insofar as we demand an account of the judgments of those 
philosophers who judge the knowledge denial in the high standards cases to be appropriate, we also need 
to acknowledge the necessity to provide an account of the judgments of those philosophers (namely, Leite, 
Black, Hazlett and Pritchard) who deny these data. It seems implausible to me, however, that any general 
semantic or pragmatic theory could explain both these judgments. After all, they contradict each other. To 
my mind, the only plausible response to such contradicting judgments is this. The judgments of the relevant 
philosophers on this particular occasion are skewed presumably because they have dealt with the relevant 
cases for so long that they can no longer say what’s appropriate and what isn’t. Thus, their judgments should 
be ignored. Instead, we should appeal to empirical results as to what competent and philosophically 
unspoiled speakers would say about the relevant cases. This is what I will be doing in what follows. 
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The knowledge denial in the high standards cases is, on average, judged as more true 
than the knowledge denial in the low standards cases.22 
Admittedly, it is relatively unclear what bearing these results should have on the 
plausibility of the Contextualist Data. For, when I speak of a claim as being judged as 
“more true” than another, all I want to say is that responses to the first claim were to the 
right of responses to the latter on the given truth scale. And it remains to be seen how best 
to interpret such outcomes. For example, ordinary speakers may indeed have a gradable 
notion of truth such that one of the claims is literally more true than the other. But it may 
also be that they just find one claim more appropriate than the other or that their 
confidence levels vary.23 So, it is unclear whether the above results can be used to settle 
our dispute about whether the knowledge ascription in the high standards cases seems 
false or only inappropriate and whether the knowledge denial seems true or also 
inappropriate. 
Independently of their relation to the Contextualist Data, though, the Contextualist Datae 
present a problem for the proponent of MPI who appeals to additive implicatures. For, it 
is at least unclear whether the bridging thesis required to explain the Contextualist Datae 
in terms of additive implicature can be upheld. Admittedly, it may well be possible to use 
additive implicatures to explain why the knowledge ascription in the low standards cases 
seems more true than the knowledge ascription in the high standards cases. For, as 
indicated already, the empirical results from (Larson et al. 2009a) suggest that it is easy 
to find examples where at least some people incorporate additive implicatures into the 
intuitive truth-conditions of the claims in question. So, assuming that the knowledge 
ascription in the high standards cases has a false additive implicature while the knowledge 
ascription in the low standards cases doesn’t, the former should, on average, be judged as 
less true than the latter. However, the situation is far less clear when it comes to the datum 
that the knowledge denial in in the high standards cases is judged as more true than the 
knowledge denial in the low standards cases. For, this time, the knowledge denial in the 
high standards cases has a true implicature while the knowledge denial in the low 
standards cases doesn’t. And, even if this true implicature is incorporated into the intuitive 
                                                 
22 See (Hansen and Chemla 2013: 305). These data are confirmed in (Schaffer and Knobe 2012) and 
(Buckwalter 2014). 
23 See (Hansen and Chemla 2013: Sec. 5.2.1) for further discussion. 
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truth-conditions of the knowledge denial, it is unclear why the knowledge denial should 
thereby be evaluated as more true. For example, I cannot make a false claim more 
appropriate by merely adding a truth. Similarly, I won’t feel more or less confident that a 
given claim is false once it is conjoined with an independent truth. The ultimate verdict 
on this issue will depend on how exactly we should interpret the notion of a claim being 
more true than another. The burden of proof, however, seems to be on those who want to 
put forward an interpretation according to which the Contextualist Datae can be explained 
in terms of MPI. 
So, even if we grant that the data about the high standards cases can be denied, the 
empirically confirmed Contextualist Datae still seem troubling enough for the proponent 
of MPI, at least as long as she only appeals to additive implicatures. 
3.3. Substitutional Implicatures and Seeming Truth-Values 
Let’s now turn to substitutional implicatures. Can these implicatures be used to 
underwrite the bridging thesis? Recall, again, what the bridging thesis amounts to. The 
bridging thesis says the following. There is at least a subclass of implicatures to which 
the alleged implicatures in the bank cases belong such that, if a claim has a false 
implicature of this sort, then it seems false, and if a claim has true implicature of this sort, 
then it seems true. We have seen that it is an open question at best whether the first part 
of the bridging thesis can be sustained in terms of additive implicatures. We have also 
seen that, for very general reasons, the second part of the bridging thesis cannot be 
sustained in terms of additive implicatures. So, in what follows, I will evaluate whether 
the bridging thesis can be sustained in terms of substitutional implicatures. 
Let’s start with the second part of the bridging principle, according to which, roughly, a 
claim can seem true because it has a true implicature. First of all, it should be noted that 
the principled problem we found for additive implicatures no longer applies when we turn 
to substitutional implicatures. The reason is this. In a nutshell, the problem with additive 
implicatures was that the overall conveyed content of a claim with an additive implicature 
contains the proposition expressed. As a result, the overall conveyed content is false if 
the proposition expressed is false, whatever the truth-value of the additive implicature. 
The same problem does not arise when we turn to substitutional implicatures. For, the 
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overall conveyed content of a claim with a substitutional implicature contains only the 
implicature. So, the conveyed content in these cases may be true even if the proposition 
expressed is false. 
These considerations show that one particular argument against the idea that 
substitutional implicatures can make a literally false claim seem true does not apply. 
Clearly, though, this result does not suffice to establish the bridging principle under 
discussion. As before, we need to be given examples of cases where a claim seems true 
just because it has a true substitutional implicature. So, in what follows, I will, again, go 
through the examples that have been used in the literature to show that they are not 
convincing. 
Tim Black offers an example of a substitutional implicature where truth-value judgments 
allegedly track the implicature. He says that 
my assertion ‘Joe Lieberman is a Republican’ is false, but in the right sort of context it can seem 
true. We can explain the seeming truth of my assertion by appealing to the fact that it has a true 
implicature, something like this: Lieberman, qua legislator, often thinks or acts like a Republican. 
(Black 2008a: 193) 
In a similar vein, Davis holds that “everyday metaphors” provide cases “in which what a 
speaker says appears true just because of a true implicature.” (2007: 413) An example 
Davis uses is this. “If my wife asks whether I made caffeinated or decaffeinated coffee, I 
might answer ‘It’s high-test.’” (2007: 411) As Davis notes, what his answer literally says 
is false “since coffee has no octane rating.” Still, he would hold, the claim may seem true 
because it has the true substitutional implicature that the coffee is caffeinated. 
I am skeptical about Davis’ and Black’s contentions. Consider Black’s case. It may be 
that, in some conversational contexts, we would be prone to respond to the claim “Joe 
Lieberman is a Republican” by saying something along the lines of “That’s true! (He acts 
like a Republican.)” But, as in the case of additive implicatures, these are not exactly the 
data we need. We need claims that will be judged as true not only in a given conversation 
but also once embedded into a scenario description that settles all the relevant facts. So, 
suppose we presented subjects with a scenario description along the following lines. 
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Joe Lieberman is a member of the Democratic Party. However, he often thinks or acts 
like a Republican. [A description of “the right sort of context.”] Now A says, “Joe 
Lieberman is a Republican.” 
Suppose further that we ask whether A’s claim is true. Independently of how we specify 
“the right sort of context,” I find it highly dubious that one would respond by saying that 
A’s claim is true. To the contrary, given that Liebermann is described as a member of the 
Democratic Party, A’s claim should seem false. So, it seems that Black’s case cannot be 
used to underwrite the bridging principle under discussion. 
As before, Black might just deny my verdict. So, we would have one intuitive verdict 
against the other. But, also as before, empirical results seem to favor my view, as the 
subsequent discussion will show. 
Though this is not the ultimate goal of the paper, (Keysar 1989: 378f) reports studies in 
which subjects were asked to evaluate the literal truth-value of metaphorical sentences 
after reading “context sections” containing information that either make the sentence 
metaphorically true or metaphorically false (whether the sentence is literally true is left 
open). For example, subjects were asked to evaluate the sentence “Bob Jones is a 
magician” in either of the following contexts, 
Metaphorically True (M+) Sometimes it seems as if Bob’s money is made of rubber because he 
stretches it so far. How does he create such a healthy profit despite these expenses? 
Metaphorically False (M-) Although Bob tries to budget carefully, it seems that to him that money 
just disappears into thin air. With such huge audiences, why doesn’t he ever break even? 
Here, M+ is supposed to make “Bob Jones is a magician” metaphorically true because 
Bob is described as a person performing deeds that resemble magic tricks. 
Correspondingly, M- is supposed to make “Bob Jones is a magician” metaphorically false 
because there is nothing magical about Bob’s described behavior.24 The subjects provided 
their responses on a seven-point scale for literal truth. It turns out that “the test sentences 
did not differ in ‘literal truth’ ratings with M+ and M- context sections”. In both cases, 
                                                 
24 Admittedly, the just discussed context sections may not be the best way to indicate that the sentence in 
question is metaphorically true or false. For example, the reference of “these expenses” in M+ remains 
unclear. Correspondingly, it remains unclear whose “audiences” are being talked about in M-. However, 
Keysar tested not only the sentence just discussed but 11 other metaphorical sentences as well. He doesn’t 
provide the corresponding context sections. But it seems reasonable to assume that they do not generally 
suffer from similar defects. 
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they “were rated near the midpoint for literal truth”. Keysar concludes that 
“metaphorically related information did not affect the literal truth-value of test 
sentences.” 
These results thus suggest that, contrary to Black, people would judge A’s claim in the 
Lieberman case above as literally false in spite of its true substitutional implicature (at 
least in the absence of arguments to the conclusion that Black’s case relevantly differs 
from cases of metaphor). So, Black’s example fails to provide a model for the bridging 
thesis. (The same goes for Davis’ example. The situation here is even clearer because 
there is no doubt that Davis’ case involves metaphor.) 
One might want to object to my appeal to the above empirical study in the following way. 
The bridging thesis is a thesis about truth-value judgments. Keysar’s study, however, 
tested only how we evaluate the literal truth-value of a given claim. Thus, the study has 
no bearing on the question at hand. 
This is an objection that would have to be investigated further. As things stand, however, 
it doesn’t seem particularly strong. First, the results in (Larson et al. 2009a: Sec. 5.1) 
suggest that, at least for the case of many additive implicatures, truth-value judgments 
and literal truth-value judgments coincide (even when there is a divergence between the 
truth-value of what is said and the truth-value of what is overall conveyed). Thus, we may 
reasonably expect that the results from Keysar’s study would be the same if we asked 
about the truth-value not the literal truth-value of the respective claims. Second, insofar 
as one is prone to accept that the knowledge denial in the high standards bank cases 
sounds true, one would most likely also be prone to accept that it sounds literally true. To 
explain this latter judgment, we need a bridging principle involving literal truth-values. 
And Keysar’s study shows at least that this latter principle cannot be sustained by means 
of Black’s and Davis’ examples. This seems problematic enough. 
There are two possible response strategies to the above considerations on the part of the 
proponent of MPI who wants to appeal to substitutional implicatures. The first is, again, 
to deny the data about the high standards cases. The second is to try to provide further 
more convincing examples. I will discuss these strategies in turn. It turns out that the first 
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strategy founders when it comes to the empirically confirmed Contextualist Datae. The 
second strategy, however, may succeed if we grant the existence of so-called implicitures. 
Denying the Data 
As before, let me briefly discuss the idea of just rejecting the data about the high standards 
cases. The proponent of MPI could argue that the knowledge denial in the high standards 
cases doesn’t seem true but only appropriate and, similarly, that the knowledge ascription 
in the high standards cases doesn’t seem false but only inappropriate.25 These data could 
easily be explained on the basis of substitutional implicatures. For, on the one hand, it is 
inappropriate to say things with false substitutional implicatures (whether or not the literal 
content is true). For example, we wouldn’t say “The plane was a mile long” if the plane 
wasn’t even huge. And, on the other hand, it is perfectly appropriate to make a claim with 
a true substitutional implicature even if its literal content is false. For example, I could 
happily say “The plane was a mile long” even if the plane was not literally a mile long. 
As before, it is not entirely clear how to settle a dispute where some hold that a claim 
seems intuitively true or false and others accept only that the claim seems appropriate or 
inappropriate. But, as before, it may be useful to refer to the results of pertinent empirical 
studies. 
So, remember the Contextualist Datae, according to which the knowledge ascription in 
the low standards cases is judged as more true than the knowledge ascription in the high 
standards cases and, correspondingly, the knowledge denial in the highs standards cases 
is judged as more true than the knowledge denial in the low standards cases. As indicated 
above, it is relatively unclear what bearing these results should have on the plausibility of 
the Contextualist Data because it is unclear how to interpret the result that some claims 
are evaluated as “more true” than others. However, the Contextualist Datae seem 
problematic for the proponent of substitutional MPI independently of their precise 
interpretation. Here is why. The results from Keysar’s study seemed to show that 
substitutional implicatures have no effect on truth-value ratings when these ratings are 
                                                 
25 See e.g. (Davis 2010: 1154). DeRose also suggests that data about appropriateness might rest on firmer 
grounds than truth-value data. As regards the knowledge ascription in the low standards cases and the 
knowledge denial in the high standards cases, he writes: “As we can sense, perhaps with even more certainty 
than with which we judge the truth-values of the claims, speakers do in fact use ‘know(s)’ in the way 
described, and appropriately so” (DeRose 2009: 50). 
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provided on a seven-point scale. Consequently, we may reasonably expect that 
substitutional implicatures should also show no effect when these responses are provided 
on a continuous scale. So, if, as the present version of MPI has it, the knowledge claims 
in the low and the high standards bank cases differ only with respect to their substitutional 
implicatures, then there should be no difference between their truth-value ratings on a 
continuous scale. According to the Contextualist Datae, however, there are such (albeit 
small) differences. So, substitutional implicatures cannot be used to explain these data 
(whatever the correct interpretation of these data may be). Consequently, there seems to 
be a discrepancy between empirically confirmed data and the predictive capacities of MPI 
when construed in terms of substitutional implicatures. 
Implicitures 
Given that the strategy of denying the data on the part of the proponent of substitutional 
MPI doesn’t seem very promising, the only hope she has can be to provide examples of 
implicatures that underwrite the bridging thesis after all. And, in fact, there is a slightly 
controversial but arguably not too controversial kind of substitutional implicatures that 
might do the trick, namely, so-called “implicitures.”26 In this section, I will spell out 
briefly what implicitures are and why implicitures, if they exist, can be used to underwrite 
the bridging thesis. 
Implicitures may be considered a kind of implicature in that they are calculable conveyed 
contents that go beyond what is literally said.27 What distinguishes implicitures from 
other implicatures is that implicitures are  
a matter of leaving words out. […] In implic-i-ture, one says something but does not mean that; 
rather, what one means includes an implicit qualification on what one says, something that one 
could have made explicit but did not. (Bach 2001: 252) 
Here are some examples. The typical “implicit qualifications” or “left out words” appear 
in curly brackets. 
You are not going to die {from that cut}. 
                                                 
26 Bach coined the term “impliciture” in his (1994). For appeals to implicitures on the part of proponents of 
MPI, see e.g. (Rysiew 2005: 62n, 2007: 629) and (Brown 2006: 416ff). 
27 Bach would not be entirely happy with the classification of implicitures as a kind of implicature. See e.g. 
(Bach 1994: 140). But at least for those implicitures that interest us here (namely, expansion implicatures, 
see below), he would, I take it, agree that they are calculable conveyed contents. This is the crucial 
assumption I am making here. The rest should be merely terminological issues. 
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I have eaten {recently}. 
It is raining {here}. 
Steel isn’t strong enough {to carry this construction}. 
Someone {on the course} solved the riddle. 
Everyone {on the course} solved the riddle. 
The final sentence, for example, supposedly says that everyone (in the whole world) 
solved the riddle. It implicites, however, that only everybody on the course solved the 
riddle.28  
There are two kinds of implicitures only one of which can be employed by the proponent 
of MPI. The kind of impliciture that can be employed by the proponent of MPI involves 
what Bach calls “expansion.” An expansion impliciture of a given utterance is an 
impliciture of that utterance such that the literal content of the utterance already is a 
complete proposition. As Bach puts it, “there is already a complete proposition, 
something capable of being true or false” (1994: 133). The quantifier case is an example 
of this. The kind of impliciture that cannot be employed by the proponent of MPI involves 
what Bach calls “completion.” A completion impliciture of a given utterance is an 
impliciture of that utterance such that the literal content of the utterance is “semantically 
underdeterminate.” An example is the steel case. According to Bach, “something must be 
added for the sentence to express a complete and determinate proposition (something 
capable of being true or false). [W]e need to know strong enough for what.” (1994: 127)29 
These latter implicitures cannot be employed by the proponent of MPI for the following 
reason. According to MPI, “Bill knows that the bank will be open” expresses a truth in 
the bank cases. Thus, it expresses something that is “capable of being true or false.” 
Hence, by definition, utterances of this sentence cannot have completion implicitures. 
                                                 
28 These examples, particularly the last, straightforwardly indicate what’s controversial about implicitures. 
In all the above cases, one might want to hold that the alleged implicited content is already part of what is 
said. Thus, this content would not count as an impliciture according to the above general characterization 
of this notion (that has it that implicitures go beyond what is said). See e.g. (Stanley 2007). This is also the 
reason why e.g. Lewis (1996) and Ichikawa (2011) consider their views forms of contextualism even though 
they model the alleged context-sensitivity of “knows” on the basis of quantifier domain restriction. 
Resolving this issue, though, goes way beyond the scope of this project. So, I will just grant the idea of an 
impliciture to the proponent of MPI and proceed from there. 
29 For more on this, see (Bach 2006b: 440f). 
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Since completion implicitures will thus play no role in what follows, I will refer to 
expansion implicitures simply as “implicitures.”30 
Now, if we allow for the existence of implicitures, it is very easy to find cases of 
substitutional implicatures that underwrite the bridging thesis. For example, when the 
teacher says to the class “Everyone solved the riddle,” this claim may well seem true even 
though the proposition expressed (that everyone in the whole world solved the riddle) 
will definitely be false. Similarly, when the teacher says to the class “No one solved the 
riddle,” the claim may easily seem true even if someone on an earlier course did solve the 
riddle. As Bach (2002: 30) claims, “intuitions tend […] to be responsive to implicit 
qualifications”. 
So, assuming implicitures, the only question that remains to be answered by the proponent 
of MPI is why the knowledge claims in the bank cases should be conceived of as cases of 
implicitures rather than cases of other kinds of implicatures where truth-value judgments 
do not track the implicated content in the relevant way. It may be possible to answer this 
question as follows. The proponent of MPI could say, for example, that the implicated 
content of Hannah’s knowledge claims in the high standards cases is that Bill knows or 
doesn’t know for sure that the bank will be open (where Bill knows for sure that the bank 
will be open only if he would be in a position to rule out the salient possibility that the 
bank has changed its hours).31 If so, the implicatures would be “a matter of leaving words 
out” (the left out words being “for sure”). Since, implicitures are characterized by being 
a matter of leaving words out, it thus follows that the bank case implicatures are 
implicitures.  
                                                 
30  It is interesting to see that MPI is incompatible with completion implicitures only in virtue of its 
commitment to moderatism, the view that “Bill knows that the bank will be open” expresses a truth in the 
bank cases. Pragmatic invariantism by itself, however, is not incompatible with completion implicitures. 
Still, even Bach (2001: 252n) himself agrees that completion implicitures are “more controversial” 
presumably because it seems initially more plausible to treat the completed material as already part of what 
is said. In any case, it seems quite unclear that there would be any relevant difference between contextualism 
and a form of pragmatic invariantism that appeals to completion implicitures. See (Montminy 2007) for 
further elaboration of this last point. 
31 For further discussion of the issue of so-called “clarification devices” and many more potential such 
devices, see (Hawthorne 2004a: 104), (Stanley 2005b: 68–70), (Ludlow 2005: 19–20), (Bach 2005: 61f), 
(Davis 2007: 418f), (DeRose 2009: 180ff) and (Montminy 2007: 114f, 2013: 2363). 
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In summary, if the proponent of MPI appeals to substitutional implicatures (in particular, 
implicitures), there is at least a case to be made that she can sustain the bridging thesis. 
In what follows, however, I will show that she will no longer be in a position to sustain 
the semantic/pragmatic thesis. In particular, I will show that Hannah’s knowledge claims 
cannot have the substitutional implicatures our present proponent of MPI assigns to them 
because these implicatures are not calculable in the way in which substitutional 
implicatures are supposed to be calculable. Objections from calculability are not new. In 
fact, such objections have accompanied MPI throughout its entire history.32 Still, I think 
that the full force of these objection hasn’t been appreciated. The basic reason for this is 
that they are normally presented against the backdrop of an underdeveloped account of 
how implicatures are calculated in general. In the following section, I will try to remedy 
this deficiency. 
I will start out with a general discussion of how implicatures are calculated. In the course 
of this discussion, I will distinguish between two ways in which implicatures can be 
calculated. In particular, I will introduce and defend the distinction between exploitation 
and observation implicatures. I will then state a general principle in terms of this 
distinction, namely, the principle that all substitutional implicatures are exploitation 
implicatures. On that basis, I conclude that the implicatures posited by the proponent of 
MPI who appeals to substitutional implicatures must be calculable along exploitational 
lines. However, as a last step, I will argue that these implicatures aren’t calculable along 
exploitational lines. It follows that substitutional implicatures cannot be used to sustain 
the semantic/pragmatic thesis required for the truth of MPI. 
3.4. Calculating Implicatures 
3.4.1. Observation and Exploitation Implicatures 
Here is the distinction between exploitation and observation implicatures. To begin with, 
remember that the presence of an implicature is supposed to be calculable. What does 
calculability mean? Roughly, it means that the implicature can be derived on the basis of 
the assumption that the speaker is being cooperative. The notion of cooperativeness here 
                                                 
32 See e.g. (DeRose 2002).  
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can be spelled out in various ways.33 In this dissertation, I will follow Grice in assuming 
that a speaker is cooperative roughly if she observes the following “conversational 
maxims.” 
Quality1: Be sincere. 
Quality2: Be justified. 
Quantity1: Be as informative as is required (for the current purpose of the exchange). 
Quantity2: Don’t be more informative than is required. 
Relation: Be relevant. 
Manner: Be perspicuous.34 
In what sense are implicatures supposed to be derivable from the assumption that speakers 
are cooperative (that is, they observe the above maxims)? According to Levinson, these 
“inferences come about in at least two distinct ways” (1983: 104). On the one hand, 
implicatures may “arise directly from the assumption that the speaker is observing the 
maxims.” (1983: 105)35 On the other hand, implicatures may “come about by overtly and 
blatantly not following some maxim, in order to exploit it for communicative 
purposes.” (1983: 109)36 Grice seems to draw the same distinction. On the one hand, he 
says, there are cases of implicatures “in which no maxim is violated, or at least in which 
it is not clear that any maxim is violated.”37 On the other hand, he says, there are cases of 
implicatures in which, “though some maxim is violated at the level of what is said, the 
hearer is entitled to assume that that maxim, or at least the overall Cooperative Principle, 
is observed at the level of what is implicated.” These latter cases, Grice holds, “involve 
exploitation, that is, a procedure by which a maxim is flouted” (1989: 32f).38 I will refer 
to these two kinds of implicatures as observation and exploitation implicatures 
respectively. The distinction between observation and exploitation implicatures seems 
                                                 
33 See (Blome-Tillmann 2013a: 176) for a brief discussion of options. 
34 See (Grice 1989: 26f). The formulation of the maxims above diverges slightly from Grice’s original 
formulation. The reason for this should become apparent below. 
35 Or, as Levinson also puts it, if the “speaker is observing the maxims in a fairly direct way” (1983: 104). 
See also (Levinson 1983: 126, 157f). 
36 Or, as Levinson also puts it, when “the speaker deliberately and ostentatiously breaches or (as Grice puts 
it) flouts the maxims.” (1983: 104) See also (Levinson 1983: 126, 157f). 
37 Or, as he also put it, in which the violation of a maxim is only “apparent.” See e.g. (Grice 1989: 31). 
38 For similar distinctions, see (Hugly and Sayward 1979) and (Huang 2007: 27ff). 
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intuitively very plausible to me. Still, as it stands, it is not particularly clear. So, in what 
follows, I will spell it out and substantiate it further.  
Paradigmatic examples 
To get an initial grasp on the distinction, it is useful to consider paradigmatic examples 
of observation and exploitation implicatures. The following case provides a paradigmatic 
example of an observation implicature the generation of which is based on the maxim of 
Relation. 39 Someone responds to the question of where to get petrol by saying, “There is 
a garage around the corner.” She thereby implicates that the garage (most likely) sells 
petrol. This implicature is standardly taken to be observational. Very roughly, the reason 
for this is that the implicature can be calculated in the following way. The hearer assumes 
that the speaker is observing the maxims. She realizes, however, that the speaker would 
not be observing the maxims—in particular, Relation—if she did not think that the garage 
(most likely) sells petrol. Thus, the hearer concludes, the speaker implicates that the 
garage sells petrol. As one can see, the calculation of this implicature is based on the 
assumption that the speaker is observing the maxims. Thus the implicature is classified 
as an observation implicature. 
The following case provides a paradigmatic example of an exploitation implicature the 
generation of which is also based on the maxim of Relation.40 Someone responds to the 
question of what to do about John’s absence by saying, “John will come or he won’t.” 
She thereby implicates that there is nothing one can do about John’s absence. This 
implicature is standardly taken to be exploitational. Very roughly, the reason for this is 
that the implicature can be calculated in the following way. The hearer realizes that what 
the speaker says is a mere logical truth and, thus, completely irrelevant for the purposes 
at hand. Thus, what the speaker says “overtly and blatantly” fails to comply with the 
maxims, in particular, Relation. Consequently, the hearer concludes, the speaker must 
have meant to convey something other than what she said. And the most plausible 
candidate here is that there is nothing to be done about John’s absence. So this is what the 
speaker implicates. As one can see, the calculation of this implicature is based on the 
                                                 
39 See (Grice 1989: 32). 
40 See (Levinson 1983: 111). In fact, Levinson considers the above implicature to be based on Quantity1. 




understanding that the speaker “overtly and blatantly” fails to follow the maxims. Thus it 
is classified as an exploitation implicature. 
Even given these examples, many details concerning the distinction between observation 
and exploitation implicatures remain obscure. In what follows, I will try to point out these 
obscurities and remove them to the extent required for the purposes at hand. 
Observing the maxims at the level of what is said/conveyed 
Here is the first obscurity. Consider the implicature in the case about John’s absence. 
Given that the case is supposed to involve an exploitation implicature, Levinson has to 
maintain that the speaker is “overtly and blatantly not following some maxim.” However, 
there is at least a sense in which the speaker does not fail to observe any maxim at all. 
For, in saying “John will come or he won’t,” the speaker conveys that there is nothing 
one can do about John’s absence. This latter claim is perfectly relevant, the speaker 
presumably believes it, etc. So, at least when it comes to what is conveyed, there is no 
maxim that the speaker fails to observe. Is Levinson just wrong then about his general 
characterization of exploitation implicatures? How do we have to understand his 
characterization of exploitation implicatures to get the cases right? 
The proper response to this worry should be fairly obvious. Exploitation implicatures 
must be understood as implicatures where the speaker fails to observe a maxim at the 
level of what is said but not at the level of what is conveyed. Let us first get clear about 
what it means to observe a maxim at the level of what is said as opposed to the level of 
what is conveyed. As a second step, we will apply the results to the case of John’s absence 
to show that this case does indeed involve an exploitation implicature on the present 
understanding. 
What does it mean to observe a maxim at the level of what is said? Given the above 
formulation of the maxims, this is straightforward to see. Consider, for example, Relation. 
This maxim says that you should be relevant. To observe this maxim at the level of what 
is said is to say (as opposed to merely convey) something which is relevant. Similarly, to 
observe the quality maxims at the level of what is said is to say (as opposed to merely 
convey) what one believes and is in a position to justify. And to observe the quantity 
maxims at the level of what is said is to say (as opposed to merely convey) something 
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informative but not too informative. The notion of observing a maxim at the level of what 
is conveyed can be defined in an analogous fashion. 
Before we go on, let’s briefly turn to the maxim of Manner. The maxim of Manner is 
special. For, it is not clear how to make sense of the idea that one should be perspicuous 
at the level of what is said as opposed to the level of what is conveyed. Rather, it seems 
that one can be perspicuous only at the level of the sentences used. Consider, for example, 
the submaxim of Manner that says “Avoid ambiguity.”41 It is quite unclear how one 
should avoid ambiguity other than at the level of the sentence used. So, I will assume in 
what follows that no distinction can be drawn between observing Manner at the level of 
what is said and observing Manner at the level of what is conveyed. When I say that a 
speaker is observing (all) the conversational maxims at the level of what is said/conveyed, 
I thus intend to be understood as follows. The speaker observes all maxims except for 
Manner at the level of what is said/conveyed and she observes Manner (at whatever level 
this maxim can be observed). Since Manner implicatures will only play a minor role in 
the discussion to come, these qualifications can mostly be ignored though. 
Given the distinction between observing a maxim at the level of what is said and 
observing it at the level of what is conveyed, we can see more clearly why the claim “John 
will come or he won’t” generates an exploitation implicature. The reason is this. 
Exploitation implicatures are generated when the speaker fails to observe the maxims at 
the level of what is said. When one says “John will come or he won’t” in a context where 
the issue is what to do about John’s absence, what one says is clearly irrelevant. Thus, we 
have an exploitation implicature in these cases, just as we should. 
Observing the maxim of Relation 
So much for the first unclarity. Here is a second unclarity I want to remove. Consider 
observation implicatures. Grice says of observation implicatures that, when they occur, 
there is “no maxim that is violated.” Levinson says that, in these cases, speakers “observe 
the maxims in a fairly direct way.”42 Clearly, we must understand these claims as claims 
                                                 
41 See (Grice 1989: 27) for this submaxim. 
42 Note here that, as I will understand these terms, “observing a maxim” and “not violating a maxim” can 
be used interchangeably (where “not observing a maxim” is presumably the term that more stably refers to 
what I have in mind when I use these terms). I assume, however, that there is a distinction to be drawn 
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about observing or violating the maxims at the level of what is said. For, we have seen 
that, even in the case of exploitation implicatures, no maxim is violated at the level of 
what is conveyed. Hence, the difference between observation and exploitation 
implicatures would disappear if we said that, also in the case of observation implicatures, 
speakers only observe the maxims at the level of what is conveyed. So, observation 
implicatures are implicatures where the speaker observes the maxims at the level of what 
is said. But, given that, why should the petrol case above turn out to involve an 
observation implicature? Let us consider this case in detail. What the speaker says in this 
case is that there is a garage around the corner. The question at issue is where to get petrol. 
Now, clearly, there are garages that don’t sell petrol. So, clearly, what the speaker says at 
least does not entail an answer to the question at issue. In a sense, then, what the speaker 
says is not relevant. Hence, in a sense, the speaker does violate Relation at the level of 
what is said. Thus, it may seem, the relevant implicature would have to be classified as 
exploitational rather than observational, contrary to what Grice and Levinson say. How 
should we deal with this problem? 
One potential response would be the following. We could grant that the speaker in the 
petrol case violates Relation at the level of what is said. In order to maintain the idea that, 
nevertheless, the case involves an observation implicature, we could further admit that 
observation implicatures must be defined as implicatures where the speaker violates a 
maxim at the level of what is said. In order to maintain the distinction between 
observation and exploitation implicatures, we could then define exploitation implicatures 
as implicatures where the speaker not only violates but overtly and blatantly violates a 
maxim at the level of what is said.43 
This response may seem initially plausible. But it is also problematic in various ways. 
First, it is in tension with what Grice and Levinson say. To repeat, Grice, for example, 
                                                 
between observing (or not violating) a maxim in a primary sense and observing (or not violating) a maxim 
in a secondary sense. In the primary sense, one observes a maxim if, as a matter of fact, one doesn’t violate 
it. For example, one observes Relation at the level of what is said in this primary sense if, as a matter of 
fact, one says something relevant. In the secondary sense, one observes a maxim already if one believes 
that one doesn’t violate it. For example, one observes Relation at the level of what is said in this secondary 
sense if one considers what one says relevant. Both senses will figure in the subsequent discussion. The 
context should make clear on each occasion which sense I have in mind. 
43 Bach (2006a) seems to favor such a proposal when he writes that “[i]mplicatures (and implicitures) arise 
only when one or another maxim is flouted or violated”. 
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explicitly says that, in the case of observation implicatures, “no maxim is violated.” 
Second, it is not quite clear why the speaker in the petrol case should not also be said to 
overtly and blatantly violate Relation. After all, it does seem fairly obvious that what she 
says does not entail an answer to the question at hand.44 
These may not be knock-down arguments. But instead of discussing the above proposal 
in more detail, let me simply put forward an alternative proposal that I find more 
appealing overall. The alternative proposal is that observation implicatures are 
implicatures where the speaker observes the maxims at the level of what is said, while 
exploitation implicatures are implicatures where the speaker fails to observe the maxims 
at the level of what is said. This again prompts the worry that, contrary to Grice and 
Levinson, the petrol case turns out to involve an exploitation implicature, because the 
speaker seemingly fails to observe Relation at the level of what is said. In order to respond 
to this worry, I will proceed as follows. I will first clarify the notion of relevance. Second, 
I will restate Relation in terms of this clarified notion. Finally, I will show that, given this 
clarified version of Relation, the speaker in the petrol case turns out to be observing 
Relation at the level of what is said. 
To get clear on the notion of relevance, we first have to understand the logical form of 
this relation. Clearly, relevance is at least a two-place relation. There is always some claim 
that is relevant for some question (or some set of questions). Thus we preliminarily arrive 
at the following form. 
Claim P is relevant for question Q. 45 
This, however, doesn’t seem to be enough. For, whether a given claim is relevant very 
often depends on our background beliefs. If I, for example, believe that all garages sell 
petrol, the claim that there is a garage around the corner will be relevant for me regarding 
the question of where to get petrol. For somebody else who, for whatever reason, believes 
                                                 
44 For a further problem, see FN 63 below. 
45 Note that I am concerned only with the relevance of claims here. Of course, questions can also be relevant 
or irrelevant. The notion of relevance required to explain this phenomenon will diverge from the one 




that garages never sell petrol, the same claim will be irrelevant regarding the same 
question. So, it seems that we need a further argument place along the following lines. 
Claim P is relevant for question Q relative to a set of background beliefs B. 
Further argument places may be required. Since they will be immaterial to the project at 
hand, however, I will stick to the logical form above. Thus, we can provide the following 
rough and ready definition of what it means for a claim to be relevant. 
Claim P is relevant for question Q relative to a set of background beliefs B just if P 
together with B entails (or at least makes likely) a certain answer (or at least a 
partial answer) to Q.46 
Whether or not we accept precisely that definition, we can use the three-place relation of 
relevance to clarify what it means to observe Relation at the level of what is said. Here is 
my proposal. 
A speaker S making an utterance u in a conversational context C observes Relation at 
the level of what is said just if what S says by uttering u is relevant for the question 
at issue in C relative to the background beliefs that S holds.47 
With this definition at hand, we can turn back to the question of why the speaker in the 
petrol case doesn’t violate Relation at the level of what is said. The answer should now 
be clear. According to the present definition, the speaker observes Relation at the level of 
what is said just if what she says is relevant for the question at issue relative to her 
background beliefs. Now, what the speaker says in the petrol case is that there is a garage 
around the corner. The question at issue is where to get petrol. Moreover, the speaker 
presumably believes that garages generally sell petrol. So, given the above definition, the 
speaker observes Relation if the claim that there is a garage around the corner, together 
with the background belief that garages generally sell petrol, makes likely a particular 
                                                 
46 Note that I am assuming here that P must not figure vacuously in the relevant entailments. Otherwise one 
could say something relevant by merely having relevant beliefs. 
47 To be precise, we would presumably have to impose some kind of restriction on the background beliefs 
that can figure in the present definition. For, a speaker will presumably not be said to be observing Relation 
if the background beliefs that make her claim relevant are obviously unacceptable for her audience or too 
complicated for the audience to grasp in the course of an ongoing conversation. The details of such a 
restriction, however, will not be relevant for my concerns. So, I leave them for another occasion. 
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answer to the question of where to get petrol. And clearly, this is the case. The answer 
that is made likely is that one can get petrol around the corner. So, according to the above 
definition, the speaker observes Relation at the level of what is said. Hence, we get an 
observation implicature, just as we should.48 
Observing one maxim at the cost of another 
So far, then, we can accept the idea that observation implicatures are implicatures where 
the speaker observes the maxims at the level of what is said, while exploitation 
implicatures are implicatures where the speaker fails to observe the maxims at the level 
of what is said. But there is one last thing we have to get clear about. Consider the case 
where someone responds to the question of where Frankie lives by saying “Somewhere 
in the south of France,” thus implicating that she cannot be more specific. Is this an 
observation or an exploitation implicature? We may want to say that it is an exploitation 
implicature. For, the speaker clearly says less than would be required. So, arguably, she 
violates the quantity maxims at the level of what is said. Such a case, however, is 
standardly not considered an exploitation implicature.49 
How do we get this verdict? I think we have to slightly modify our above definitions 
along the following lines. Exploitation implicatures are implicatures where the speaker 
not only fails to observe the maxims, but fails to observe the maxims and could have done 
                                                 
48 One may worry that, given the above definitions, the speaker in the case of John’s absence will also turn 
out to be observing Relation at the level of what is said. This is not the case, however. Let me elaborate. 
Assume the above definitions hold. We can then argue as follows. The speaker in the case of John’s absence 
observes Relation at the level of what is said only if what she says is relevant as regards the question at 
issue relative to her background beliefs. So, the speaker observes Relation at the level of what is said only 
if what the speaker says together with certain of her background beliefs entails or makes likely a particular 
answer to the question at issue. Now, what the speaker says is that John will or will not come (a logical 
truth). The question at issue is what should be done about John’s absence. So, the speaker observes Relation 
at the level of what is said only if the logical truth that John will or will not come, together with certain of 
the speaker’s background beliefs, entails or makes likely a particular answer to the question of what to do 
about John’s absence. The speaker, however, does not hold background beliefs that would satisfy this 
condition (assuming that the logical truth must not figure vacuously in the relevant derivations). To see 
this, consider an example of a background belief that would satisfy the condition. Consider, for example 
the belief that, whenever John will or will not come, one should call him. This belief together with the 
logical truth that John will or will not come would entail a particular answer to the question of what to do 
about John’s absence (namely, that one should call him). However, the speaker certainly does not hold this 
belief. For, given minimal logical competence on her part, this would mean that she also holds the absurd 
belief that one should always call John. So, according to the definitions above, the speaker in the case of 
John’s absence does not observe Relation at the level of what is said. 
49 See (Levinson 1983: 107) and (Grice 1989: 32). 
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better.50 More precisely, exploitation implicatures are implicatures where the speaker 
fails to observe the maxims at the level of what is said and there is a proposition p such 
that, if the speaker had said that p, she would have observed the maxims at the level of 
what is said (or would have been closer to observing the maxims at the level of what is 
said than she actually is)51. Relatedly, we should redefine observation implicatures as 
follows. Observation implicatures are implicatures where the speaker either observes the 
maxims or, if she doesn’t, couldn’t have done better. More precisely, observation 
implicatures are implicatures where either the speaker observes the maxims at the level 
of what is said or there is no proposition p such that, if the speaker had said that p, she 
would have observed the maxims at the level of what is said (or would have been closer 
to observing the maxims at the level of what is said than she actually is). 
With these definitions at hand, we can easily see why the France case above involves an 
observation rather than an exploitation implicature. The speaker in this case provides less 
information than is required and thus fails to observe the quantity maxims at the level of 
what is said. But this is presumably so only because if she were to provide more 
information by saying, say, that Frankie lives in Cannes, she would say something she 
doesn’t justifiably believe and thus fail to observe the quality maxims at the level of what 
is said. So, even though the speaker fails to observe a maxim at the level of what is said, 
she presumably couldn’t have done better. There is no proposition p such that, if the 
speaker had said that p, she would have observed all maxims at the level of what is said. 
Thus, given the above definitions, we have an observation rather than an exploitation 
implicature, just as we should. 
Now, I think that the above proposal is ultimately the correct way to deal with cases such 
as the France case. However, it also makes the present framework much more 
cumbersome and difficult to handle. In particular, we can no longer test whether an 
                                                 
50 This is at least one sense, I think, in which speakers in the case of exploitation implicatures not only fail 
to observe the maxims but “flout” or “exploit” them. 
51 It may not be entirely straightforward to spell out what exactly it is supposed to mean that a speaker could 
be “closer” to observing the maxims. Here I will just assume an intuitive grasp of this concept. One thing 
should be noted however. Whether a speaker is close to observing the maxims depends not only on the sum 
of the distances to each individual maxim (as it were). It depends on a weighted sum of these distances. As 
Grice puts it, it “is obvious that the observance of some of these maxims is a matter of less urgency than is 
the observance of others” (1989: 27). In particular, the distance to the quality maxims will be weighted 
more strongly than the distance to the other maxims. 
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implicature is observational by simply looking at whether the speaker observes all 
individual maxims. Instead, we now have to check whether she observes all individual 
maxims and, if she doesn’t, whether there is anything she could have said that doesn’t 
violate any maxim. So, to simplify the discussion, I will adopt an alternative solution to 
the problem of the France case. This solution may not be entirely correct, and it is 
certainly less encompassing than the solution presented above. Still, it should yield the 
same results for the cases we are interested in here. The proposal goes as follows. 
We stick to the simple idea that observation implicatures are implicatures where the 
speaker observes the maxims at the level of what is said, while exploitation implicatures 
are implicatures where the speaker fails to observe the maxims at the level of what is said. 
In order to deal with the France case, we slightly modify the content of Quantity1. So far, 
this maxim says that one should be as informative as is required. Instead, we say that, 
according to Quantity1, one should be as informative as is required, but only to the extent 
that this is compatible with the quality maxims. More precisely, we define the observation 
of Quantity1 as follows. 
A speaker S making an utterance u in a conversational context C observes Quantity1 
at the level of what is said just if, from the propositions that S justifiably believes, 
what S says in uttering u is the most informative proposition regarding the question 
at issue in C. 
This proposal allows us to stick to the simple definition of observation and exploitation 
implicatures, while, at the same time, yielding the right result for the France case. 
Consider again the France case. It does seem that what the speaker says in this case is the 
most informative thing she can say without violating the quality maxims. From all the 
things the speaker justifiably believes, what she actually says is the most informative 
proposition. Correspondingly, the speaker observes Quantity1 at the level of what is said 
in the sense just defined. So, according to the above proposal, we have an observation 
implicature, just as we should. 
Calculating observation and exploitation implicatures 
The proposal presented in the last paragraph is almost what I want to accept, but not quite. 
The reason is this. So far, the definitions of observation and exploitation implicatures 
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make no reference to any kind of calculation. However, observation and exploitation 
implicatures were supposed to differ precisely in the way in which they are calculated 
(according to Levinson at least). So calculation should play a role in their definition. In 
what follows, I want to remedy this deficiency by developing a definition of observation 
and exploitation implicatures that is based on the way in which these implicatures are 
calculated. (The relation to the definitions developed so far should soon become 
apparent.) 
Let’s start with observation implicatures. How do we calculate observation implicatures? 
One may worry that observation implicatures cannot be calculated given what I have said 
so far. For, on the present view, speakers observe all maxims at the level of what is said 
when an observation implicature is generated. And it may be held that, if all maxims are 
observed, there is nothing that could trigger the search for an implicature.52 This is not 
the case however. 
Consider the petrol case. How can we calculate the implicature in this case? We start out, 
I take it, with the assumption that the speaker is observing the maxims at the level of what 
is said when she says “There is a gas station around the corner.” Next, we realize that the 
speaker can be observing Relation at the level of what is said only if she holds the 
background belief that the mentioned garage is likely to sell petrol. Since nothing speaks 
against the idea that the speaker holds that belief, we conclude that the speaker does hold 
that belief. Consequently, we assume that the speaker wants us to hold that belief as well; 
that is, that the speaker means to convey that the garage is likely to sell petrol. Hence, we 
take it to be an implicature of the speaker’s claim that the garage is likely to sell petrol. 
This is a paradigmatic instance of the kind of calculation that occurs in the case of 
observation implicatures. No maxim is violated. Still, an implicature is generated. 
Correspondingly, we can define observation implicatures as follows. 
An observation implicature is an implicature that can be calculated along the lines of 
the following pattern: 
                                                 
52 Remember that Bach (2006a), for example, states that “[i]mplicatures (and implicitures) arise only when 
one or another maxim is flouted or violated”.  
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The speaker is observing the conversational maxims at the level of what is said. The 
speaker can be observing the conversational maxims at the level of what is said only 
if she thinks that p. There are no good reasons to hold that the speaker doesn’t think 
that p. Thus, the speakers thinks that p. Thus, the speaker wants me to think that p as 
well. Thus, the speaker conveys that p. Thus, the speaker implicates that p (given that 
p differs from what is said).53 
Let’s now turn to exploitation implicatures. How are these implicatures calculated? 
Consider the case of John’s absence. As before, I take it, we start out with the assumption 
that the speaker observes the maxims at the level of what is said when she says, “John 
will come or he won’t.” We realize, however, that the speaker can be observing the 
maxims, in particular Relation, at the level of what is said only if she thinks that the logical 
truth she expresses is relevant for the question at issue. And this is something that the 
speaker clearly doesn’t believe. Thus, we discard the original assumption that the speaker 
observes the maxims at the level of what is said. Still, we uphold the assumption that the 
speaker observes the maxims at the level of what is conveyed. Correspondingly, we 
conclude that what the speaker means to convey differs from what is said.54 As a last step, 
we try to figure what it could be that the speaker wanted to convey (on the basis of the 
assumptions that it differs from what is said, that it should still have some connection to 
what is said, that it is supposed to be in line with the maxims, and other contextual cues). 
                                                 
53 This pattern is at least closely related to the pattern Grice (1989: 31) states as a general means to derive 
implicatures (not only observation implicatures). However, when he later considers examples of 
implicatures where a maxim is flouted, the pattern he uses seems much closer to the pattern below for 
exploitation implicatures (see esp. Grice’s discussion of irony on p. 34). Hugly and Sayward (1979) also 
observe that Grice’s original pattern cannot be applied to what I would refer to as exploitation implicatures. 
54 Some may worry that one can never uphold the assumption that the speaker is observing the maxims at 
the level of what is conveyed once one has given up the assumption that the speaker is observing the maxims 
at the level of what is said. For, it may be worried that if the speaker doesn’t want to convey what she said, 
she automatically violates Manner. As Wilson (2006: 1727) puts it, “whatever implicature is derived, the 
resulting interpretation would irrevocably violate the Manner supermaxim (‘Be Perspicuous’), since the 
most straightforward way of conveying this implicated information would have been to express it directly.” 
This reasoning, however, is misguided. It may be that to express something directly is always more 
perspicuous than to merely convey it as an implicature. The maxim of Manner, however, does not say that 
you should be as perspicuous as possible. It only enjoins you to be perspicuous. (In the same way, Qualtity2 
enjoins you to be justified. Certainly, though, it doesn’t say that you should be justified to the extent that 
your justification could not be better.) So, even if saying something directly is more perspicuous than to 
convey it as an implicature, it doesn’t follow that conveying something as an implicature is never 
perspicuous. If the hearer has no problems figuring out what it was that was supposed to be implicated, the 
speaker’s claim may well be counted as perspicuous even if it would have been even more perspicuous if 
the speaker had directly said what she in fact only conveys. 
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In the particular case at hand, this leads us to the conclusion that the speaker wants to 
convey and thus implicates that there is nothing to be done about John’s absence. This is 
a paradigmatic instance of the type of calculation that occurs in the case of exploitation 
implicatures. Correspondingly, we can define exploitation implicatures as follows. 
An exploitation implicature is an implicature that can be calculated along the lines of 
the following pattern: 
The speaker is observing the conversational maxims at the level of what is said. But 
the speaker can be observing the conversational maxims at the level of what is said 
only if she thinks that q. And there are good reasons to hold that the speaker doesn’t 
think that q.55 Thus, contrary to the initial assumption, the speaker is not observing 
the conversational maxims at the level of what is said. Still, the speaker is observing 
the conversational maxims at the level of what is conveyed. Thus, the speaker must 
mean to convey something other than what is said. All things considered, the most 
plausible candidate conveyed content is p. Thus the speaker conveys that p. Thus the 
speaker implicates that p (or at least that part of p that differs from what is said).56 
Further examples 
Before we conclude, let’s consider some further examples to substantiate the present 
interpretation of the distinction between observation and exploitation implicatures. So far, 
                                                 
55 What are the candidate reasons to think that a speaker doesn’t believe that q? I think the answer to this 
question provides an account of why exploitation implicatures are associated with the idea of “overtly and 
blatantly” not observing a maxim. So let me say a few words about this issue. One reason to assume that a 
speaker doesn’t believe that q is that the speaker said that she doesn’t believe that q (or said that not-q). But 
the q involved in the pattern above most likely isn’t a proposition the speaker and the hearer have explicitly 
discussed already. So, what other reasons are there to think that a speaker doesn’t believe that q? One reason 
that will typically figure in the pattern above is that q is just an absurd claim that no one would be willing 
to hold. For example, consider the case of John’s absence. Here the hearers realize that they can uphold the 
assumption that the speaker is observing Relation only if they assume that the speaker believes that a mere 
logical truth has a bearing on the question of what to do about John’s absence. Why don’t they conclude 
that the speaker holds such a belief? Because the content of that belief is so absurd that no one would be 
willing to accept it. Thus, the reasons to think that the speaker doesn’t believe that q that figure in the pattern 
above normally license the claim that the speaker “overtly and blatantly” fails to hold the relevant belief. 
Correspondingly, they license the claim that the speaker “overtly and blatantly” fails to observe the maxims. 
That, I think, is why exploitation implicatures are associated with the idea that the speaker “overtly and 
blatantly” fails to observe a maxim. 
56 This pattern is at least closely related to the pattern described in (Levinson 1983: 157f) for the calculation 
of exploitation implicatures. 
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we have mostly considered implicatures based on the maxim of Relation. Let’s now 
consider implicatures that are based on other maxims. First, consider quality implicatures. 
Exploitation implicatures of this kind are easy to find. Take, for example, the case where 
someone says “Queen Victoria was made of iron”, thereby implicating, say, that Queen 
Victoria was tough. This is standardly considered an exploitation implicature. 57 
Correspondingly, it can be derived as follows. The speaker observes Quality1 at the level 
of what is said only if she believes what she said: that Queen Victoria was literally made 
of iron. Obviously, though, the speaker doesn’t hold that belief. Hence, she fails to 
observe the maxims at the level of what is said. Nevertheless, she observes them at the 
level of what is conveyed. Thus, the speaker must mean to convey something other than 
what is said. The most natural candidate claim is that Queen Victoria is tough. So, this 
claim is implicated. 
Observation implicatures based on the quality maxims are more difficult to find. Grice 
doesn’t provide examples of this sort. But Levinson says that, when I say “John has two 
PhDs,” I observationally implicate that “I believe that he has, and have adequate evidence 
that he has.” (1983: 105) Whether these claims are cases of observation implicatures 
presumably depends on whether we want to classify them as implicatures to begin with.58 
If they are implicatures, however, they clearly are of the observational type. For, they can 
be calculated as follows. In saying “John has two PhDs,” the speaker is observing the 
maxims at the level of what is said. She would not be doing so unless she believed that 
John has two PhDs and that she is justified in holding this belief. There is no reason to 
think that the speaker doesn’t hold these beliefs. Thus, the speaker holds these beliefs. 
Hence, she wants me to hold them as well. Thus, she implicates that she believes that 
John has two PhDs and that she is justified in holding this belief. 
Let’s now turn to quantity implicatures. As an example of an exploitation implicature that 
is based on the quantity maxims, consider Grice’s letter of recommendation case.59 In a 
letter of recommendation for a philosophy job, someone writes “Dear Madame, Ms. X’s 
command of English is excellent, and her attendance at tutorials has been regular. Yours, 
                                                 
57 See (Levinson 1983: 110). 
58 A reason that straightforwardly speaks against this classification is that the alleged implicatures aren’t 
cancellable. 
59 See (Grice 1989: 33). 
84 
 
etc.” This letter will generate an exploitation implicature to the effect that Ms. X is no 
good at philosophy. Correspondingly, the implicature can be calculated in the following 
way. We can uphold the assumption that the writer observes Quantity1 at the level of what 
is said only if we assume that she thinks she cannot say more than she says without 
violating the quality maxims. However, assuming that Ms. X is a pupil of the writer, the 
writer certainly can say more. Thus, the writer does not observe Quantity1 at the level of 
what is said. Hence, we can conclude that the writer must have meant to convey 
something other than what is said. And a plausible candidate here is that Ms. X is no good 
at philosophy. This is what is implicated. 
Here is an example of an observational quantity implicature. Suppose someone says, “It’s 
warm,” thus implicating that it is not hot. This implicature is standardly taken to be 
observational. 60  Correspondingly, the derivation could go (roughly) as follows. The 
speaker observes the maxims at the level of what is said. If the speaker observes Quantity1 
at the level of what is said, she must think that it is not hot. For, if she (justifiably) thought 
it was hot, what she said would have been less informative than it could have been (in 
particular, the speaker could have made the stronger claim that it is hot instead of the 
weaker claim that it is warm). Nothing speaks against the idea that the speaker thinks it 
is not hot. Thus, the speaker thinks it is not hot. Hence, she wants me to think that too. 
So, she implicates that it is not hot.  
Manner implicatures 
Let’s finally turn to Manner implicatures. We have seen already that it makes no sense to 
distinguish between observing Manner at the level of what is said and observing Manner 
at the level of what is conveyed. It is a consequence of this that Manner implicatures 
cannot be exploitation implicatures in the sense just defined. In detail, the reason is this. 
In the case of exploitation implicatures, hearers first realize that the speaker fails to 
observe the maxims at the level of what is said. Then they fall back to the assumption that 
the speaker still observes them at the level of what is conveyed (and then they try to figure 
out what it is that is conveyed). This cannot happen in the case of Manner implicatures, 
however, if we assume that it makes no sense to distinguish between observing Manner 
at the level of what is said and observing Manner at the level of what is conveyed. For, if 
                                                 
60 See (Levinson 1983: 106). 
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it makes no sense to distinguish between observing Manner at the level of what is said 
and observing Manner at the level of what is conveyed, then it also makes no sense to say 
that a speaker fails to observe Manner at the level of what is said but doesn’t fail to 
observe Manner at the level of what is conveyed. So, Manner implicatures cannot be 
exploitational. 
This conclusion is admittedly at odds with what Grice and Levinson say. For, they both 
think that there are exploitational Manner implicatures. At this stage, however, I want to 
take the liberty to say that they were wrong. The distinction they plausibly had in mind 
when they distinguished exploitation from observation implicatures just fails to allow for 
exploitational Manner implicatures. 
There are two possible conclusions to be drawn from this result. Either all Manner 
implicatures are observational or the distinction between observation and exploitation 
implicatures is not exhaustive. I do not want to adjudicate between these options here. 
Let me only indicate that I am inclined to accept the first. There is at least a case to be 
made that all Manner implicatures are observational. 
To begin with, consider the following example of a Manner implicature that clearly is of 
the observational type.61 Someone says, “Katie got drunk and drove home.” She thereby 
implicates that Katie first got drunk and then drove home. This is an observational Manner 
implicature that can be calculated in the following way. The speaker is observing the 
maxims at the level of what is said. In particular, she is observing Manner. If she is 
observing Manner, she must think that the events she refers to happened in the order in 
which she refers to them. Thus, she thinks that this is so. Thus, she wants me to think that 
this is so as well. Hence, she implicates that the events she refers to happened in the order 
in which she refers to them; that is, Katie first got drunk and then drove home. 
Let us now consider a Manner implicature that Grice and Levinson consider to be 
exploitational.62 In a review of a musical performance, someone writes, “Ms. Singer 
produced a series of sounds corresponding closely to the score of an aria from Rigoletto.” 
The writer implicates that Ms. Singer’s performance was awful. As I said, Grice and 
                                                 
61 See (Levinson 1983: 108). 
62 See (Levinson 1983: 112) and (Grice 1989: 37). 
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Levinson hold that this case involves an exploitation implicature. There is a case to be 
made, however, that the implicature can be calculated along the lines of the pattern for 
observation implicatures. The calculation could go as follows. The speaker is observing 
the maxims at the level of what is said. In particular, she is observing Manner. If she is 
observing Manner, she must think that there was no way to express what she said (or 
something sufficiently similar to what she said) in a more succinct way without violating 
some other maxim at some level. In particular, the speaker must think that she would have 
violated a maxim at some level if she had just said, “Ms. Singer sang an aria from 
Rigoletto.” Nothing speaks against this assumption, however. In particular, the following 
seems quite likely. The speaker thinks that, if she had just plainly said, “Ms. Singer sang 
an aria from Rigoletto,” then she would have conveyed that there was nothing unusual 
about the singing, in particular, that the singing wasn’t totally awful. The speaker also 
thinks, however, that the performance indeed was totally awful. As a consequence, she 
thinks that she would have violated the quality maxims at some level if she had just 
plainly said, “Ms. Singer sang an aria from Rigoletto.” Thus, among other things, the 
speaker most likely thinks that Ms. Singer’s performance was awful. Thus, she wants me 
to think that too. Thus, she implicates that Ms. Singer’s performance was awful. 
It seems quite plausible to me that all Manner implicatures can be derived in a similar 
way (and that the above calculation is in line with the general calculation pattern for 
observation implicatures). Thus, I am inclined to think that all Manner implicatures are 
observation implicatures. If it turns out that they are not, however, I am also happy to 
grant that they are neither observation nor exploitation implicatures but implicatures of a 
third kind.63 
                                                 
63  One might think that, in light of the fact that my proposal forces me to reclassify some Manner 
implicatures, it would be better after all to adopt the proposal indicated above, according to which 
observation implicatures differ from exploitation implicatures in that the first involve the violation of a 
maxim while the second involve the exploitation or flouting of a maxim. Note, however, that a proposal 
along these lines also forces us to reclassify some implicatures. Consider, for example, the Manner 
implicature in the case of Katie’s drunken drive. Levinson plausibly classifies this implicature as 
observational. However, there is no maxim whatsoever in this example that the speaker could be said to 
violate (let alone flout or exploit). In this example, the speaker would violate Manner if she didn’t believe 
that the events she recounts happened in the order in which she recounts them. But, given that the speaker 
does hold that belief, Manner is not violated. Thus, according to the proposal just mentioned, we would 
have to say that Levinson is wrong to classify this implicature as observational. So, even according to this 




We should now have a firm enough grasp on the distinction between observation and 
exploitation implicatures to come back to the general principle mentioned at the outset of 
this section.  
Principle: All substitutional implicatures are exploitation implicatures.64 
I take this principle to be justified simply because I fail to see counterexamples to it. 
However, it may also be possible to support it by general considerations of roughly the 
following sort. Suppose a given implicature is not an exploitation implicature. In that 
case, the speaker will have observed all maxims at the level of what is said. 
Correspondingly, there will be no reason to think that what is said is not supposed to be 
conveyed. Hence, no substitutional implicature is generated. So, whenever something is 
not an exploitation implicature, it is also not a substitutional implicature. Thus, by 
contraposition, whenever something is a substitutional implicature, it is also an 
exploitation implicature. More would have to be said to fully substantiate this reasoning. 
But I will leave that for another occasion.65 
3.4.2. Calculating Substitutional Implicatures in the Bank Cases 
We now have a relatively firm grasp on how implicatures are calculated in general. Given 
that, we can turn back to the implicatures posited by the proponent of substitutional MPI. 
                                                 
64 Levinson (1983: 105) similarly claims that “implicatures that arise from the assumption that the speaker 
is observing the maxims […] simply amplify the communicated content in restricted ways”. This is to say 
that all observation implicatures are additive implicatures. Assuming that the distinction between additive 
and substitutional implicatures and the distinction between observation and exploitation implicatures are 
exhaustive, Levinson’s thesis is equivalent to Principle. 
65 Note that the other direction of Principle presumably does not hold, that is, that not all exploitation 
implicatures are substitutional. See, for example, Grice’s letter of recommendation case (Quantity1). In this 
case, we have an exploitation implicature. Still, it may well be that, in addition to what is merely conveyed, 
the speaker also wants to convey what is literally said. Here is a further example of this sort (taken from 
(Grice 1989: 35)). Anna says, “Carla is an old bag.” Berta responds, “Huh, lovely weather for March, isn’t 
it?” Berta thereby implicates that Anna shouldn’t have insulted Carla (or something along these lines). In 
this case, Berta clearly fails to observe Relation; there is no belief she plausibly holds that would connect 
what she says to the questions at issue. Thus, we have an exploitation implicature. Nevertheless, we might 
argue that this implicature is additive. For, it does seem that Berta may want to convey what she said, that 
the weather is good (in order to direct the conversation towards this new topic). So, here we have an 
exploitation implicature that is additive. Thus it is not the case that all exploitation implicatures are 
substitutional. More generally, this last thesis can be motivated as follows. Whenever there is an 
exploitation implicature, the speaker fails to observe the maxims at the level of what is said. However, the 
fact that a speaker fails to observe the maxims at the level of what is said only vindicates the conclusion 
that the speaker cannot want to convey only what is said. The speaker may still want to convey what is said 
and something else in addition. So, an exploitation implicature may well be additive. 
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Are these implicatures properly calculable? To answer this question, we first have to ask 
whether the relevant implicatures are supposed to be observational or exploitational. 
Given Principle, the answer is clear. The proponent of substitutional MPI appeals to 
substitutional implicatures. Thus, her implicatures must be calculable along the lines of 
the pattern discerned for exploitation implicatures. In what follows, however, I will show 
that the implicatures posited by the proponent of substitutional MPI cannot be calculated 
along the lines of this pattern. (To simplify the terminology, I will from now on use 
“calculable” in the sense of “calculable along the lines of the pattern discerned for 
exploitation implicatures.”) 
Let’s discuss the alleged implicature of the knowledge denial in the high standards cases 
first. According to MPI, the knowledge denial in the high standards cases expresses the 
falsity that Bill doesn’t know that the bank will be open. It supposedly seems true, 
however, because it has a true implicature along the lines of the claim that Bill doesn’t 
know for sure that the bank will be open. At first sight, it may seem straightforward to 
calculate the relevant implicature along exploitational lines by appealing to the quality 
maxims. The idea here would be the following. In saying “Bill doesn’t know that the bank 
will be open,” Hannah observes the quality maxims at the level of what is said only if she 
justifiably believes that Bill doesn’t know that the bank will be open. However, according 
to MPI, Bill does know that the bank will be open and Hannah should be perfectly aware 
of that (because Bill just informed her about his epistemic position). Thus, Hannah 
doesn’t believe that Bill doesn’t know that the bank will be open. Hence, she fails to 
observe the quality maxims at the level of what is said. Thus, she doesn’t want to convey 
what she says. So, she most likely implicates that, even though Bill knows that the bank 
will be open, he doesn’t know for sure that this is so. 
This strategy may seem initially appealing. But I don’t think it will do. The basic reason 
for this has been pointed out by DeRose (2009: 122f). In a nutshell, his worry is that while 
we, as omniscient observers of the discussion between Hannah and Sarah, may be in a 
position to calculate the relevant implicature on the basis of the quality maxims, Hannah’s 
audience, namely, Sarah will not be in a position to do so. Let me elaborate. It seems 
immensely plausible that, in order for an implicature to be properly calculable, it must be 
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calculable by the speaker’s audience, that is, by Sarah in the case at hand.66 Thus, if the 
above calculation is supposed to go through, there must be good reasons for Sarah to 
reject the assumption that Hannah believes that Bill doesn’t know that the bank will be 
open when she says so. But Sarah has no such reasons. After all, she doesn’t know what 
Bill told Hannah on the phone. In particular, she has no reason to believe that Bill didn’t 
just say that he doesn’t know that the bank will be open. Thus, Sarah cannot calculate the 
relevant implicature on the basis of the quality maxims. Thus, the implicature isn’t 
properly calculable on the basis of these maxims after all. 
It is for this reason, I think, that proponents of MPI generally appeal to the maxim of 
Relation to calculate the implicature in question.67 In what follows, I will show that this 
strategy is also bound to fail. If the alleged implicature of Hannah’s knowledge denial in 
the high standards cases is calculable on the basis of Relation, it should be possible for 
Hannah to go through a reasoning along the following lines. If Hannah observes Relation 
at the level of what said, then she has belief B. However, there are good reasons to hold 
that Hannah doesn’t have belief B. So, Hannah fails to observe Relation at the level of 
what is said, etc. I will argue that this cannot be done because there is no belief B that 
satisfies this pattern. In other words, I will show that there are no problematic beliefs that 
we have to ascribe to Hannah in order to uphold the assumption that she observes Relation 
at the level of what is said. 
What beliefs do we have to ascribe to Hannah to uphold the assumption that she observes 
Relation at the level of what is said? We have seen that, in order to observe Relation at 
the level of what is said, what Hannah says will have to be relevant for the question at 
issue relative to Hannah’s background assumptions. What beliefs do we have to ascribe 
to Hannah in order to uphold this assumption? The question at issue in the high standards 
bank cases presumably is whether Bill not only knows but knows for sure that the bank 
will be open (because the stakes are high and a far-fetched error-possibility has been 
mentioned). What Hannah says, according to MPI, is that Bill doesn’t know that the bank 
will be open. So, our question is: Which beliefs do we have to ascribe to Hannah in order 
                                                 
66 See e.g. (Saul 2010: Sec. 1.2.2) for a defense of the claim that conversational implicatures must be 
calculable by one’s audience. 




to uphold the assumption that the claim that Bill doesn’t know that the bank will be open 
is relevant for the question of whether Bill knows for sure that the bank will be open 
relative to Hannah’s background beliefs? It seems that the only background belief we 
have to ascribe to Hannah to uphold this assumption is the more or less trivial belief that 
if Bill doesn’t know that the bank will be open, then he is also doesn’t know for sure that 
the bank will be open. Clearly, it is entirely unproblematic to ascribe this belief to Hannah. 
So, there are no implausible beliefs we have to ascribe to Hannah in order to uphold the 
assumption that she observes Relation at the level of what is said. Thus, the relevant 
implicatures cannot be calculated on the basis of Relation.68 
This reasoning might seem too quick. For, one might think that I illegitimately assumed 
that the question at issue in the bank cases is whether Bill knows for sure that the bank 
will be open. Alternatively, one could hold that the question at issue is only whether Bill 
can rule out the salient alternative that the bank has changed its hours.69 Even on this 
assumption, however, there is no problematic belief we have to ascribe to Hannah in order 
to uphold the assumption that she observes Relation at the level of what is said. Given 
that the question at issue is whether Bill can rule out the salient alternative, Hannah 
observes Relation just in case the claim that Bill doesn’t know that the bank will be open 
is relevant for the question of whether Bill can rule out the salient alternative that the bank 
has changed its hours relative to Hannah’s background assumptions. The only belief we 
have to ascribe to Hannah to uphold this assumption, however, is the belief that, if Bill 
doesn’t even know that the bank will be open, then he will most likely also not be in a 
position to rule out the alternative that the bank has changed its hours (which is, after all, 
more far-fetched than any alternative one has to rule out to obtain knowledge, according 
to MPI). Again, it is not at all implausible that Hannah should hold this belief. So, as 
before, we cannot calculate the relevant implicature on the basis of Relation.70 
                                                 
68 See (DeRose 2009: 122) for essentially the same point. 
69 See (Blome-Tillmann 2013b: 4309f) and (Dimmock and Huvenes 2014: Sec. 6) for proposals along these 
lines. 
70 Note, besides, that I find it highly implausible that the question at issue in the high standards bank cases 
should only be whether Bill can rule out the salient alternative. Here is why. The proponent of MPI has to 
agree that in the low standards bank cases Hannah’s knowledge ascription is relevant (because no 
implicature is supposed to be generated in these cases). Hence, at least one of the questions at issue in the 
low standards cases must be whether Bill knows that the bank will be open. However, if this question is at 
issue in the low standards cases, then there is no reason why it should not also be at issue in the high 
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Now, it might be held that, at least if we hold that the issue in the bank cases is whether 
Bill can rule out the salient alternative, then it is possible to calculate the relevant 
implicature on the basis of Quantity1. The reasoning would go as follows. If Hannah 
observes Quantity1 at the level of what is said, then what she says must be as informative 
as is required. What she says, however, isn’t as informative as is required. For, even if we 
grant that what Hannah says makes likely a particular answer to the question of whether 
Bill can rule out the salient alternative, it does not entail any such answer. Thus, Hannah 
fails to observe Quantity1 at the level of what is said. 
At this stage, however, we must remember what Quantity1 actually demands. We have 
seen that, according to Quantity1, a speaker should be only as informative as she can be 
without violating the quality maxims. In fact, then, we can only reason as follows. If 
Hannah observes Quantity1 at the level of what is said, then what she says must be as 
informative as she can be without violating the quality maxims. It is not at all clear, 
however, that there are any reasons for Sarah to reject the consequent of this conditional. 
For, again, Sarah has no clue what Bill told Hannah on the phone. Correspondingly, it is 
a perfectly open possibility for her that Bill didn’t say whether he can rule out the salient 
alternative that the bank has changed its hours. So, again, it is impossible for Sarah to 
calculate the relevant implicature on the basis of Quantity1. 
So much for Hannah’s knowledge denial in the high standards cases. Let’s now turn to 
her knowledge ascription. The situation in this case looks even worse. This time, the 
appeal to quality is straightforwardly ruled out because, according to MPI, Hannah says 
something she justifiably believes. We can thus turn directly to the calculation of the 
relevant implicature in terms of Relation. As before, we have to ask whether there are any 
implausible beliefs that we have to ascribe to Hannah to uphold the assumption that she 
observes Relation at the level of what is said. Again, I will argue that there are no such 
beliefs. 
                                                 
standards cases. After all, it would seem bizarre if raising the stakes and mentioning further alternatives 
should make knowledge irrelevant and leave as relevant only the mentioned salient alternatives. In high 
standards situations, we plausibly strive for stronger epistemic positions, that is, to rule out larger sets of 
alternatives; we don’t just strive to achieve different epistemic positions, that is, to rule out different sets of 
alternatives. So, knowledge should be relevant in the high standards cases. Hence, the question at issue in 
the high standards cases should be whether Bill knows that the bank will be open and can rule out the salient 
alternative, that is, roughly, whether Bill knows for sure that the bank will be open. 
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What beliefs do we have to ascribe to Hannah to uphold the assumption that she observes 
Relation at the level of what is said? According to MPI, Hannah expresses the proposition 
that Bill knows that the bank will be open when she says “Bill knows that the bank will 
be open” in the high standards cases. The question at issue is, again, whether Bill knows 
for sure that the bank will be open (or, alternatively, whether Bill can rule out the salient 
alternative that the bank has changed its hours). So, Hannah will be observing Relation 
just if the claim that Bill knows that the bank will be open is relevant for the question of 
whether Bill knows for sure that the bank will be open (or, alternatively, whether Bill can 
rule out the salient alternative that the bank has changed its hours) relative to Hannah’s 
background beliefs. Which background beliefs do we have to ascribe to Hannah to uphold 
that assumption? Presumably, we have to ascribe to Hannah the belief that, if Bill already 
knows that the bank will be open, then there is a good (or at least improved) chance that 
he even knows for sure that the bank will be open (or, alternatively, that he can even rule 
out the salient alternative that the bank has changed its hours). Are there any reasons for 
Sarah not to ascribe this belief to Hannah? I don’t see any. After all, the belief is quite 
plausible. So, again, the Relation strategy fails. 
As before, one might want to invoke Quantity1. For, again, one might want to say that 
Hannah is not as informative as is required. After all, she doesn’t directly answer the 
question of whether Bill knows for sure that the bank will be open (or can rule out the 
salient alternative). As before, however, we can respond that, in order to observe 
Quantity1, Hannah needs to be only as informative as she can be without violating the 
quality maxims. And, also as before, Sarah has no reason to believe that Hannah would 
be in a position to say something more directly to the point without violating the quality 
maxims. For example, it should be perfectly unproblematic for Sarah to assume that 
Hannah just cannot tell whether Bill knows for sure that the bank will be open (or, 
alternatively, can rule out the salient alternative). Thus, again, the Quantity1 strategy fails. 
In sum, neither the alleged implicature of Hannah’s knowledge ascription in the high 
standards cases nor the alleged implicature of Hannah’s knowledge denial in the high 
standards cases can be calculated along exploitational lines. Hence, we should reject the 





To conclude, the proponent of MPI can either appeal to additive implicatures or to 
substitutional implicatures. If she appeals to additive implicatures, she cannot sustain the 
bridging thesis, according to which the seeming truth-value of a given claim is often 
determined by the truth-value of the implicatures this claim carries. If the proponent of 
MPI appeals to substitutional implicatures, she doesn’t face this problem (assuming that 
we grant the existence of implicitures). Still, she cannot sustain the semantic/pragmatic 
thesis, according to which the knowledge claims in the bank cases have the relevant 
implicatures. The reason for this is that substitutional implicatures must be calculable 
along the lines of the pattern discerned for exploitation implicatures; and the implicatures 
posited by the proponent of MPI cannot be calculated along these lines.  Thus, either way, 
MPI must be rejected. 
Before we go on, I should note that the objections against MPI I have discussed in this 
chapter are by no means to only objections there are. Still, they have a major merit that 
sets them apart from other objections in the literature, namely, they don’t appeal to any 
potentially controversial intuitive datum (other than the Contextualist Data, which, as 
indicated, are just presupposed in this dissertation and, besides, can be backed up by 
empirical results). In particular, the result that additive implicatures cannot be used to 
explain why a given claim seems true is based on very general considerations as to how 
we evaluate the truth-value of a given claim. Similarly, the result that substitutional 
implicatures cannot be calculated in the bank cases is independent of any appeal to 
intuitive data. The same cannot be said about the other objections present in the 
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literature.71 I do not want to claim that these objections have no force for this reason. 
However, they do seem to have a weak spot that may be difficult to remove.
                                                 
71 There is the objection that the alleged implicatures of the knowledge claims in the bank cases cannot be 
canceled properly even though, qua implicature, they should be. See (Dimmock and Huvenes 2014: Sec. 
5) and (Petersen 2014: 12). This objection relies on the intuition that the alleged implicatures cannot be 
canceled properly. Montminy (2007: 105) points out that this intuition is not universally accepted. There is 
the objection that, at least once the proponent of MPI appeals to implicitures, she will no longer be in a 
position to explain disagreement or retraction data. See (Montminy 2007: 118) and (Dimmock and Huvenes 
2014: Sec. 4). This objection obviously relies on disagreement and retraction data. These are a mine field 
anyway. And there is the objection that, if knowledge claims had implicatures, people should be aware of 
this fact in a way in which they aren’t. See (Montminy 2007: 117, 2009: 646f) and (Blome-Tillmann 2013b: 
Sec. 5). This objection relies on the intuition that we aren’t properly aware of the alleged implicatures in 
the bank cases, which is rejected e.g. in (Ludlow 2005: 30f) and (Petersen 2014: 10). (The awareness 




4. Skeptical Pragmatic Invariantism 
We now turn to a second version of pragmatic invariantism, namely, skeptical pragmatic 
invariantism (SPI). This view is very similar to MPI, the major difference being that, 
according to SPI, “knows” invariably expresses a very demanding relation. In more detail, 
SPI amounts to the following claims. “Knows” invariably expresses the same relation. 
This relation is such that Hannah’s knowledge denials in the bank cases turn out to express 
a truth, while her knowledge ascriptions turn out to express a falsity. Thus, SPI 
straightforwardly explains the data about the high standards cases: Our judgments about 
these cases just reflect the truth-values of the propositions the proponent of SPI takes to 
be expressed by the claims in question. But how does SPI explain the data about the low 
standards cases, where our judgments diverge from the truth-values of the allegedly 
expressed propositions? As should be expected, the proponent of SPI responds to this 
question in the following way. The knowledge ascription in the low standards cases seems 
true because it has a true implicature, and the knowledge denial in the low standards cases 
seems false because it has a false implicature. 
Similar to the case of MPI, we can split up SPI into two subtheses. On the one hand, there 
is the semantic/pragmatic claim that Hannah’s knowledge ascription in the low standards 
cases expresses a falsity but implicates a truth, while Hannah’s knowledge denial in the 
low standards cases expresses a truth but implicates a falsity. On the other hand, there is 
the bridging thesis, according to which, roughly, truth-value intuitions can be guided by 
the implicatures of the claims in question. 
This time, I will just grant the bridging thesis. For, we have seen in the discussion of MPI 
that the bridging thesis can be sustained if the proponent of SPI appeals to substitutional 
implicatures, in particular, implicitures. And proponents of SPI generally appeal to such 
implicatures anyway.1 The only question that needs to be addressed then is whether the 
semantic/pragmatic thesis can be sustained. To simplify the discussion, I will just identify 
                                                 
1 Schaffer (2004b) defends a version of SPI in terms of substitutional implicatures that are not implicitures. 
But he has given up this view by now. Impliciture SPI is defended in (Conee 2005a: 52f), (Douven 2007) 
and (Davis 2004: 273f, 2007: 427, 2010: 1155–1156). Bach (2010: FN 31) “suggests, without endorsing,” 
it. Fantl and McGrath (2009: 183–194; 2012: 693f) claim that the view is “not out of the question.” 
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SPI with this thesis in what follows. And I will use the term “implicature” to refer only 
to substitutional implicatures, in particular, (substitutional) implicitures. 
So, is SPI a plausible position? My verdict on this issue will be somewhat split. On the 
one hand, I think that SPI is much more promising than MPI and, thus, deserves to be 
defended. On the other hand, I think that there are data that rebel against SPI, data, 
however, that may not be universally accepted and that I cannot back up by empirical 
results. Correspondingly, the structure of this chapter is as follows. First, I will briefly 
elaborate on the definition of SPI. In particular, I will discuss how we should interpret the 
content of the implicatures posited by the proponent of SPI in order to avoid some simple-
minded objections. Second, I will discuss and reject what I consider to be more serious 
objections to SPI. Finally, I will present the intuitive datum that I think speaks against 
SPI. In particular, I will argue that, if the knowledge claims in the bank cases had the 
implicatures they are supposed to have according to SPI, then people should be aware of 
this fact in a way in which they are not. As indicated already, this datum may not be 
universally accepted. So, I will only somewhat tentatively conclude that SPI must be 
rejected. 
4.1. What is Implicated? 
What is the content of the implicatures posited by the proponent of SPI? I take it to be 
relatively uncontroversial among proponents and sympathizers of SPI that the knowledge 
claims in the low standards scenarios are supposed to be cases of loose use. Thus, the 
implicature of the knowledge ascription in the low standards cases is that Bill is close 
enough to knowing that the bank will be open, and the implicature of the knowledge 
denial in the low standards cases is that Bill is not close enough to knowing that the bank 
will be open. Similar implicatures are generated in many other situations. For example, 
when I say “It’s three o’clock,” I will often implicate that it is only close enough to three 
o’clock. And, when I say “It’s not three o’clock,” I may implicate that it is not even close 
enough to three o’clock.2 
                                                 
2 Note, that, as before in the case of impliciture MPI, loose use, qua impliciture, has a somewhat dubious 
status. DeRose (2012: 714ff), for example, argues that loose use can be treated semantically, suggesting 
that, therefore, loose use accounts might just be forms of contextualism. For similar doubts, see (Leite 2005: 
121). Davis (2007: 415–417) argues, obviously, that loose use is a pragmatic phenomenon. Again, this is a 
topic for another occasion. 
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What does it mean to say that one is close enough to knowing something? I will not 
engage in the project of spelling out this notion. Still, let me issue a warning that two 
proposals that have come up in the literature won’t do. 
The first proposal has it that S is close enough to knowing that p iff, unless something 
unlikely happens, S knows that p. (Here, the “unless”-clause is outside the scope of the 
knowledge operator.) 3  This proposal is problematic because it doesn’t yield a true 
implicature for the knowledge ascription in the low standards cases. In more detail, the 
problem is the following. The low standards bank cases are such that the bank will be 
open on the next Saturday. So, in these scenarios, nothing unlikely happens. So, if it is 
true that, unless something unlikely happens, Bill knows that the bank will be open, Bill 
will know that the bank will be open in these scenarios. However, according to SPI, Bill 
doesn’t know that the bank will be open in the low standards cases. So, it is not true that, 
unless something unlikely happens, he knows that the bank will be open in these cases. 
Thus, assuming that Hannah’s knowledge ascription implicates that, unless something 
unlikely happens, Bill knows that the bank will be open, this implicature will be just as 
false as the proposition allegedly expressed. In order to sustain SPI, however, we need a 
true implicature for the knowledge ascription in the low standards cases. So, the 
proponent of SPI cannot accept the above interpretation of the loose use view. 
The second proposal to interpret the loose use view has it that S is close enough to 
knowing that p iff S knows that, unless something unlikely happens, p. (Here, the 
“unless”-clause is within the scope of the knowledge operator.) 4  This proposal is 
problematic because it does not respect plausible judgments to the effect that knowledge 
is factive. Suppose, for example, that, in a scenario otherwise like the low standards cases, 
the unlikely happened and, unbeknownst to Hannah and Sarah, the bank did change its 
hours and won’t be open on Saturday. Clearly, it would now seem intuitively false for 
Hannah to say “Bill knows that the bank will be open on Saturday.” For, the bank just 
                                                 
3 Bach (2010: 122f) “suggests without endorsing” this proposal. 
4 Douven (2007: 333n) endorses this view and explicitly distinguishes it from the first. But he doesn’t say 
why he dismisses the first. Bach “suggests without endorsing” this view as well. But, he favors the first 
view above. As regards the second, he claims that “it might seem extreme to suppose that most of what 
ordinarily passes for categorical knowledge is really conditional in content.” But he doesn’t give reasons 
for this contention either. Harman (2007: 176) also seems to propose a view along these lines. His remarks 
are very sketchy though and he takes his view to be a form of contextualism. 
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won’t be open on Saturday. On the present account, however, the claim would have to 
seem true. The reason is this. 
First of all, it should be clear that, in the modified low standards case just described 
(where, unbeknownst to Hannah and Sarah, the unlikely happened and the bank changed 
its hours), Hannah’s knowledge ascription should have just the same implicatures as it 
has in the original low standards cases. For, Hannah and Sarah’s conversational context 
is identical in these scenarios. And it would seem that the presence of an implicature 
depends on nothing but the conversational context. Thus, if we accept the above 
interpretation of the loose use account, Hannah’s knowledge ascription should implicate 
that Bill knows that, unless something unlikely happens, the bank will open. But, second, 
this implicature will be just as true in the modified low standards cases as it is in the 
original low standards cases. After all, why should the answer to the question of whether 
Bill knows that, unless something unlikely happens, the bank will be open depend on 
whether the unlikely did happen and the bank did change its hours? So, to the extent that 
the knowledge ascription in the original low standards bank cases seems true because of 
the implicature just discussed, the knowledge ascription in the modified low standards 
cases should seem true for just the same reason. Clearly, though, it doesn’t. 
The above proposals should thus be dismissed. As I said, I will not engage in the project 
of trying to provide an alternative interpretation of the notion of being close enough to 
knowledge. But let me briefly indicate a promising account in terms of the already 
mentioned relevant alternatives framework. In terms of that framework, we can say that 
S is close enough to knowing that p iff p and S can rule out all alternatives to p that are at 
issue in the given context.5 Such a view would not be subject to the above criticisms. For, 
first, we now get an arguably true implicature for the knowledge ascription in the low 
standards cases, namely, the claim that the bank will be open and Bill can rule out all 
alternatives to this claim at issue in the low standards cases (these alternatives presumably 
include only moderately distant alternatives because not much is at stake and no far-
fetched error-possibilities have been mentioned in the low standards cases). Second, this 
implicature turns out false once we assume that the bank will not be open. For, the present 
account has it that one can know that p only if p. Thus, factivity intuitions are respected. 
                                                 
5 See (Davis 2007: 420) for considerations that seem to go into a similar direction. 
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We now have a sufficiently clear conception of the version of SPI that interests us here 
to consider some genuine objections. Let’s start with objections I don’t consider decisive. 
4.2. Objections and Replies 
Sentence and Speaker Meaning 
To begin with, consider the following, most commonly raised worry.6 In a nutshell, this 
worry has it that SPI is incompatible with plausible ideas as to how words acquire their 
meaning. In more detail, it goes as follows. If, as the proponent of SPI has it, “knows” 
does not convey what it literally expresses in the low standards bank cases, then it will 
not convey what it literally expresses in most ordinary conversations. For, most ordinary 
conversations in which we ascribe knowledge are very much like the conversation in the 
low standards cases. In particular, the subject’s epistemic position is roughly as good as 
Bill’s and there isn’t much at stake and no error-possibilities have been mentioned. 
However, 
if we adopt the eminently plausible view that the linguistic meaning of an expression is determined 
by its use in a speech community—or by the conventions governing its use—then there seems to 
be no room for a difference between literal meaning and standard speaker meaning. (Blome-
Tillmann 2013b: 4304) 
Adapted to my terminology, “eminently plausible” views on meaning determination 
entail that it is impossible for an expression to literally express something other than what 
it conveys in most ordinary conversations. Thus, “knows” must convey what it literally 
expresses in the low standards cases. So, SPI is wrong. 
Response 1 
This worry doesn’t seem decisive because there is not much of a pressure for the 
proponent of SPI to accept the view on meaning determination described by Blome-
Tillmann in the quote above. For example, the proponent of SPI could accept the 
following closely related and seemingly equally plausible view instead. What a term 
literally expresses is determined by what the term standardly conveys when used literally. 
This view may amount to a pointless triviality if we take the literal uses of a term to be 
just those uses where the term is used to convey what it literally expresses. But we need 
                                                 
6 See (Hawthorne 2004a: 121–123), (DeRose 2009: 125), (Fantl and McGrath 2009: 48) and (Blome-
Tillmann 2013b: 4304f). 
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not do so. Plausibly enough, there are independent tests for non-literality. For example, it 
seems plausible that there are independent signs of irony, hyperbole, etc.7 So, all that we 
can establish is that there is “no room for a difference” between what a term literally 
expresses and what it is standardly used to convey when it is used literally. But this 
principle does not threaten SPI. For, the proponent of SPI will hold that, on the rare 
occasions where “knows” is used literally (say, when we speak of a priori truths or truths 
we gather from immediate perception), it does convey what it literally expresses 
according to SPI, namely, a quite demanding epistemic relation. 
Response 2 
Let me also discuss a second response strategy to the above objection. It is based on the 
idea that Bill might not be as representative a knower as this objection suggests. In detail, 
it goes as follows. Consider the claim that a proponent of SPI is committed to the view 
that ordinary knowledge claims generally don’t convey what they literally express. This 
commitment is supposed to follow from the thesis that Bill doesn’t know that the bank 
will be open in the bank cases. Note, though, that it only follows from this thesis if the 
epistemic position of subjects to which we ordinarily ascribe knowledge generally equals 
or is worse than Bill’s in the bank cases. This is far from trivial, however. It may just as 
well be that, in general, we ascribe knowledge only to subjects whose epistemic position 
is better than Bill’s. Thus, a proponent of SPI can respond to the present argument by just 
denying that ordinary knowledge claims generally don’t convey what they literally 
express.8,9 
                                                 
7 One may want to object at this point that the knowledge claims in the bank cases just don’t show these 
signs of non-literality. In fact, my objection to SPI below (in terms of the awareness principle) will be an 
objection precisely along these lines. Note, however, that this objection is entirely independent of the 
general semantic considerations discussed above. If, as the proponent of SPI has it, knowledge claims are 
often cases of non-literal speech, then they should show the signs of non-literal speech whatever we think 
about how expressions acquire their meaning. 
8 The SPI accounts in (Conee 2005a: 52) and (Davis 2007, 2010) suggest responses along these lines. 
9 This move may also suffice to alleviate Hawthorne’s worry that, if SPI is true, “no one—not even the 
philosophically unsophisticated—ever believes that he knows such ordinary proposition as that Manchester 
United beat Coventry City 2–1, or that the plane from Detroit is late, or that the towels are in the 
dryer.” (2004a: 119) Assuming that, according to SPI, knowledge claims like the ones mentioned by 
Hawthorne normally do convey what they literally express, SPI is perfectly compatible with the view that 




Here is a possible rejoinder to this response. Note that, according to this response, we 
often use “knows” literally. But if that is so, Cohen (2005a: 58) objects,  then the 
proponent of SPI can no longer explain why “competent speakers, under skeptical 
pressure, tend to deny that we know even the most conspicuous facts of perception, the 
clearest memories, etc.”10 This objection can be explicated as follows. If, as the present 
response has it, we often use “knows” literally, then we most certainly do so in the cases 
Cohen describes (that involve “the most conspicuous facts of perception, the clearest 
memories, etc.”). And, if we use “knows” literally in these cases, SPI has no explanation 
for why we still deny the relevant knowledge claims in the face of skeptical 
considerations. So, if we often use “knows” literally, Cohen’s cases cannot be explained 
in terms of SPI. 
I reject this rejoinder because it relies on what seems to be a dubious datum, namely, the 
datum that, in the face of skeptical pressure, competent speakers deny knowledge even of 
“the most conspicuous facts of perception, the clearest memories, etc.” Many people, in 
particular proponents and sympathizers of SPI, would reject this datum. Davis, for 
example, claims: 
Careful reflection does not ordinarily prompt a retraction or correction of the claim to know one 
has a hand, the way it prompts Hannah to retract her claim to know the bank will be open on 
Saturday. (Davis 2007: 436) 
Relatedly, Fantl and McGrath write: 
Try to get someone to concede he doesn’t know his spouse will be home by 6 p.m., and you will 
get your concession without too much work. Try to get someone to concede that he doesn’t know 
that George W. Bush wasn’t the first president—and good luck to you! (Fantl and McGrath 2009: 
193f) 11 
All three authors seem to agree that there is whole range of claims that we wouldn’t retract 
under skeptical pressure. Thus, we can dismiss Cohen’s rejoinder on the grounds that it 
is based on what seems to be a questionable datum. 
It must be granted that at least some people (some philosophers, for example) become 
convinced by wide-ranging skeptical arguments and, as a result, come to think that they 
know hardly anything at all. Similarly, there certainly are skeptical arguments that are 
                                                 
10 See (DeRose 2012: 712f) for a related worry. 
11 See also (Conee 2005a: 53) and (Douven 2007: Sec. 2) for related considerations. 
102 
 
very difficult to answer. These data cannot be explained on the basis of SPI once we 
accept the above response. However, I don’t think that these data and the more mundane 
bank case reactions need to be explained in a uniform fashion. One candidate account for 
why skeptical arguments sound compelling to some people that would be perfectly 
compatible with SPI is that skeptical arguments simply involve one or the other easily 
missable argumentative fallacy.12 This issue would have to be addressed in more detail. 
But I think it should be clear that the burden of proof is on those who want to hold that 
skeptical arguments do yield troublesome data for the proponent of SPI. 
Expansion 
So much for the first worry for SPI. Here is a second worry. It is a worry that Blome-
Tillmann raises against the proponent of MPI who appeals to (expansion) implicitures. 
But it could just as well be raised against the forms of SPI we are considering in this 
section (that also appeal to (expansion) implicitures). Blome-Tillmann states this worry 
in the following quote. As indicated, he addresses MPI, but it should be obvious how to 
transfer his considerations to the case of SPI. 
[I]f we took Hannah’s utterance of [‘Bill doesn’t know whether the bank will be open’ in the high 
standards cases] […] to be a case of expansion, then it should—just as in the examples in (23) 
[which correspond to my examples of implicitures above]—be fairly obvious what the additive but 
suppressed lexical material of that utterance would consist in. That this is far from obvious, 
however, casts significant doubt on the view that the utterances at issue are instances of Bach’s 
expansion impliciture. (Blome-Tillmann 2013b: 4317)13 
The objection, here, cannot be that it is impossible to expand Hannah’s knowledge claims 
such that they express their alleged implicitures. For, according to SPI, Hannah’s 
knowledge claims are supposed to implicite that Bill is (not) close enough to knowing 
that the bank will be open or, equivalently, that Bill is (not) close enough to being such 
that Bill knows that the bank will be open. And “Bill is (not) close enough to being such 
that Bill knows that the bank will be open” most certainly is an expansion of the sentence 
                                                 
12 See (Conee 2005b: 66) and (Davis 2007: 436) for the idea of separating the account of our reactions to 
skeptical arguments and the account of bank case reactions. See (Sosa 1999: 148) and (Feldman 2001: 75f) 
for candidate fallacies that might be involved in skeptical arguments. Sosa, for example, argues that 
knowledge requires “safe” not “sensitive” beliefs. On that basis, he goes on to suggest that skeptical 
arguments sound compelling because “[s]afety and sensitivity, being mutual contrapositives, are easily 
confused.” 
13 See (Leite 2005: 122) for a similar objection. 
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“Bill knows that the bank will be open.”14 The objection rather is this. First, it is, in some 
sense, “far from obvious” what the additional but suppressed lexical material of Hannah’s 
utterances could be. Second, this should be fairly obvious if they are cases of implicitures. 
So, they are not cases of implicitures. 
I grant the first premise. However, I deny the second. This premise may initially seem 
plausible. For example, when the parents say to the child “You are not going to die,” and 
the child responds “I am immortal then?” the parents will straightforwardly come up with 
the expansion “You are not going to die from the cut.” However, this observation doesn’t 
generalize. Consider the following dialogue, 
Teacher: Everyone is there. Let’s start. 
Student: Everyone? What about the pope? 
Teacher: Well, everyone who’s participating in the course. 
Student: What about John? (Assume that John participates in the course but is absent 
because of a long hospital stay.) 
Teacher: Well, everyone who’s supposed to be here is there! 
Student: But wasn’t the janitor supposed to be here to repair the blackboard? (Suppose 
that’s true.) 
Teacher: You know what I meant! Let’s start. 
Presumably, the teacher meant that everyone whose absence would be a reason not to 
start is there. But she couldn’t articulate it. Such things do happen. So, it seems that it is 
not generally obvious how to articulate implicitures. But if that is so, then it doesn’t seem 
to be a problem that it is not obvious what the expansions of Hannah’s knowledge claims 
should look like (so long as these expansions are available at all). Hence, Blome-
Tillmann’s objection has no force. 
Calculability 
Consider next the idea of objecting to SPI on the basis of the idea that the alleged 
implicatures aren’t properly calculable. Given that the implicatures posited by the 
                                                 
14 By the way, the same goes if Blome-Tillmann’s objection is leveled against MPI. Blome-Tillmann 
himself points out, in a different paper, that we can say things like “x knows with very/quite/extremely good 
evidence/justification that p.” (2008: 46) These sentences clearly are expansions of the sentence “x knows 
that p” and at least some of them (or their negations) may well be used to express what Hannah’s knowledge 
claims implicite according to MPI. 
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proponent of SPI are supposed to be substitutional, they must be calculable along the lines 
of the pattern discerned above for exploitation implicatures. It is relatively 
straightforward, however, to calculate them along these lines. 
Consider the knowledge ascription in the low standards cases first. Here the standard 
proposal is roughly this.15 If Hannah observes Quality1 (“Be sincere”) at the level of what 
is said when she says that Bill knows that the bank will be open, then she must believe 
that Bill knows that the bank will be open. Given SPI, however, Hannah doesn’t believe 
that (given what Bill told her). Thus, Hannah fails to observe Quality1. So, we get an 
exploitation implicature, plausibly to the effect that Bill does not know that the bank will 
be open but still is close enough to knowing that the bank will be open. 
One might want to object, as we did before in the case of MPI, that Sarah need not be 
aware of the Quality1 violation and, thus, will fail to calculate the relevant implicature in 
the way just proposed. In the present context, however, this response has no force. For, 
depending on how the line between knowledge and non-knowledge is drawn, the 
proponent of SPI may either argue that we hardly know anything at all or, at least, that 
we generally do not have knowledge of the kind that is involved in the bank cases (say, 
knowledge about complex, specific future facts). Either way, Sarah will be in a position 
to see the Quality1 violation because she will plausibly be aware that we hardly if ever 
have the relevant kind of knowledge. So, the above derivation seems fine.  
Consider the knowledge denial in the low standards cases next. On the basis of the above 
proposal, it is easy to see how the relevant impliciture in this case can be calculated. The 
proponent of SPI can argue that it is just trivial that Bill doesn’t know that the bank will 
be open (because we hardly if ever have knowledge of this kind). Thus, what Hannah 
says is completely uninformative (and, given that she has just been talking to Bill about 
his epistemic position with respect to the claim that bank will be open, it should be clear 
even to Sarah that Hannah would be in a position to provide at least some relevant 
information). So, Hannah cannot be assumed to be observing Quantity1 (“Be as 
informative as is required”) at the level of what is said. This will trigger the search for an 
                                                 
15 See (Schaffer 2004b: 140), (Davis 2007: 413) and (Douven 2007: 339). 
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alternative content she could have meant. And a plausible candidate here is that Bill is 
not even close enough to knowing that the bank will be open. 
4.3. Awareness 
Let’s now turn to what I take to be a more serious worry. It is based on the observation 
that, if a given utterance has a substitutional implicature, then people are, in a yet to be 
specified sense, aware of the discrepancy between what they say and what they mean to 
convey, for short, they are aware of their implicatures. Let’s refer to this idea as the 
awareness principle.16 We can cash it out in the following way. Note, to begin with, that, 
given Principle, all substitutional implicature are exploitation implicatures. This means 
that, whenever a given utterance has a substitutional implicature, the literal content of that 
utterance violates at least one conversational maxim. So, if a hearer either fails to realize 
that an utterance has such an implicature or intentionally takes the utterance too literally—
is being a “stickler for correct speech” to use a phrase from Grice—, it will be natural for 
her to object to the literal content of the relevant utterance on the grounds that it violates 
the relevant maxims. The idea that, in the case of substitutional implicatures, people are 
aware of their implicatures can now be spelled out in the following way. A speaker 
confronted with such an objection will straightforwardly be able to make sense of this 
objection (either in terms of the idea that the objector failed to see the implicature or else 
is being nitpicky) and respond accordingly. 
Let’s consider some examples. Suppose the following dialogue takes places. 
A: The plane was a mile long. 
B: That’s absurd! No plane is a mile long! 
Here, A’s first utterance generates a substitutional implicature to the effect that the plane 
was huge. B’s response is an objection to the literal content of A’s claim, in particular, to 
its violation of Quality1. Now, it seems pretty clear that A, as a competent speaker, will 
                                                 
16 See (Bach 2005: 73), (MacFarlane 2005b: 206f, 2011: 541) and (Turri 2014) for a similar observation as 
part of a case against SPI. See also (Hawthorne 2004a: 104f). Hawthorne only presents this observation as 
an objection to contextualism. However, as the examples he discusses suggest, he seems willing to classify 
certain forms SPI (those that appeal to loose use) as forms of contextualism. Fantl and McGrath (2012: 
693f) also acknowledge a principle along the above lines (but deny that it cuts against loose use SPI). See 




straightforwardly realize that B is (intentionally or unintentionally) missing the point and, 
thus, respond accordingly, for example, as follows, 
A: Oh c’mon, you know what I meant! 
The present example involved a violation of Quality1. But it seems that people are not 
only aware of Quality1 substitutional implicatures, but of substitutional implicatures in 
general. 
Consider, for example, a case where the relevant maxim is Relation. A and B are 
wondering what to do about John’s absence. The following dialogue transpires. 
A: John will come or he won’t. 
B: Well, these are all the options, aren’t they? But I was wondering what we should 
do about his absence. 
Again, the following response on the part of A should be readily at hand for all competent 
speakers. 
A: Oh, c’mon. You know what I meant. (There is nothing we can do about his 
absence.) 
Here is an example where the violated maxim is Quality2. Consider the following case as 
described by Grice. 
I say of X’s wife, She is probably deceiving him this evening. In a suitable context, or with a 
suitable gesture or tone of voice, it may be clear that I have no adequate reason for supposing this 
to be the case. My partner, to preserve the assumption that the conversational game is still being 
played, assumes that I am getting at some related proposition for the acceptance of which I do have 
a reasonable basis. The related proposition might well be that she is given to deceiving her husband, 
or possibly that she is the sort of person who would not stop short of such conduct. (Grice 1989: 
34f) 
In the just described context, the following dialogue could occur. 
A: She’s probably deceiving him this evening. 
B: How can you know that? You do not even know whether she went out today! 
A: Oh, c’mon. You know what I meant. 
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So far, we have considered only examples that involve implicatures that are not 
implicitures. But what I have said also goes for implicitures. With respect to quantifiers, 
Stanley for example claims that 
the unrestricted interpretation is also available to competent language users, as the coherence of 
the following sort of discourse illustrates: 
A: Every bottle is in the fridge. 
B: Well, your fridge couldn’t possibly be that large! There are bottles somewhere in the world that 
aren’t in your fridge. (Stanley 2007: 211) 
Given this dialogue, it would be perfectly natural for A to respond by saying “Oh, c’mon. 
You know what I meant.”17 Related observations have frequently been made with respect 
to implicitures of the loose use type. Here as well, dialogues of the following type seem 
fine. 
A: It’s {about} three o’clock. 
B: It’s one minute past! 
A: Oh, c’mon. You know what I meant.18 
In the above two impliciture cases, the objections targeted violations of Quality1. But we 
can also take claims with implicitures too literally by objecting to violations of Relation. 
Consider, for example, the following case, where the teacher tries to defend herself 
against the charge that a given riddle was too difficult a homework. 
Teacher: Someone even solved the riddle! 
Parents: So? That was presumably you! 
Teacher: Oh, c’mon. You know what I meant. 
This dialogue also seems fine. So, it seems that we are aware of implicitures in just the 
same way in which we are aware of other implicatures.19  
                                                 
17 For similar remarks, see also (Grice 1989: 45), (Conee 2005a: 49) and (Montminy 2009: 646f). 
18 See e.g. (Lasersohn 1999: 522), (Bach 2005: 73), (MacFarlane 2005b: 207, 2011: 541), (Blome-Tillmann 
2013b: 4302) and (Turri 2014). 
19 The idea of cashing out the awareness principle in terms of the naturalness of dialogues like the ones 
above is taken from Blome-Tillmann. Note some points of divergence though. First, I have argued that B’s 
respective objections can either be understood in terms of the idea that B fails to see the implicature or in 
terms of the idea that she is being a stickler. Blome-Tillmann (2013b: 4311n) envisages only the first kind 
of understanding. The stickler reading, however, often is the only reading available, particularly when it 
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Given the awareness principle, the problem for the proponent of SPI is this. Consider 
Hannah’s knowledge ascription in the low standards cases. According to SPI, this claim 
has a substitutional implicature (in particular, a loose use implicature) because what 
Hannah says violates Quality1. So, given the above awareness principle, the following 
dialogue should be fine in the low standards cases. 
Hannah: Bill knows that the bank will be open. 
Sarah: I doubt that. The bank could have changed its hours. 
#Hannah: Oh, c’mon. You know what I meant. 
However, many would say (and I would agree) that Hannah’s response seems not 
particularly natural. As Hawthorne (2004a: 105) claims, “our standard techniques for 
dealing with epistemic challenges that raise relatively farfetched possibilities are 
concession and, more rarely, sticking to one’s guns.” So, Hannah could plausibly concede 
“You’re right. I didn’t think of that” or stick to her guns by saying “(Oh, c’mon.) How 
likely is that?” The above, clarifying response, however, seems unnatural.20,21 
Consider also Hannah’s knowledge denial in the low standards cases. The proponent of 
SPI has it that this claim has a substitutional implicature that is based on the violation of 
                                                 
comes to implicitures. (The concept of a stickler is taken from (or at least inspired by) (Grice 1989: 44f). It 
is also employed in (Fantl and McGrath 2012: 693f).) Second, Blome-Tillmann thinks that, in her second 
utterance, A should be able to “clarif[y] her initial intentions by admitting that she hasn’t spoken literally 
but exaggerated, spoken ironically, etc.” (2013b: 4311n) Similarly, one might think that A should be able 
to state what exactly it was that she implicated (Hawthorne’s discussion may suggest that). I do not want 
to go so far as that. For, the categories of exaggeration, irony, etc. may be unfamiliar. And I don’t think that 
speakers are generally able to tell what exactly it is they implicate (see the discussion of expansion above). 
Still, it seems reasonable to require that speakers be able to tell that the hearer was missing the point. This 
seems to be captured by the response “You know what I meant!” Third, Blome-Tillmann (just like all the 
other authors mentioned in the previous footnotes) considers only objections on the part of B to the truth-
value of A’s literal claim, that is, only cases of Quality1 violations. I think that B’s objections may target 
whatever maxim violation there is. 
20 See also (Bach 2005: 73), (MacFarlane 2005b: 207, 2011: 541) and (Turri 2014).  
21 Let me briefly mention a closely related potential objection to SPI that I consider indecisive. It might be 
argued that claims that seem true because they are close enough to being true stop to seem true once we 
add something like “strictly speaking.” For example, it may seem true to say “It’s three o’clock” when it is 
actually ten seconds past. Still, in the same situation, it will arguably not seem true to say “Strictly speaking, 
it is three o’clock.” Now, if Hannah’s knowledge ascription in the low standards cases seems true because 
it is a case of loose use, a corresponding utterance of “Strictly speaking, Bill knows the bank will be open” 
should not seem true. And, now it may be argued that this just isn’t the case. See (Hawthorne 2004a: 120) 
and (Blome-Tillmann 2013b: 4302) for related points. However, Conee (2005a: 52) (and, similarly, Davis 
(2007: 430)) holds that it would indeed seem false for Hannah in the low standards cases to say “Bill really 




Quantity1. Correspondingly, dialogues of the following type should be fine if the 
awareness principle holds. 
Hannah: Bill doesn’t know that the bank will be open. 
Sarah: Of course he doesn’t. No one knows such things. Is that all he told you on the 
phone? 
#Hannah: Oh, c’mon. You know what I meant. 
Again, though, such a dialogue seems hard to make sense of. 
In order to avoid distracting objections, let me emphasize that the “You know what I 
meant!” responses on the part of Hannah in the dialogues just described are subtly 
different from other possible responses on her part that I would find perfectly acceptable. 
Blome-Tillmann, for example,  suggests that, in a dialogue like the one above, “it might 
seem natural for [Hannah] to reply that she was speaking loosely.” (2013b: 4303n)22 I 
fully agree. Similarly, consider the following dialogue. 
Hannah: Bill knows that the bank will be open. 
Sarah: I doubt that. The bank could have changed its hours. 
Hannah: You’re right. Bill doesn’t know it. 
It seems fairly uncontroversial that Hannah could now go on to say something like “I was 
speaking casually,” particularly, if Sarah were to insist “But you just said that he does!”23 
The fact that these responses are acceptable, however, does not show that the above “You 
know what I meant!” response is acceptable as well. To see this, consider the following 
dialogue. 
Hannah: The bank will be open. 
Sarah: I doubt that. The bank could have changed its hours. 
Hannah: I guess you’re right. It might be closed. 
Just as before, Hannah could now go on to say “I was speaking casually/loosely,” 
particularly, if Sarah were to insist “But you just said that it will be open!” Obviously, 
                                                 
22 For somewhat related judgments, see (Fantl and McGrath 2012: 694). 
23 See e.g. (DeRose 2009: 171), (Davis 2010: 1155) and (Dimmock and Huvenes 2014: 6n). 
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though, her original assertion wasn’t a case of loose use (in the relevant sense). More 
plausibly, it was just an ill-considered judgment.24 And when Hannah says that she was 
speaking loosely/casually, she plausibly just wants to admit that she wasn’t careful 
enough when she made her original statement, not that she didn’t mean what she said. 
Correspondingly, it would not seem fine for her to respond “Oh, c’mon. You know what 
I meant!” The same, I think, goes for the dialogues above. 
For those who do not share these verdicts, let me note that there is another frequently 
adopted intuitive datum that may create some pressure towards following my lead. It is 
the (admittedly somewhat vague) datum that high standards contexts are contexts where 
we feel “enlightened” in some sense.25 Let me elaborate. Consider the following dialogue 
again. 
Hannah: Bill knows that the bank will be open. 
Sarah: I doubt that. The bank could have changed its hours. 
#Hannah: Oh, c’mon. You know what I meant. 
I have objected to SPI on the grounds that this dialogue sounds weird. If you accept the 
idea that high standards contexts are enlightened contexts, you should accept that verdict, 
for the following reason. In the above dialogue, Sarah objects to Hannah by mentioning 
an error-possibility. Presumably, she thereby raises the epistemic standard. Thus, given 
the assumption that high standards contexts are enlightened contexts, Hannah should feel 
enlightened in some sense after hearing Sarah’s objection. However, when Hannah 
responds to this objection by saying “Oh c’mon. You know what I meant!” she is 
precisely denying that there is anything enlightening about this objection. To the contrary, 
she is suggesting that she had the mentioned error-possibility in mind all along but just 
didn’t bother to make that explicit. So, if we grant that raising epistemic standards is 
enlightening, then we should say that this response is inappropriate. Thus, we should 
accept my argument against SPI.26 
                                                 
24  Davis (2007: 410f) similarly distinguishes loose use from what he calls “sloppy” or “careless” or 
“unenlightened” use.  
25 See e.g. (Hawthorne 2004a: 164) and (Cohen 2005a: 58) for the thesis that high standards contexts are 
enlightened contexts. 
26 To be clear, note that the phenomenon of enlightenment in high standards contexts, though closely 




To conclude, I am almost certain that some of my readers will neither accept the intuitive 
verdicts about the dialogues above nor the enlightenment intuition. I have nothing to say 
to these readers. The upshot of the present chapter for them should be that SPI yields a 
very attractive account of the Contextualist Data. For, apart from the awareness objection 
just discussed, there seem to be no decisive objections to this view on offer. For those 
who do share my verdicts about the dialogues above or, at least, the enlightenment 
intuition, the upshot of the present chapter should be that SPI must be rejected. In any 
case, I will now turn to what I take to be the correct account of the Contextualist Data, 
projective invariantism.
                                                 
claims after an error-possibility has been mentioned. Loose use may explain retraction. See e.g. (Davis 
2007: 406f). Still, when we retract claims because it is pointed out that they are strictly speaking false, we 
do so with what MacFarlane dubs an “exasperated grumble.” (2011: 541) We precisely don’t consider 




5. Projective Invariantism 
In this chapter, I will propose an invariantist account of the Contextualist Data that does 
not suffer from any of the problems discussed so far. I call it projective invariantism 
because it is based on the idea that readers project certain assumptions into the scenarios 
they read. Before we start, let me briefly outline this view and discuss how it relates to 
the views considered so far. 
Projective invariantism is, of course, a form of invariantism. Thus, projective invariantists 
hold that the proposition expressed by knowledge claims does not vary with the epistemic 
standard of their context of use. As a result, they face the challenge from the Contextualist 
Data. To respond to this challenge, they argue roughly as follows. We evaluate the 
knowledge claims in the bank cases differently because the epistemic position of the 
subject of these knowledge claims differs between the bank cases. This, in turn, is so 
because there are certain straightforward psychological mechanisms that lead readers of 
the bank cases to interpret these cases in relevantly different ways. In particular, these 
mechanisms lead readers of the bank cases to assume that it is more likely in the high 
than in the low standards cases that the bank has changed its hours because this possibility 
is mentioned only in the high standards cases. 
Projective invariantism, thus, differs from all the views discussed so far. Consider 
relativism (chapter 2) and pragmatic invariantism (chapter 3 and 4). With these views, it 
shares only the commitment to invariantism. For, projective invariantists neither appeal 
to relative nor to pragmatic contents in the way these theories do. Consider subject-
sensitive invariantism and the belief removal theory (chapter 1). With these views, 
projective invariantism further shares the commitment to the idea that the epistemic 
position of the relevant subject differs between the bank cases. However, according to 
projective invariantism, the difference in the subject’s epistemic position is neither due to 
anti-intellectualistic features of the subject nor to differences in the beliefs she holds (as 
these views would have it). Projective invariantism presumably is most closely related to 
psychological error-theories (chapter 1). With these theories, it shares the commitment to 
invariantism and the appeal to psychological principles. Furthermore, as most versions of 
the psychological error-theory, projective invariantism also trades on how likely we 
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consider the salient error-possibility in the high standards cases to be. Still, there are 
important differences. In particular, projective invariantism is not an error-theory and it 
does not appeal to the psychological mechanisms psychological error-theorists have so 
far employed. 
This is projective invariantism in rough outline. In this chapter, I will further spell out and 
defend this view. Correspondingly, the structure of the chapter is as follows. In the first 
section, I will lay out the projective invariantist account of the Contextualist Data in more 
detail. In the second section, I will show how to deal with various objections to this 
position. 
5.1. The Contextualist Data 
In this section, I will present the projective invariantist account of the Contextualist Data. 
We have seen that these data are problematic for the invariantist for the following reason. 
On the one hand, the invariantist wants to say that the propositions expressed by the 
knowledge claims in the low and the high standards bank cases are the same. On the other, 
it seems that the relevant epistemic facts are the same in these cases as well. As a 
consequence, it seems that our truth-value judgments about the knowledge claims in the 
low and the high standards cases should be the same. But, according to the Contextualist 
Data, they are not. The strategy that I think the invariantist should pursue to respond to 
this challenge is to deny its second premise. The invariantist should claim that, contrary 
to appearance, the epistemic facts are, or more precisely, will be assumed to differ 
between the bank cases, in particular, that Bill’s epistemic position will be assumed to be 
stronger in low standards cases than in the high standards cases. 
In light of the above discussion of the third-person cases, such a strategy may seem 
hopeless. Remember that the corresponding low standards bank cases seem to differ from 
the high standards cases only in that, in the high standards cases, more is at stake for 
Hannah and Sarah and Sarah mentions the error-possibility that the bank has changed its 
hours. The epistemic subject, Bill, however, is neither part of nor aware of the 
conversation between Hannah and Sarah. Thus, it seems very much unclear how the 
above differences should affect his epistemic position. So, let me first present a general 
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framework that opens up the possibility of claiming that Bill’s epistemic position differs 
between the bank cases to then introduce a particular implementation of this framework. 
Here is the general framework. I grant that as far as the explicit content of the scenario 
descriptions is concerned, there is no epistemically relevant difference between the low 
and the high standards cases. However, when we ask whether Bill’s epistemic position 
differs between the low and the high standards cases, we should not only look at what’s 
explicitly said in the description of these scenarios. This is so because these descriptions 
leave open epistemically relevant features (such as, for example, the likelihood of the 
possibility that the bank changes its hours) that are going to be filled in in one way or 
another by the readers of the scenarios. And epistemic differences may reside in these 
non-explicit features just as well as in the explicitly described bits of the scenarios. Hence, 
one way to respond to the above argument against the idea that Bill’s epistemic position 
differs between the bank cases is to show that, even though the explicitly described bits 
of the scenarios do not differ in any epistemically relevant respect, the descriptions invite 
readers to fill in the scenarios such that there are epistemically relevant differences after 
all. 
In what follows, I will present a specific implementation of this general framework. To 
do so, I will, first, highlight one specific epistemically relevant yet unspecified feature of 
the bank cases. Second, I will provide considerations that make it at least prima facie 
plausible that this feature will be filled in differently in the different bank cases. 
As to the underspecified feature, note that nothing is said explicitly in the scenario 
descriptions about how likely it is supposed to be that Hannah and Sarah’s bank changes 
its hours. Nothing is said, for example, about how frequently it changed its hours before, 
how frequently shops in general change their hours in Hannah and Sarah’s environment, 
how reliable the director of the bank is supposed to be, etc. Nothing is said about all these 
aspects of the situation. Still, quite plausibly, they affect Bill’s epistemic position with 
respect to the claim that the bank will be open. For, the more likely it is that the bank 
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changes its hours, the easier it will be for Bill to be wrong about the opening hours of the 
bank. And, plausibly, the easier it is to be mistaken, the weaker one’s epistemic position.1 
So, here we have an epistemically relevant yet unspecified feature of the bank cases, 
namely, the likelihood of the possibility that the bank changes its hours. I will now present 
three mutually supportive, yet self-standing arguments for the claim that this feature will 
be filled in differently in the different bank cases, in particular, for the claim that the 
possibility that the bank changes its hours will be assumed to be less likely in the low 
than in the high standards bank cases. This result should suffice to establish that Bill’s 
epistemic position will be assumed to be weaker in the high than in the low standards 
cases. 
In a nutshell, the arguments go as follows. According to the first argument, the likelihood 
of the possibility that the bank has changed its hours will be assumed to be higher in the 
high standards cases because we are reminded of this possibility when Sarah mentions it 
in these scenarios. According to the second argument, the likelihood of the possibility 
that the bank has changed its hours will be assumed to be higher in the high standards 
cases because Sarah implicates that this possibility is likely when she mentions it. 
According to the third argument, the likelihood of the possibility that the bank has 
changed its hours will be assumed to be higher in the high standards cases because this 
possibility would not occur to Sarah unless it was likely in these cases. I take the first 
argument to be the most original contribution to the debate. The second and the third 
argument draw heavily upon proposals already present in the literature. I put them forth 
nevertheless because they haven’t been embedded into the general framework described 
above.2 
Before we can spell out the just mentioned arguments in more detail, we first have to ask 
how readers of a scenario generally fill in the missing details of a scenario. This is 
                                                 
1 Note that, when I speak of likelihoods here and in what follows, I have in mind some kind of more or less 
objective sort of likelihood that is relatively independent of the evidence available to particular subjects. 
As indicated above, for example, the likelihood of the possibility that Bill is mistaken is supposed to depend 
on features such as how frequently the bank has changed its hours before, whether or not Bill is aware of 
how often the bank has changed its hours before. DeRose (2009: 22f) and Gerken (2011: 56), for example, 
endorse the idea that a subject’s epistemic position depends on the likelihood of error-possibilities in this 
objective sense. 
2 See below for references. 
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ultimately an empirical question. But the following seems like a principle that should 
guide us at least to a certain extent. 
Normalcy Projection (NP): Subjects will tend to fill in the missing details of a scenario 
in accordance with what they think would be normal in the context of the scenario 
as explicitly described. 
The idea behind this principle is that if the author of a scenario fails to specify a relevant 
bit of the scenario, then, presumably, this part of the scenario is not supposed to be special 
in any way. Hence, we will just project what we consider normal into the empty yet 
relevant slots. As I said, (NP) is ultimately an empirical principle that stands in need of 
empirical confirmation. In this dissertation, however, I will just assume that something 
along the lines of (NP) is true and proceed from there. 
The argument from reminding 
Here then is a detailed version of the first of the above three arguments to the conclusion 
that the bank will be assumed to be more likely to change its hours in the high standards 
cases. Plausibly, when we don’t think of an error-possibility, we tend to act as if we 
thought that its likelihood is zero even if we already know (in some sort of unconscious 
or tacit way) that the likelihood is not zero. For example, suppose that you know full well 
that robins and bluebirds are equally likely to be seen in your area. Suppose further that 
you see an orange-breasted bird that, for all you see, is either a robin or a bluebird. If you 
don’t think of the possibility that the bird is a bluebird (maybe because it’s been a while 
since you last saw a bluebird), you will presumably still say, “That’s a robin!” This is so 
because you treat the likelihood of unthought-of possibilities as zero.3 When subjects read 
the low standards cases, they similarly don’t think of the possibility that (normal) banks 
sometimes change their hours. Hence, given the previous observation, they will treat the 
likelihood of this possibility as zero, in particular, they will act as if they thought that the 
likelihood of this possibility is zero. Given (NP), they will thus project this likelihood into 
the scenario. So, they will assume that the likelihood of the possibility that Hannah and 
                                                 
3 I take it that the above principle is fairly obvious and hence need not be backed up by empirical results. 
Still, of course, it is in the end an empirical psychological principle. For those who thus seek empirical 
corroboration, I refer to (Gerken 2011: 50; 2012: 155). The right-to-left direction of what he calls the 
“Principle of Contextual Salience” seems to correspond at least roughly to the above thesis. Gerken 
discusses this thesis in a psychologically much more informed fashion than I am able to do. 
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Sarah’s bank changes its hours is zero in the low standards cases. In the high standards 
cases, the situation is different. It seems clear that once we are reminded of a known-to-
be-likely possibility, we no longer treat its likelihood as zero even if we haven’t been 
taking it into account before. For example, when I remind you, “It could also be a 
bluebird,” you’ll immediately retract your original assertion of “That’s a robin!” because 
you remember that this possibility is likely.4  Similarly, when subjects read the high 
standards cases, they are reminded of the possibility that (normal) banks sometimes 
change their hours because this possibility is mentioned in the scenarios. Hence, they also 
realize that its likelihood is, though maybe low, certainly not zero. Again, given (NP), 
they will project this assumption into the scenario and thus assume that it is likely at least 
to a certain degree that Hannah and Sarah’s bank changes its hours. So, the assumed 
likelihood of this possibility will be higher in the high than in the low standards cases. 
(The just presented argument leads to an account of the Contextualist Data only on the 
assumption that Bill fails to know that the bank will be open in the high standards cases 
because the normal likelihood of the possibility that banks change their hours prevents 
him from knowing that. It may be worried that this idea leads to a problematic form of 
skepticism. I don’t think it does. The issue will be addressed below.) 
The argument from implicatures 
Here is a detailed version of the second argument for the conclusion that the bank will be 
assumed to be more likely to change its hours in the high standards cases, in particular, 
for the partial conclusion that the likelihood of this possibility will not be considered zero 
in the high standards cases. It is based on the idea that, first, Sarah implicates that it is 
likely to a certain degree that the bank changes its hours when she mentions that 
possibility and, second, that this implicature will be assumed to be true in the high 
standards cases given (NP). Let’s discuss these claims in turn. 
Why should Sarah implicate that it is likely to a certain degree that the bank changes its 
hours? Here, we can draw on the work of Dougherty and Rysiew (2009). They pursue a 
                                                 
4 The above claim is closely related to the left-to-right direction of Gerken’s Principle of Contextual 
Salience which has it that “[n]ormally, if for an agent, A, q is a contextually salient alternative to S’s 
knowledge that p, then A processes q as an epistemically relevant alternative to S’s knowledge that p.” 
However, my contention here is more moderate and therefore hopefully uncontroversial. It roughly says 
that normally, if for an agent, A, an alternative, q, is salient and A knows that the likelihood of q lies above 
a certain threshold, then A “processes” q as epistemically relevant. 
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project that is closely related to mine, namely, they try to explain, from an invariantist 
(intellectualist and fallibilist) point of view, why so-called “concessive knowledge 
attributions” sound odd (a concessive knowledge attribution being a claim of the form “I 
know that p, but it is possible that q” where q entails not-p). We need not bother about 
the details of their account here. All that is relevant is that, in the course of their 
discussion, they plausibly argue for the following claim: “In saying that p is possible one 
implies that there is some real chance that p.” (2009: 130) (Dougherty and Rysiew do not 
say much about what a “real” chance is supposed to be. Still, they assume that, if there is 
a real chance of error, then this “may well be enough to prevent one from knowing.”) 
Following Dougherty and Rysiew, the above implicature can be derived in the following 
way.5 The mere existence of a possible alternative arguably will not be relevant for the 
question of whether someone knows that a certain proposition is true. (Otherwise we 
would presumably be wedded to a fairly strong form of skepticism.) So, when, say, Sarah 
says “Banks can always change their hours,” she will say something irrelevant to the 
extent that all she says is that this possibility exists. The irrelevance of her claim will thus 
trigger the search for an implicature. And this implicature arguably is the thesis that the 
possibility that banks change their hours not only exists but is also likely to a relevant 
degree.6 
Why should readers of the bank cases assume that this implicature is supposed to be true? 
Plausibly, we do not normally try to mislead people. So, given (NP), Sarah will have to 
be assumed to believe that there is a real chance that the bank changes its hours. 
                                                 
5 See (Dougherty and Rysiew 2009: 128f). See also (Bach 2008: 79) for a similar reasoning. As will become 
apparent in a minute, the subsequent derivation relies on assumptions about the semantics of possibility 
claims that may not be entirely uncontroversial (in particular, that their semantic content by itself is 
irrelevant for the question of whether someone knows a given proposition). Addressing this issue, however, 
goes beyond the scope of the present project. For further discussion, see e.g. (Stanley 2005a), (Dodd 2010) 
and (Dougherty and Rysiew 2011). 
6 I tacitly made the transition from the idea that a given possibility is a “real” possibility to the idea that the 
possibility is likely. It may be doubted, however, whether this transition is legitimate. For example, one 
may think that whether a possibility is real depends on how much is at stake. Thus, one may hold, a 
possibility can be real even if it is unlikely, namely, when much is at stake. See e.g. (Fantl and McGrath 
2009: 22f) for such a conception of the realness of a possibility. Here is my response to this worry. Even 
those who want to say that the realness of a possibility depends on how much is at stake do not want to say 
that the realness of a possibility depends only on what is at stake. Instead, they will say that a possibility is 
real if it is likely enough for the stakes at hand (or something along these lines). Thus, if a possibility is 
real, it still follows that it is likely at least to a certain degree. And this is all that is required for the above 
argument to go through. 
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(Otherwise she would convey something she does not herself believe. Hence, one would 
most naturally think that she is trying to mislead Hannah.) Now, in the absence of 
misleading evidence, we normally hold true beliefs about our everyday concerns (such as 
the opening hours of our bank). So, given that no reason is given in the bank cases to 
think that Sarah should have been misled in any way and given (NP), Sarah’s belief will 
most likely be assumed to be true. Thus, we have a second argument for the conclusion 
that the possibility that the bank changes its hours will be considered more likely in the 
high than in the low standards cases.7 
The argument from occurrence 
Here is the detailed version of the third argument for this conclusion. As Bach plausibly 
points out, if “our cognitive processes are operating well, generally the thought of a 
possibility contrary to something we’re inclined to believe occurs to us only if it’s a 
realistic possibility, not a far-fetched one” (2010: 121). Thus, the possibility that the bank 
changed its hours should normally occur to Sarah only if this possibility is likely to a 
certain degree. So, given that this possibility does occur to Sarah in the high standards 
cases, we have to assume that it is likely there in order to preserve normalcy. Hence, given 
(NP), we have a further argument for the claim that the possibility that the bank changes 
its hours will be assumed to be less likely in the low than in the high standards bank 
cases.8 
Note that the presently described mechanism is importantly different from the implicature 
mechanism above. For example, the implicature mechanism arguably won’t apply when 
we consider bank cases where the error-possibility is not mentioned in the high standards 
cases but only considered in thought by the knowledge ascribing subject. For, thoughts 
(as opposed to mentionings) plausibly don’t have implicatures.9 The present mechanism, 
however, straightforwardly does apply to these cases. For, to repeat, an error-possibility 
normally occurs to somebody (in thought or in speech) only if this possibility is likely. 
                                                 
7  For a suggestion that goes in in the direction of this second argument, see May’s comments on 
http://certaindoubts.com/?p=1373.  
8  Again, I am tacitly making the transition from something being a “realistic” or “not far-fetched” 
alternative to it being a likely alternative. See FN 6 for why this transition is compatible with the idea that 
whether a possibility is realistic or far-fetched depends on how much is at stake. 
9 See e.g. (Baumann 2011) for such bank cases (and an argument against pragmatic invariantism that is 
based on these cases and the just mentioned idea that thoughts don’t have implicatures). 
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To sum up, we have seen that there are three straightforward reasons to hold that the 
possibility that the bank changes its hours will be assumed to be less likely in the low 
than in the high standards bank cases. Hence, we have good reasons to assume that Bill’s 
epistemic position will be assumed to be better in the low than in the high standards cases. 
Thus, we have a straightforward explanation of the Contextualist Data. 
5.2. Objections and Replies 
In what follows, I will discuss potential objections to projective invariantism and show 
how they can be answered. Here is the first objection. 
Skepticism 
Schaffer and Knobe (2012: 27) object to a view similar to projective invariantism that it 
would commit the invariantist to “the quasi-skeptical view that in fact Hannah [in our 
case, Bill] does not know that the bank will be open on Saturday” and suggest “that most 
invariantists will already reject the strategy at this point.”10 They would presumably level 
the same objection to projective invariantism in the following way. To begin with, note 
that projective invariantism is not supposed to be an error-theory. Thus, according to 
projective invariantism, both our judgments about the low as well as our judgments about 
the high standards cases are correct. With respect to the high standards cases, however, 
we tend to endorse the knowledge denial. So, projective invariantists must say that these 
denials are correct. Correspondingly, they must say, as Schaffer and Knobe have it, that 
Bill doesn’t know that the bank will be open in the high standards cases. Why would 
people find this result problematic? The reason, I take it, is this. It may be assumed that, 
in ordinary conversations, we generally ascribe knowledge to subjects whose epistemic 
position is not in the least better than Bill’s in the high standards cases. So, saying that 
Bill fails to know that the bank will be open in the high standards cases commits one to 
the thesis that our ordinary practice of ascribing knowledge is generally mistaken. And 
this result looks very much like a potentially troubling form of skepticism. 
The present objection seems serious. So, let me spend some time on stating how, I think, 
it can be answered. First of all, I am perfectly happy to accept the intermediate conclusion 
                                                 
10 Gerken (2011: 54f) also endorses an objection along these lines. This may be part of the reason why he 
doesn’t apply his Principle of Contextual Salience (see FN 3 and 4) in the way I propose to apply it. 
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that Bill doesn’t know that the bank will be open in the high standards cases. As indicated, 
this is a straightforward consequence of the idea that projective invariantism is not an 
error-theory. What I deny, however, is that this result leads to a problematic form of 
skepticism. In particular, I deny that, in ordinary conversations, we generally ascribe 
knowledge to subjects whose epistemic position is not better than Bill’s in the high 
standards cases. 
I reject that premise because I think that it is unfounded. To see this, note that all candidate 
motivations of this premise are straightforwardly bound to fail (at least in the present 
dialectical context). The first idea that might come to mind is the following. One could 
say that, given the Contextualist Data, people tend to accept the knowledge ascription in 
the low standards cases. Thus, they find it appropriate to ascribe knowledge to subjects 
whose epistemic position is not better than Bill’s in the bank cases. Thus, in ordinary 
conversations, they would also ascribe knowledge to subjects whose epistemic position 
is not better than Bill’s in the bank cases. 
Such a reasoning clearly begs the question against projective invariantism. For, the 
projective invariantist holds that Bill’s epistemic position differs between the low and the 
high standards cases. So, the only conclusion we can derive from the data about the low 
standards cases is that, in ordinary conversations, we would ascribe knowledge to subjects 
whose epistemic position is not better than Bill’s in the low standards cases. This, 
however, is a conclusion the projective invariantist can happily endorse. For, the 
projective invariantist holds that it is perfectly correct to ascribe knowledge to such 
subjects. She only denies that we can truly ascribe knowledge to subjects whose epistemic 
position is not better than Bill’s in the high standards cases. (And we do not accept the 
knowledge ascription in these cases.) 
Here is another way in which one might want to substantiate the idea that we would 
ordinarily ascribe knowledge to subjects whose epistemic position is not better than Bill’s 
in the high standards cases. Suppose we modify the low standards cases such that Bill’s 
epistemic position equals the epistemic position he supposedly has in in the high standards 
cases according to projective invariantism. Even so, one might want to argue, we would 
accept the knowledge ascription in these cases. Thus, we would ordinarily ascribe 
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knowledge to subjects whose epistemic position is not better than Bill’s in the high 
standards cases after all. 
This reasoning is also misguided. It is based on the idea that, even if we modify the low 
standards bank cases such that Bill’s epistemic position equals the epistemic position he 
supposedly has in in the high standards cases, we would still accept the knowledge 
ascription in these cases. This idea seems mistaken. In order to modify the low standards 
cases in the just proposed way, we would have to state in the scenario description that it 
is likely to a certain degree that the bank changes its hours. After all, this is what makes 
Bill’s epistemic position in the high standards cases fail to amount to knowledge 
according to projective invariantism. However, it seems quite plausible to me that, if we 
modify the low standards cases in such a way, people would no longer accept the 
knowledge ascription. Besides, many theorists in the field should be happy to accept this 
verdict. For, by pointing out that it is likely to a certain degree that the bank changes its 
hours, we certainly make this error-possibility salient, if not to Hannah and Sarah, then at 
least to the reader of the scenario. And many theorists are committed to hold that making 
an error-possibility salient in this way does have an effect on our judgments.11 So, it is an 
open question at best whether we would still accept the knowledge ascription in the low 
standards cases if we modify these cases such that Bill’s epistemic position equals the 
epistemic position he supposedly has in in the high standards cases according to projective 
invariantism. Correspondingly, the above reasoning is bound to fail as well. 
I can see no other way to support the premise that, in ordinary conversations, we would 
generally ascribe knowledge to subjects whose epistemic position is not better than Bill’s 
in the high standards cases. Thus, I reject that premise. Correspondingly, the above 
skepticism objection has no force. 
                                                 
11 Admittedly, it would at least be consistent for the contextualist to deny that verdict. For, the contextualist 
could consistently say that salient error-possibilities affect our judgments only if they are salient for the 
speaker in question, that is, in our case, for Hannah and Sarah, not the reader of the scenario. This response 
strategy, however, is not available for many other theorists. Proponents of assessment relativism, for 
example, according to which the truth-value we ascribe to knowledge claims depends on our epistemic 
standard, cannot resort to this response strategy. For, assuming assessment relativism, the truth-value 
readers of the bank cases ascribe to the knowledge claims in the bank cases should depend only on what is 
salient to them. Similar considerations hold for psychological error-theories. According to these theories, 
it is also the readers of the scenario (not the speakers in the scenario) who form mistaken judgments about 
the bank cases. So, again, all that should count is what is salient to them. 
123 
 
Remark. Even though I want to say that the epistemic position of subjects to which we 
ordinarily ascribe knowledge generally is better than Bill’s in the high standards cases 
and, thus, that our ordinary knowledge claims are mostly correct, I do not want to deny 
that they are also oftentimes mistaken. In particular, I think that there are situations like 
the robin case above where we ascribe knowledge just because we fail to think of likely 
alternatives. In such cases, the subjects’ epistemic position presumably won’t be better 
than Bill’s in the high standards cases. Thus, they will fail to know. However, it should 
be uncontroversial that such cases occur. Hence, it seems safe to assume that the thesis 
that they occur does not lead to any problematic form of skepticism. 
Making the Likelihood Explicit 
Here is a second, related objection to projective invariantism. Stanley alludes to this 
objection when he writes that “even when we have full knowledge of the likelihood of 
various counter-possibilities, it does not affect our judgments.” (Stanley 2005b: 101) As 
applied to projective invariantism, the objection could be developed as follows. Projective 
invariantism crucially relies on the fact that the bank cases are underspecified when it 
comes to how likely it is that the bank changes its hours. For, this allows readers to fill in 
the low and the high standards cases in different ways. Thus, if projective invariantism 
holds, the Contextualist Data should disappear once we explicitly stipulate how likely it 
is that the bank changes its hours in the bank cases. To make the Contextualist Data 
disappear, it should suffice, for example, to end the high standards cases with a claim to 
the effect that the likelihood of the possibility that the bank changes its hours is zero. 
Stanley’s quote above can be seen as the objection that this prediction is mistaken. 
To respond, I think that Stanley is just wrong about this latter judgment. At the very least, 
the judgment is unfounded. (Note that Stanley does not back up his claim by any further 
considerations.) To me, it seems quite plausible that the Contextualist Data would 
disappear if the scenarios were specified in the mentioned respect. Suppose, for example, 
that we end the high standards cases with claims along the following lines. 
Note that, even though Sarah mentions the possibility that the bank has changed its 
hours, this possibility is utterly unlikely. The bank hasn’t changed its hours before. 
Banks in Hannah’s and Sarah’s environment are generally very reliable. And even if 
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the bank had changed its hours, this would have been properly announced at least two 
weeks before. So, Bill would most likely have known. 
To me at least, it seems not at all clear that, once we add the above paragraph, people 
would still agree that Bill fails to know that the bank will be open in the high standards 
cases. Further empirical research may prove me wrong. But I don’t think the issue can be 
settled from the armchair. 
Far-Fetched Alternatives 
Here is another closely related objection to projective invariantism. One might hold that 
we would obtain the Contextualist Data even if we let Sarah mention an alternative that 
we don’t consider likely at all. For example, one might hold that the Contextualist Data 
would still be present if Sarah mentions the possibility, say, that a meteor destroys the 
bank before Saturday. This result would be problematic because projective invariantists 
explain the Contextualist Data at least partly on the grounds that we do consider the 
alternative in the high standards cases likely (and are reminded of that once the possibility 
is mentioned). 
Again, my response is just to deny the alleged data. In fact, I think the real data favor my 
proposal. Gerken seconds this response in the following passage. 
[A]n important consideration concerning very far-fetched salient alternatives cases must be noted. 
Consider, for example, the alternative that the matter in S’s car has spontaneously reorganized in 
the form of a giant lizard (MacFarlane 2005b). This salient alternative to S’s knowledge that the 
car is in the driveway does not generate strong intuitions to the effect that S does not know that the 
car is in the driveway (MacFarlane 2005b). [FN: We have at present no empirical evidence about 
far-fetched salient alternatives. But the intuitive judgment appears to be widely agreed upon.] The 
absence of an intuition in this case—or, at least, the asymmetry in strength of intuition—needs to 
be explained as much as the presence of intuitions in cases of less far-fetched salient alternatives.  
(Gerken 2012: 141f) 
If Gerken is correct, it is indeed a good thing that projective invariantism does not predict 
contextualist effects when very far-fetched alternatives are mentioned. For, there simply 
are no such effects. (Admittedly, Gerken does not directly say that the Contextualist Data 
are absent when very far-fetched alternatives are mentioned. He leaves open the 
possibility that the data should only be weaker. But this is unproblematic for the projective 
invariantist. For, at least some of the mechanisms described above to accommodate the 
Contextualist Data may apply even when the mentioned error-possibility is very far-
fetched. In particular, readers may still ascribe to Sarah an implicature to the effect that 
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the possibility she mentions is likely, or assume that the possibility is supposed to be 
likely in the bank cases in order to make sense of why it occurs to Sarah in these cases.) 
Skeptical Arguments 
The following is yet another objection in the vicinity of the previous considerations. 
Suppose a skeptic, instead of merely making an error-possibility salient, presents 
arguments to the conclusion that we don’t know that the error-possibility does not obtain 
and then appeals to epistemic closure to reach the skeptical conclusion that we don’t know 
what we thought we know. Suppose, for example, that the skeptic points out that we don’t 
know that we are not brains in a vat because our sensory experiences would be exactly 
the same as they are if we were brains in a vat. Suppose further that she now appeals to 
one or the other epistemic closure principle to conclude that we don’t even know we have 
hands. One might be inclined to think that people tend to respond to such arguments by 
granting that they don’t know they have hands. And it might further be held that projective 
invariantism is unsuited to explain this datum. In support of this latter contention, Nagel, 
for example, argues that, when 
we  succumb  to  the  temptation  of  rescinding  knowledge ascriptions under sceptical pressure, 
we can at least ostensibly continue to judge the odds of being in a sceptical scenario as very low: 
the sceptic might move you into suspension of judgement even after granting that the odds of being 
a BIV are one in a quadrillion, if he is skilled at getting you to appreciate  that  things  would  
appear  exactly  the  same  to  you  under  that condition. (Nagel 2010: 299) 
I fully agree with Nagel that projective invariantism cannot account for the fact (if it is 
fact) that we retract knowledge claims in the face of skeptical arguments, at least when 
these arguments involve far-fetched alternatives such as that of being a brain in a vat. For, 
as indicated by Nagel, none of the mechanisms posited above to account for the 
Contextualist Data applies to these reactions. First of all, we will not be reminded that it 
is likely to a relevant degree that we are brains in vats when this possibility is pointed out 
to us. After all, we presumably consider this alternative to be extremely unlikely. 
Relatedly, the skeptic may happily cancel any implicature to the effect that this possibility 
is likely without undermining her case. Finally, it seems clear that the skeptical error-
possibility comes to the mind of the skeptic not because it is likely but because the skeptic 
has been engaging in philosophy. 
But how problematic is the result that projective invariantism cannot explain our assumed 
reactions to skeptical arguments? I don’t think this is very problematic. First of all, it 
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seems to be very much unclear that we do indeed tend to retract knowledge claims in the 
face of skeptical arguments. Many, if not most people are entirely unmoved by such 
considerations.12 What does seem correct is only that some people become convinced by 
skeptical arguments (some philosophers, for example) and that, for most people, it is 
difficult to see where exactly skeptical arguments go awry (even if most people think that 
these arguments just have to go awry at some point or other). Admittedly, projective 
invariantism cannot explain these residual data either. But this result is problematic only 
if there are no plausible accounts of these data with which projective invariantism could 
be supplemented. This is not the place to argue that there are such accounts. It seems 
fairly clear, however, that the burden of proof is on those who want to say that there are 
none. For example, the projective invariantist could appeal to the strategies mentioned in 
connection with SPI, according to which skeptical arguments involve one or the other 
non-obvious argumentative fallacy.13 
Too Small a Difference 
Consider also the following objection. Nagel complains that “it is unclear exactly why a 
slight increase in the apparent odds of danger in cases like (b) [i.e. cases like the high 
standards cases] would be sufficient to overturn the positive assessment of cases like (a) 
[i.e. cases like the low standards cases].” (2010: 299)14 The idea here seems to be that the 
slight increase in the likelihood of being wrong posited by projective invariantism would, 
at best, move us from knowledge to borderline knowledge or from borderline knowledge 
to non-knowledge but not from knowledge to non-knowledge. 
It seems quite unclear, however, why this should be so. For, it is quite unclear why a 
slight increase in the likelihood of being wrong should only make a slight difference to 
one’s overall epistemic position. For example, the projective invariantist could hold that, 
particularly when we go from zero to non-zero, an increase in the likelihood of being 
wrong makes a large difference to one’s overall epistemic position. Given that, there is a 
large difference between the subject’s epistemic positions in the bank cases. Thus, there 
                                                 
12 See (Feldman 2001: 77),  (Bach 2010: 108f) and (Davis 2004: 274, 2007: 436) for related observations. 
13 See p. 101. 
14 For a suggestion that seems to go in a similar direction, see the response by Schaffer to the comment by 
May on http://certaindoubts.com/?p=1373. 
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is no reason why the subject should not know the bank will be open in one but not the 
other case.15 
Mere Stakes Effects 
The next and final worry has it that we would obtain varying evaluations of the knowledge 
claims in low and the high standards cases even if we only changed the stakes between 
the scenarios and not the mentioned error-possibilities. 16  This might again seem to 
undermine my proposal. For, if no error-possibility is mentioned, we arguably won’t be 
reminded of an error-possibility, the relevant implicature will also not be present and there 
will be no reason to think that an error-possibility occurred to any of the subjects involved 
in the bank cases. 
Here are my responses to this objection. First, it is far from clear that mere stakes effects 
cannot be explained on the basis of projective invariantism. Drawing on results from 
                                                 
15 Full disclosure: In fact, I don’t think that the best explanation of the Contextualist Data is that Bill knows 
the bank will be open in the low but not the high standards cases. Instead, I am inclined to think that the 
best explanation is that Bill is a borderline case of a knower in all bank cases who is somewhat closer to 
being a knower in the low than in the high standards cases. This idea would have to be motivated in more 
detail. But let me briefly indicate the basic thought. It is a striking feature of the empirical results about the 
bank cases that, at least on average, people judge all the knowledge claims, denials as well as ascriptions, 
in all the bank cases, high standards as well as low standards, as at least more true than false. (See (Hansen 
and Chemla 2013: 309) and, relatedly, Figure 2 above on p.59. (Buckwalter 2014) confirms this effect.) 
Why is that? Doesn’t consistency require that we judge at least some of the claims as more false than true? 
The following seems like a promising account. It is often held that, in the face of borderline cases, “one can 
go either way,” that is, when a is a borderline case of an F, it is allowed to classify a as an F but it is also 
allowed to classify a as a non-F. See e.g. (Shapiro 2006: 9f). Suppose we grant that thesis. And suppose 
further that we hold that Bill is a borderline case of a knower in the bank cases. If so, we get a 
straightforward explanation of the datum that we accept all knowledge claims in all bank cases: We accept 
all knowledge claims in all bank cases because it is allowed for the relevant speaker to make all these 
claims. Given that Bill is a borderline knower, how do we explain that there are, nevertheless, differences 
between our evaluations of the knowledge claims in the low and the high standards cases? Here, we can 
employ projective invariantism to argue that these differences are due to the fact that Bill is somewhat 
closer to being a knower in the low than the high standards cases. In sum, we thus arrive at the thesis that 
Bill is a borderline case of a knower in all bank cases who is somewhat closer to being a knower in the low 
than in the high standards cases. As I said, the present proposal would have to be further substantiated. In 
particular, one would have to rule out alternative explanations of the datum that we tend to accept all 
knowledge claims in the bank cases. And one would have to spell out and motivate the thesis that, in the 
face of borderline cases, one can go either way. These, however, are topics for another occasion. 
16 That there are mere stakes effects seems to have been confirmed in (May et al. 2010), (Sripada and 
Stanley 2012) and (Buckwalter and Schaffer 2013). It should be noted, though, that May et al. think that 
their effects are too weak to underwrite stakes sensitivity. Pinillos (2012) claims to have found very strong 
stakes effects. But I side with (Buckwalter and Schaffer 2013: Sec. 2.2) and (Buckwalter 2014: Sec. 3.2) in 
holding that this claim is not well-founded because one plausible explanation of his results is independent 
of the putative stakes sensitivity of knowledge attributions. Addressing this last issue in more detail would 
go beyond the scope of this project. 
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psychology, Buckwalter and Schaffer (2013: 22) argue that high stakes “can be expected 
to trigger anxiety in the participants [of the respective studies] and thereby ‘to intensify 
the generation of alternative hypotheses.’” In this way, additional alternatives may come 
to mind when one reads the high standards cases even if they are not mentioned. Thus, 
readers may also be reminded that these alternatives are not unlikely. As a result of 
that, they may then be less prone to ascribe knowledge because the epistemic position of 
the relevant subject is weakened. Second, in light of the failure of the invariantist theories 
discussed in the previous chapters, an explanation of the salience effect alone may already 
be progress enough.17 So, even if the above account of the stakes effect fails, this would 
not be a devastating result. 
5.3. Conclusion 
To sum up, projective invariantism plausibly explains the Contextualist Data. It does so 
by adopting invariantism and the various arguments to the conclusion that the subject’s 
epistemic position will be assumed to be different in the low and the high standards cases. 
Given that all other invariantistic candidate accounts of the Contextualist Data fail, we 
should thus accept projective invariantism, at least insofar as we are convinced that 
invariantism is the right way to go.
                                                 
17 And, insofar as the contextualist wants to apply her theory to respond to skeptical arguments, the salience 
effect is of considerably more importance than the stakes effect anyway. See the discussion of the 
contextualist response to skeptical arguments in the next chapter. 
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Appendix: The Factivity Problem 
In this chapter, I will briefly return to the contextualist account of the Contextualist Data, 
according to which “knows” expresses differently demanding relations depending on 
whether the expression is used in the low or the high standards cases. I have claimed in 
the introduction that the basic problem for contextualism is to provide an account of the 
Invariantist Data, that is, the data from speech reports and disagreement. This assumption 
has figured in the background in my discussion of relativism. For, I have argued there 
that the relativist cannot accept certain kinds of responses to my objection from indirect 
testimony unless she is prepared to give up at least some aspects of the objection from the 
Invariantist Data to contextualism. This point would be weakened if the Invariantist Data 
turned out not to be crucial for the case against contextualism anyway. So, in this last 
chapter, I will try to corroborate the assumption that they are by showing that another 
prominent objection to contextualism fails. 
It has been argued that contextualism faces the so-called factivity problem and hence 
cannot be stated properly. 1  The basic idea behind this charge is that contextualists 
supposedly have to say, on the one hand, that knowledge ascribing sentences like “S 
knows that S has hands” are true when used in ordinary contexts while, on the other hand, 
they are not true by the standard of their own context. In this chapter, I will show that the 
argument to the factivity problem fails because it rests on the mistaken premise that 
contextualists are committed to the truth of particular ordinary knowledge attributions. 
Let me start by presenting the factivity problem. To begin with, let me clarify what exactly 
the factivity problem is supposed to show. The factivity problem, I take it, is an argument 
to the conclusion that anti-skeptical epistemic contextualism cannot be stated properly if 
it is conjoined with contextualistic versions of the principles (KNA) that one can properly 
assert that p only if one knows that p, (Fact) that knowledge that p entails that p and (Clos) 
that we know the things that follow from what we know so long as we know that they 
                                                 




follow from what we know. (KNA) is the knowledge norm of assertion, (Fact) is the 
factivity principle for knowledge and (Clos) is the principle of epistemic closure. 
As stated already, epistemic contextualism roughly is the semantic thesis that “knows” 
expresses more or less demanding epistemic relations depending on the epistemic 
standard in play at the context of its use. Anti-skeptical epistemic contextualism, as I will 
understand it here, entails the following two additional claims. First, it entails that 
skepticism is false. Skepticism is most commonly construed as the thesis that “[o]rdinary 
knowledge attributions are generally false.” (Stanley 2005b: 82)2 Hence, anti-skeptical 
epistemic contextualism entails that it is not the case that ordinary knowledge ascriptions 
are generally false. And I will assume here that this, in turn, means that anti-skeptical 
contextualism entails that ordinary knowledge ascriptions are generally true.3 Second, 
anti-skeptical epistemic contextualism entails a particular response to a particular form of 
skeptical argument, a response that typical epistemic contextualists endorse. Let me 
elaborate. 
The skeptical argument I have in mind is an argument to the conclusion that skepticism 
is true and goes, very roughly, as follows: You don’t know that you are not a (just recently 
envatted) handless brain in a vat. If you don’t know that, then you also don’t know that 
you have hands. So, you don’t know that you have hands. Analogous arguments show 
that, for most ordinary claims p, we don’t know that p. If we don’t know all these things, 
then ordinary knowledge ascriptions are generally false. So, ordinary knowledge 
ascriptions are generally false. Hence, skepticism is true. (Note here that ordinary claims 
are supposed to be those claims that are said to be “known” in ordinary contexts.) 
The anti-skeptical contextualist responds to that argument not only by pointing out why 
the argument is not sound but also by explaining why it seems sound to begin with. The 
argument is not sound, according to the anti-skeptical contextualist, because it is not true 
that ordinary knowledge ascriptions are generally false if we don’t know that p for most 
                                                 
2 See also (Hawthorne 2004a: 53), (Davis 2007: 427), (Rysiew 2007: 627) and (DeRose 2009: 124). 
3 Freitag (2011: 277n; 2013: 135) tries to defuse the factivity problem by claiming that the skeptic says that 
ordinary knowledge attribution are necessarily false, not that they are false as a matter of contingent fact. 
Correspondingly, on Freitag’s view, the anti-skeptical contextualist only has to say that ordinary knowledge 
ascriptions can be true, and this claim does not give rise to the factivity problem (as will become apparent 
below). Freitag’s definition of skepticism, however, goes against the grain of the contemporary discussion 
(see FN 2). That is why, I think, his response to the factivity problem is not fully satisfactory. 
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ordinary propositions p. The reason is that once the skeptical argument is presented and 
the corresponding error-possibility is made salient, our epistemic standard rises such that, 
in the scope of the argument, “knows” comes to express the very demanding relation of 
knowledgeS. In ordinary discourse, however, “knows” expresses the far less demanding 
relation of knowledgeO. And even if we don’t knowS a lot, it does not follow that we also 
don’t knowO a lot.
4 The argument nevertheless seems sound because the inference to the 
claim that we don’t knowS most ordinary claims is perfectly sound and because “we fail 
to realize […] that the skeptic’s present denials that we know various things are perfectly 
compatible with our ordinary claims to know those very propositions.” (DeRose 1995: 
5)5 
So, to repeat, the anti-skeptical epistemic contextualist endorses epistemic contextualism, 
anti-skepticism and the just sketched response to the skeptical argument. The factivity 
problem is not an argument against epistemic contextualism per se but an argument 
against anti-skeptical epistemic contextualism conjoined with contextualistic version of 
(KNA), (Fact) and (Clos). 
It should be noted that, even so, the factivity problem puts considerable pressure on 
epistemic contextualism per se: The factivity problem supposedly shows that, in order to 
have a view that can be stated properly, an epistemic contextualist must either reject anti-
skepticism or her response to the skeptical argument or give up at least one of the 
principles (KNA), (Fact) and (Clos). But each of these disjuncts comes at a price. First, 
epistemic contextualists typically hold that one major merit of their theory is that it 
provides a response to skepticism. Correspondingly, they can give up anti-skepticism and 
their response to the skeptical argument only to the extent that they are prepared to give 
up what they take to be a major merit of their theory.6 Similarly, second, (KNA) plays a 
crucial role in an important argument for epistemic contextualism. This argument has to 
be given up if (KNA) is given up.7 Third, (Fact) seems intuitively very plausible. So, quite 
                                                 
4 To simplify the discussion, I pretend that there are only two relations “knows” can express, the relation 
of knowledgeO and the relation of knowledgeS. The contextualist will actually say that there are many more 
such relations. 
5 It is, of course, debatable whether the contextualist response to the skeptical argument can ultimately be 
sustained. See e.g. (Schiffer 1996) for further discussion.  
6 This point is emphasized most strongly in Jäger’s (2012: 494) recent presentation of the factivity problem. 
See also (Ashfield 2013: 121). 
7 See, again, (Jäger 2012: 494) for this point. See (DeRose 2002) for the argument in question. 
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generally, it would seem to be a drawback of a theory if it can be maintained only if this 
principle is rejected. Finally, even if it may be disputable whether (Clos) holds in full 
generality, there should still be suitably restricted versions of that principle that are, on 
the one hand, true and, on the other, strong enough to underwrite the subsequent 
arguments. So, again, the contextualist would be ill-advised to reject this principle. 
Discussing in detail the issues mentioned in this paragraph is a topic for another occasion. 
To save some breath, I will, in what follows, use “contextualism” to refer to anti-skeptical 
epistemic contextualism conjoined with contextualistic versions of (KNA), (Fact) and 
(Clos) (unless indicated otherwise). The factivity problem, then, is an argument to the 
conclusion that contextualism, in this sense, cannot be stated properly.8 
Let me now show how the factivity problem is supposed to arise. As a first step, we have 
to spell out the contextualistic versions of (KNA), (Fact) and (Clos). Let’s start with 
(KNA). A contextualist will not say that one can properly assert that p only if one knows 
                                                 
8 Setting up the factivity problem in the way I did indicates two drawbacks of at least the presentation of 
the response to the factivity problem given in (Brueckner and Buford 2009; 2010). First, Brueckner and 
Buford seem to endorse what I take to be the conclusion of this argument. They write that a contextualist 
“cannot ‘knowledgably’ state the contextualist thesis that ‘[S knows that h at t]’ is true in O.” (2009: 436) 
We need not bother here about the specific thesis contextualists supposedly cannot “knowledgably” state. 
What matters for our purposes is only that this thesis is claimed to be a “contextualist” thesis. It is not 
entirely clear what this is supposed to mean. One plausible interpretation, though, is that a contextualist 
thesis is a thesis that is, in some sense, part of contextualism. If that is so, Brueckner and Buford are 
committed to hold that contextualists cannot “knowledgably” state a claim that is part of contextualism and, 
as a consequence, cannot “knowledgeably” state contextualism itself. Given (KNA), this just means that 
contextualism cannot be stated properly and hence entails the conclusion of the factivity problem. (I take 
this to be the bottom line of why Jäger (2012: 496) thinks that Brueckner and Buford’s response to the 
factivity problem can be dismissed.) Brueckner and Buford may object that I am misconstruing their idea 
of a “contextualist thesis.” A contextualist thesis need not be a thesis that is part of contextualism; it could 
also be a thesis that, say, just involves contextualistic vocabulary. Similarly, they may object that the claim 
quoted above is immaterial to their overall argument and that retracting it wouldn’t do harm to their 
response to the factivity problem. Even so, the above considerations show that, as it stands, Brueckner and 
Buford’s response to the factivity problem is not fully satisfactory because it has an obvious reading 
according to which it entails the conclusion of the factivity problem. Second, Brueckner and Buford mainly 
argue that the contextualist can accept the “contextualist dogma” that it “is possible for there to be two 
contexts C1 and C2 such that a sentence of the form ‘[X knows that p at t]’ is true in C1 and not true in C2” 
(2009: 434, 437) without being committed to the factivity problem. But this dogma seems to be just a 
statement of contextualism per se. If that is so, their argument is beside the point. Even proponents of the 
factivity problem do not (or at least should not) claim that contextualism per se cannot be stated properly. 
Only anti-skeptical contextualism (conjoined with the above general principles) is supposed to be 
unstatable. (I take this to be the bottom line of why Baumann (2010: 85, 87) thinks that their argument can 
be dismissed.) Now, it may be that Brueckner and Buford’s dogma is supposed to already entail a certain 
form of anti-skepticism. Similarly, it may be that, despite the fact that they to do not explicitly consider this 
issue, their arguments show that the contextualist can properly accept not only contextualism per se but 
also anti-skepticism. But be that as it may, a fully satisfactory response to the factivity problem should 
make these issues explicit. 
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that p. For this would mean that assertions are governed by whatever it is that “knows” 
expresses in the context of this article. This certainly seems arbitrary. The contextualist 
will correspondingly say that one can properly assert the sentence “p” in a context C only 
if “S knows that p” is true in C. Descending to the object language, the contextualist will 
hold that for every C: 
(KNAC) An assertion that p by a speaker S is proper in a context C only if S knowsC 
that p, 
where “knowsC” is the relation that, according to contextualism, “knows” expresses in a 
context C. For analogous reasons, the contextualist will spell out (Fact) and (Clos) as the 
claims that for every C: 
(FactC) If S knowsC that p, then p. 
(ClosC) If S knowsC that p and S knowsC that if p, then q, then S knowsC that q. 
Proponents of the factivity problem use these principles to show that contextualism 
cannot be stated properly in the following way. By definition, contextualism entails anti-
skepticism, that is, that ordinary knowledge ascriptions are generally true. Let’s introduce 
“S” as a name for a contextualist, say, Keith DeRose, and “h” as an abbreviation for “S 
has hands.” According to proponents of the factivity problem, the contextualist 
commitment to anti-skepticism then entails that “S knows that h” is true when uttered in 
an ordinary context. Correspondingly, the first premise of the factivity problem is that 
contextualists are committed to the claim that “S knows that h” is true in an ordinary 
context.9 Let’s use “knowsO” as a term for the relation that, according to contextualism, 
“knows” expresses in an ordinary context (as we already did above). We can then restate 
the first premise of the factivity problem as follows: According to contextualism, 
                                                 
9 The above reasoning to the first premise of the factivity problem seems to be present in most presentations 
of the factivity problem. Baumann (2008: 583; 2010: 87), for example, claims that contextualism without 
the claim that “knowledge attributions made in a lower context are in fact true” would be “not very attractive 
[...].” Wright (2005: 243) concurs that the contextualist “has no point to make” unless she can accept that 
“common sense’s claims to knowledge are, in their proper context, perfectly good [...].” Jäger (2012: 491f) 
quotes DeRose in saying that we do not speak falsely “when we claim to know [...] in [ordinary] contexts 
in which no skeptics are calling our attention to [skeptical] hypotheses” (DeRose 1999: 18). And 
Williamson states that according to contextualism, “in everyday contexts many assertions of ‘knowledge’ 
are [...] correct.” (2005b: 689) All four authors use these claims to straightforwardly justify the premise that 
contextualists must concede that “S knows that h” is true in an ordinary context. 
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(LOWC) S knowsO that h.
10 
I will argue later in this chapter that this first premise cannot be derived from the 
contextualist commitment to anti-skepticism in the way just presented and that, as a result, 
we should reject the factivity problem. For now, though, I will take it for granted. 
The second premise of the factivity problem straightforwardly follows from the 
contextualist response to the skeptical argument. In response to this argument, our 
contextualist conceded that we don’t knowS most ordinary propositions. In particular, she 
conceded that we don’t knowS that we have hands. Correspondingly, the second premise 
of the factivity problem is that  
(HIGHC) S doesn’t knowS that h. 
The factivity problem can now be derived as follows: According to the first premise, 
proponents of contextualism have to endorse (LOWC). So, whenever a contextualist 
properly asserts her view, she also properly asserts (LOWC). Assume S is a contextualist 
who properly asserts her position in a skeptical context. Then the following holds true: 
(1) S properly asserts in a skeptical context that (LOWC) i.e. that S knowsO that h. 
This claim, together with (KNAC), straightforwardly entails that 
(2) S knowsS that S knowsO that h. 
 (KNAC) analogously yields that 
(3) S knowsS that (FactC) i.e. that if S knowsC that p, then p, 
                                                 
10 Note that it is not entirely obvious that (LOWC) follows from the thesis that “S knows that h” is true in 
an ordinary context. For contexts are often construed as possible situations of the utterance of a sentence. 
And even if there are possible ordinary situations in which “S knows that h” is true, it does not follow that 
S knowsO that h. All that would follow is that possibly S knowsO that h. So, contexts must be seen here as 
(something like) actual situations of the utterance of a sentence. I mention these points because confusion 
about these two notions of a context may easily make it seem that (LOWC) is just a trivial consequence of 
contextualism: Contextualists clearly accept that there are ordinary (possible) contexts such that “S knows 
that h” is true. It is also trivial that if there are ordinary (actual) contexts such that “S knows that h” is true, 
then S knowsO that h. But, contrary to what may seem to be the case if the two notions of a context aren’t 
kept apart, these two claims cannot be put together to yield that contextualists trivially accept that S knowsO 
that h. I don’t want to claim that proponents of the factivity problem did confuse these notions of a context. 




because, just as they endorse (LOWC), contextualists endorse (FactC). But if we now 
combine (2), (3) and (ClosC), we arrive at the conclusion that 
(4) S knowsS that h. 
And this claim contradicts (HIGHC). So, contextualists cannot properly state their theory 
in skeptical contexts. However, whenever they do state their theory they find themselves 
in “paradigmatic epistemology or ‘philosophy classroom’ contexts in which skeptical 
hypotheses are salient and taken seriously.” (Jäger 2012: 492) These contexts arguably 
are skeptical contexts. So, contextualism cannot be stated properly at all.11 
In what follows, I will show that the argument to this conclusion is not sound because its 
first premise, that contextualists are committed to (LOWC), is false. Note, first, that this 
does not mean that (LOWC) itself false and, second, that whether (LOWC) is true or false 
is an issue that will not be addressed in this chapter. 
To show that the contextualist is not committed to (LOWC), we have to show that none 
of the claims that make up contextualism carries with it a commitment to this claim. This 
is what I will be doing in what follows. Let’s start by considering the commitment to anti-
skepticism which, as argued above, is standardly taken to entail the commitment to 
(LOWC). Here is why it doesn’t. It seems clear that even if anti-skepticism is true, and 
thus that ordinary knowledge attributions are generally true, it simply does not follow that 
(LOWC) is true. For it is certainly possible that all everyday utterances of the specific 
sentence “S knows that h” are false even if ordinary knowledge ascriptions are generally 
true. But if anti-skepticism doesn’t entail (LOWC), then it is perfectly consistent for the 
contextualist to accept anti-skepticism without accepting (LOWC). Hence, the 
contextualist is not committed to (LOWC) just in virtue of her commitment to anti-
skepticism. Of course, the contextualist would be committed to (LOWC) if she held that 
                                                 
11 There is room for doubt as to whether philosophical contexts (or at least those philosophical contexts 
where contextualism is stated) need to be skeptical contexts and, indeed, I am not unsympathetic to the idea 
of rejecting the factivity problem on the basis of the claim that they are not. In this chapter, however, I want 
to attack the factivity problem from a different, so far un(der)explored angle and hence take this point for 
granted. For arguments to the conclusion that philosophical contexts aren’t skeptical, see e.g. (Montminy 
2008: 2–6) and (Ashfield 2013: Sec. 8). For arguments to the conclusion that they are, see (Jäger 2012: 
496f). Note also that Baumann (2008: 582f) argues that the factivity problem arises already if the 
contextualist tries to state her position in a demanding but not necessarily skeptical context. If that is so, 
the factivity problem requires only the weaker (and presumably indisputable) assumption that philosophical 
contexts are demanding contexts. All these issues though go beyond the scope of the present discussion. 
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ordinary knowledge attributions are one and all true. But that would be absurd. We do 
make mistakes. What the contextualist accepts is that ordinary knowledge ascriptions are 
generally true. And this claim does not entail (LOWC) and thus does not yield a 
commitment to this claim. Note that this result does not rely on my particular choice of h 
as the thesis that S has hands. “h” can stand for whatever ordinary claim we like. The 
contextualist will not be committed to the truth of this particular claim just in virtue of 
her commitment to anti-skepticism. For the claim that ordinary knowledge attributions 
are generally true does not entail the truth of any particular ordinary knowledge 
attribution. 
One might want to respond to these considerations by arguing that the contextualist is 
committed to (LOWC) not because anti-skepticism entails (LOWC) but because 
knowledgeS of anti-skepticism entails knowledgeS of (LOWC). Such an argument, 
however, would be bound to fail because it is far from clear that knowledgeS of anti-
skepticism should entail knowledgeS of (LOWC) (or, for that matter, of the truth of any 
particular ordinary knowledge attribution). For example, I may perfectly well know that 
the tickets of a yet to be drawn lottery will generally lose even if I don’t know of any 
particular ticket that it will lose. In just the same way, it should be perfectly possible to 
knowS that anti-skepticism is true, that is, that ordinary knowledge attributions are 
generally true, even if one does not knowS of any particular ordinary knowledge 
attribution that it is true. 
These considerations may leave one wonder what exactly the contextualist motivation for 
anti-skepticism is going to be if it is not the truth of particular ordinary knowledge claims. 
After all, whereas, in the lottery case, we normally have a guarantee that there is only one 
winning ticket, we certainly have no guarantee that there is only one false ordinary 
knowledge claim. This question goes beyond the scope of the present discussion, but let 
me briefly indicate one such candidate motivation. DeRose, for example, accepts a 
principle of charity according to which it is “a strike against a theory of a common term 
of a natural language that it involves the speakers of that language in systematic and 
widespread falsehood in their use of that term.” (1995: 46) This principle, maybe together 
with the contextualist response to the skeptical argument above, may well be used in an 
argument for anti-skepticism that is entirely independent of the truth of particular ordinary 
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knowledge claims. It might be debatable whether such appeals to charity are any good.12 
But in light of the fact that leading proponents of contextualism do invoke such principles, 
they can certainly not be rejected out of hand in an argument supposed to show that 
contextualism cannot be stated properly. So, the present discussion may show that one 
way to corroborate the factivity problem would be to demonstrate that every possible 
justification of anti-skepticism appeals to the truth of particular ordinary knowledge 
attributions. Pending such demonstration, however, the factivity problem can be rejected. 
(In the foregoing paragraphs, I presupposed that knowledgeS of anti-skepticism is 
possible. The question under discussion only was whether such knowledgeS is possible 
independently of knowledgeS of the truth of particular ordinary knowledge claims. 
However, this presupposition might be doubted. This, in turn, might then be thought to 
make contextualism unstatable. I will address this worry in the final sections of this 
chapter.) 
The analogy to the lottery case may also leave one wonder how exactly the contextualist 
will motivate that she doesn’t knowS that (LOWC) obtains. After all, it would be question 
begging just to respond that this assumption leads to the factivity problem. What the 
contextualist should say here is this: I fail to knowS that (LOWC) obtains, that is, that S 
knowsO that h, simply because knowledgeO is factive and because I don’t knowS that h. 
This reasoning would not at all be question begging. For it only relies on the factivity 
principle and the assumption that the contextualist doesn’t knowS a lot. And the proponent 
of the factivity problem uses these principles in her very own argument. 
So much for the contextualist commitment to anti-skepticism. Is there any other 
ingredient of contextualism that might lead to a commitment to (LOWC)? Consider 
contextualism per se. It might be thought that this thesis leads to (LOWC) for the 
following reason. In explaining contextualism per se, contextualists typically present 
scenarios like the bank cases and then say of some of the knowledge ascriptions and 
denials made in these scenarios that they are true.13 Maybe this is even the only way to 
properly explain contextualism per se. So, one might want to conclude that contextualists 
are committed to say of the particular ordinary knowledge attributions that occur in bank 
                                                 
12 See e.g. (Hawthorne 2004a: 126–133), (MacFarlane 2005b: 211f) and (Davis 2007: 428–430) for further 
discussion. 
13 See e.g. (DeRose 2009: 1f). 
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case like scenarios that they are true; and, hence, that they are committed to the truth of 
particular ordinary knowledge attributions after all. (LOWC) will be just a placeholder for 
one of these claims. 
This reasoning would be mistaken for the following reason. Saying of imagined assertions 
in imagined scenarios that they are true is entirely unproblematic as far as the factivity 
problem is concerned. For example, the contextualist in a skeptical context may perfectly 
happily say of Hannah’s low stakes assertion of “Bill know that the bank will be open” 
that it is true. For this just means that the contextualist must knowS that Bill knowsO that 
the bank will be open in the low stakes scenario. Given the factivity principle, it does 
follow that the contextualist must also knowS that the bank will be open in the low stakes 
scenario. But since the low stakes scenario is just defined such that the bank will be open, 
such knowledgeS seems entirely unproblematic. So, contextualism per se does not entail 
the truth of any real life ordinary knowledge attribution and hence cannot be used to 
underwrite the supposed commitment to (LOWC).
14 
Consider then the contextualist response to the skeptical argument. Does that response 
entail a commitment to (LOWC)? It seems fairly clear that it doesn’t. In response to the 
skeptical argument, the contextualist did say that we cannot show that “S knows that h” 
is false in an ordinary context by showing that it is false in a skeptical context. However, 
this is not to endorse (LOWC), that is, that “S knows that h” is true in an ordinary context. 
As for (ClosC), (FactC) and (KNAC), these principles are obviously not involved in 
generating a commitment to (LOWC). So, in sum, no ingredient of the contextualist 
position commits the contextualists to (LOWC). The factivity problem should thus be 
rejected. 
To clarify the dialectical situation here, let me emphasize that I am perfectly happy with 
the conclusion that, in a skeptical context, there is hardly any ordinary knowledge 
attribution such that the contextualist could properly say of that knowledge attribution 
that it is true. We can easily establish this result along the lines of the reasoning 
subsequent to (1) above. What I am saying is that this just does nothing to establish the 
conclusion of the factivity problem that contextualism cannot be stated properly. For the 
                                                 
14 See FN 10 for a related point. 
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contextualist just isn’t committed to say of any particular ordinary knowledge attribution 
that it is true. 
Three further clarificatory remarks: First, when I say that in a skeptical context there is 
hardly any ordinary knowledge attribution such that the contextualist could properly say 
of that knowledge attribution that it is true, this is not to say that the contextualist should 
deny the truth of most particular ordinary knowledge attributions in these contexts. This 
would certainly be incompatible with accepting anti-skepticism. When asked in a 
skeptical context whether a particular ordinary knowledge attribution is true, the 
contextualist’s response should generally be “I don’t know (because I don’t know that the 
putatively “known” content is true).” (Remember the discussion of the lottery example to 
see that this does not preclude the contextualist from properly saying that anti-skepticism 
is true.) Second, the previous comment is not to be understood such that the contextualist 
in a skeptical context should say things like “I don’t know whether those ordinary people 
know that I have hands.” This would implausibly suggest that the contextualist should 
generally consider it an open question whether ordinary speakers meet the excessive 
epistemic demands of the present skeptical context. All that the contextualist should say 
is “I don’t know whether this particular ordinary standards usage of ‘I know that the 
contextualist has hands’ is true.” This claim is perfectly compatible with the assumption 
that the ordinary speaker in question does not meet the skeptical epistemic demands. It 
only suggests that it is an open question whether she meets the far less demanding 
epistemic standard that governed her own assertion. And this latter contention seems 
entirely unproblematic. Third, even if there is hardly any ordinary knowledge attribution 
such that the contextualist in a skeptical context could properly say of that knowledge 
attribution that it is true, the same is not true when the contextualist finds herself in an 
ordinary context. In such a context the contextualist can properly say of an ordinary 
knowledge claim that it is true as long as she knowsO that the relevant speaker knowsO 
the propositions she professes to “know” (which will often be the case). Note though that 
the contextualist will have to retract such claims as soon as she finds herself in a skeptical 
context. For if she were to retain a commitment to them, she could no longer properly 
state her views, as the factivity problem shows. 
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In the remainder of this chapter, I will discuss and reject two revised versions of the 
factivity problem that might have come to mind already in the course of my discussion of 
the original factivity problem. Here is the first. Given that our contextualist accepts that 
ordinary knowledge ascriptions are generally true, she will also have to accept that, for 
some ordinary sentence p, there are ordinary contexts in which “S knows that p” is true. 
Descending to the object language, the contextualist has to say that there are ordinary 
propositions p such that S knowsO that p. Given the contextualist response to the skeptical 
argument, the contextualist will even have to accept that there are ordinary propositions 
p such that S knowsO that p and S doesn’t knowS that p. Now, let’s introduce “h” as an 
arbitrary name for one of the propositions that S knowsO but doesn’t knowS. We then 
arrive at the conclusion—which strongly resembles (LOWC) and (HIGHC)—that, 
according to the contextualist, S knowsO that h while S doesn’t knowS that h. Suppose 
now that the contextualist finds herself in a skeptical context. Then, given (KNAC), she 
can properly assert the just derived commitment only if, among other things, she knowsS 
that S knowsO that h. Given (FactC) and (ClosC), she must thus knowsS that h. But, by 
assumption, she doesn’t. Hence, contextualism cannot be stated properly (in a skeptical 
context). 
Here is my response to this revised factivity problem. I have nothing to object to the 
reasoning that leads to the conclusion that the contextualist has to accept that there are 
ordinary propositions p such that S knowsO that p and S doesn’t knowS that p. The rest of 
the argument, however, rests on a logical mistake as the following analogy brings out. 
Consider the arguably plausible view that sentences express different propositions 
depending on the time at which they are uttered. One way of specifying this view would 
be to assign different properties to each predicate depending on the time of its utterance. 
We would then presumably say that “knows” expresses different relations depending on 
the time at which it is used. It could express e.g. the relations of knowledget1, knowledget2, 
etc. Assume that this view is true. Now suppose that I want to say that there are things 
that I have forgotten. I will then be committed to the claim that there are proposition p 
such that I knowtpast that p but don’t knowtnow that p. Certainly, though, it would be absurd 
to present the following argument to the conclusion that I cannot properly assert that I 
have forgotten something: Let’s introduce “h” as an arbitrary name for one of the 
propositions that I knowtpast but don’t knowtnow. We then arrive at the claim that I am 
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committed to hold that I knowtpast that h and don’t knowtnow that h. Given the knowledge 
norm of assertion, I must thus knowtnow that I knowtpast that h (given that I now want to 
say that I have forgotten something). Given the factivity of knowledge and epistemic 
closure, I must thus also knowtnow that h. But this contradicts the assumption that I don’t 
knowtnow that h. So, I cannot properly say that I have forgotten something. Clearly, we 
cannot accept that reasoning if just because its conclusion is entirely absurd: We can 
properly say that we have forgotten something. But whatever mistake it is that afflicts the 
argument, this mistake will carry over to the completely analogous argument to the 
factivity problem described above. So, both these arguments should be rejected.15 
Here is a second, very much neglected variation on the factivity problem that is taken 
from (Williamson 2001: 26). 16  It is based on the already mentioned idea that the 
contextualist might not be able to properly state her view because she doesn’t knowS that 
anti-skepticism is true. Let me elaborate. Instead of starting with the assumption that the 
contextualist is committed to (LOWC), Williamson starts with the premise that the 
contextualist is committed to the following claim: 
(LOWC*) Ordinary knowledge attributions are generally true. 
In the present context, there is certainly no doubt that this premise is true. For (LOWC*) 
is just a statement of anti-skepticism and, on the present understanding, contextualism 
entails anti-skepticism. Next, Williamson introduces the following premise instead of 
(HIGHC): 
(HIGHC*) S doesn’t knowS that ordinary claims are generally true. 
Williamson does not provide a reason to accept this premise and I will argue later that 
there is no such reason. But if we accept it, we can derive that the contextualist cannot 
properly state her view in the following way. Given (KNAC), the contextualist must 
                                                 
15 I do not want to commit myself to saying where exactly the arguments go awry because this seems to be 
a tricky logical issue. One possible source of the wrongness of the arguments could be that “h,” as 
introduced, is ambiguous between what we could call a referential and a descriptive reading. On the 
referential reading, I don’t knowtnow/S that h because I do not stand in the knowledgetnow/S relation to the 
proposition denoted by “h.” On the descriptive reading I do knowtnow/S that h because I do knowtnow/S that 
whatever proposition “h” picks out, this proposition is true because it is supposed to be a proposition I 
knowtpast/O and hence, given factivity, a true proposition. Thanks to Bruno Jacinto for helpful discussion. 
16 Kompa (2005: 18f) endorses the argument but doesn’t add any substance. 
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knowS that (LOWC*), that is, that ordinary knowledge ascriptions are generally true in 
order to properly state her position in a skeptical context. Given (FactC) and (ClosC), she 
must then also knowS that ordinary claims are generally true in order to properly state her 
position in a skeptical context. But given (HIGHC*), she doesn’t have that knowledgeS. 
So, given that philosophical contexts are skeptical contexts, it follows that contextualism 
cannot be stated properly. 
Why should we accept (HIGHC*)? Why should the contextualist be forced to construe 
knowledgeS such that it turns out impossible for her to knowS that ordinary claims are 
generally true (setting aside the already discussed issue that the contextualist cannot 
appeal to the truth of particular ordinary knowledge claims)? In what follows, I will lay 
out what I take to be the most promising answer to these questions and show that it is 
mistaken. On that basis, I conclude that (HIGHC*) should be rejected. Here is the answer 
I have in mind. 
In her response to the skeptical argument, the contextualist conceded the soundness in a 
skeptical context of arguments like the following, call them “Conceded:” 
You don’t know that you are not a (just recently envatted) handless brain in a vat. 
If you don’t know that, then you also don’t know that you have hands. 
So, you don’t know that you have hands. 
Given that, it might be held, the contextualist should also grant the soundness in a 
skeptical context of the following seemingly very similar argument, call it “General:” 
You don’t know that it is not the case that we all are and have always been brains in 
vats. 
If you don’t know that, then you also don’t know that ordinary claims are generally 
true (because if we all are and have always been brains in vats, then ordinary claims 
are generally false). 
So, you don’t know that ordinary claims are generally true. 
But if that argument is sound in a skeptical context, then the contextualist doesn’t knowS 
that ordinary claims are generally true, and that is precisely what (HIGHC*) says. 
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The premise in the foregoing paragraph that the contextualist must grant the soundness 
in a skeptical context of General if she grants the soundness in a skeptical context of the 
Conceded arguments is far from trivial. After all, even if these arguments are similar, this 
does not entail that they should be treated alike in every respect. So, it will have to be 
supported by a further argument. The argument adduced here would presumably go as 
follows: If the contextualist wants to hold that General is not sound in a skeptical context, 
she needs to provide a reason why the argument is not sound in such a context. But 
whatever reason the contextualist puts forward here, this reason will also show that the 
Conceded arguments are not sound in a skeptical context either. So, the contextualist will 
have to grant that General is sound in a skeptical context if she grants that the Conceded 
arguments are. 
The just stated argument for (HIGHC*) fails because it far from clear that every reason 
the contextualist could have for rejecting the soundness in a skeptical context of General 
will also be a reason to reject the soundness in a skeptical context of the Conceded 
arguments. For example, the contextualist could reject General on the basis of semantic 
externalism. The idea here would be that if we all are and have always been brains in vats, 
the meanings of our words adapt such that ordinary claims turn out to be true after all.17 
Such an approach would not carry over to the Conceded arguments. For these arguments 
turn on scenarios like that of being an only recently envatted handless brain in a vat. And 
such more local scenarios certainly do not give rise to meaning adaptation.18 To be clear, 
I am not endorsing the semantic externalist response here. I just want to bring out that it 
would be unfounded to assume that the contextualist cannot argue that General is not 
sound in a skeptical context without undermining her response to the Conceded 
arguments. Further considerations would be required to make that contention plausible, 
but, as far as I can see, such considerations have yet to be delivered. 
Admittedly, even if the contextualist manages to show that General is not sound in a 
skeptical context without thereby undermining her response to the Conceded arguments, 
she will still make contextualism obsolete as far as responding to General itself is 
concerned. For a contextualist response to that argument would start from the assumption 
                                                 
17 This line of argument is, of course, inspired by Putnam. For helpful discussion, see (Brueckner 2012). 
18 See e.g. (DeRose 1999) for this last observation. 
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that the argument is sound in a skeptical context. This, however, doesn’t seem to be much 
of a drawback. For, it simply might well be that different skeptical arguments require 
different solutions and that contextualism is only part of the overall response to 
skepticism. 
Let me emphasize once more that I am not endorsing the above response to General. I 
only want to show that, so far, we have no compelling argument for (HIGHC*). Again, 
even if the contextualist grants the soundness in a skeptical context of the Conceded 
arguments, it just doesn’t follow that she also has to grant the soundness in a skeptical 
context of General. To vindicate this transition, the above mentioned response to General 
would have to be ruled out, and at least a case would have to be made that there is no 
possible argument that could plausibly play its part. So far, however, this just hasn’t been 
done. 
This is not to say that it can’t be done. So, let me conclude this chapter by showing that 
there still is room for maneuvering even if it turns out that the contextualist has to accept 
General if she accepts the Conceded arguments. This latter conditional leads to trouble 
only if its antecedent is true, that is, only if the contextualist has to accept the Conceded 
arguments. In the present chapter, contextualism has just been defined such that this 
assumption is unproblematic. However, as I will show in what follows, this definition 
might not be the only sensible option. 
Note, to begin with, that it can easily seem that the skeptic, in presenting the above 
mentioned Conceded argument, uses the sledgehammer to break a walnut. As has 
frequently been observed, we need not appeal to alternatives as far-fetched as that of being 
a brain in a vat to challenge most ordinary knowledge claims. So-called “lottery 
propositions” will generally suffice.19 For example, the skeptic could argue that I don’t 
know that my bike is parked outside because I don’t know that it hasn’t been stolen; I 
don’t know that the bank will be open tomorrow because I don’t know that it hasn’t 
changed its hours; I don’t know that I will never be rich because I don’t know that I will 
not win the lottery; etc. It would seem that such consideration could be leveled against 
almost all ordinary knowledge claims. So, in this way, the skeptic could argue for her 
                                                 
19 See e.g. (Vogel 1990: 20f) and, following Vogel, (Hawthorne 2004a: 5f). 
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position independently of any appeal to far-fetched alternatives such as that of being a 
brain in a vat. 
Now, contextualism could be construed as a theory designed to respond to precisely this 
kind of what we may call “lottery skepticism,” that is, skepticism supported by the just 
mentioned lottery considerations. As before, the contextualist would admit that the 
individual arguments the lottery skeptic presents are sound but object that they only show 
that we don’t knowS a lot but not that we don’t knowO a lot. The contextualist, however, 
would no longer apply this strategy to what we may call “brain in a vat skepticism,” that 
is, skepticism supported by considerations involving brains in vats and similarly far-
fetched possibilities. Correspondingly, she would no longer apply her strategy to the 
above mentioned Conceded argument. Assuming this conception of contextualism, there 
is no longer any pressure for the contextualist to concede the soundness in a skeptical 
context of General. For she could simply claim that this arguments does not fall within 
the purview of her theory because it involves brains in vats.20 
Would this differential treatment of lottery and brain in a vat skepticism be ad hoc? Would 
it be too much of a concession to admit that contextualism does not provide a response to 
brain in a vat skepticism? Plausibly not. Hawthorne: 
Indeed, lottery-style considerations are arguably a more dialectically effective tool for the skeptic 
than standard brain in a vat or deceiving demon thought experiments. While many contemporary 
philosophers are inclined to resist the skeptic by claiming that they can, after all, know that they 
are not brains in vats, […] they are not nearly so eager to embrace the claim that they know they 
will lose a lottery for which they hold a lottery ticket. And once this has been conceded, it is 
extremely hard to justify a different attitude to the other ‘lottery propositions’ that figure in the 
above examples. (Hawthorne 2004a: 6) 
To the extent that Hawthorne is correct, the just outlined response would neither be ad 
hoc nor, arguably, involve too much of a concession. It wouldn’t be ad hoc because the 
differential treatment of lottery and brain in a vat skepticism would just line up with the 
differential reactions to these arguments of “many contemporary philosophers.” It would 
arguably also not involve too much of a concession. For, Hawthorne plausibly suggests 
that the strongest case for skepticism is not made by the brain in a vat skeptic but by the 
                                                 
20 This raises the question of whether there is a lottery proposition for the thesis that ordinary claims are 
generally true. I take this to be at least unclear. But fully answering this question would require a more 
complete discussion of what lottery propositions are (one that goes beyond merely citing examples). This 
is a topic for another occasion. See e.g. (Douven 2007: Sec. 2) for further discussion (that tends to be 
favorable to my cause). 
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lottery skeptic. And the present version of contextualism still purports to respond to the 
latter. 
So, to sum up, the original factivity problem fails because even though the contextualist 
cannot properly state (LOWC), she is not committed to this claim and thus can still 
properly state her view. The first revised factivity problem fails because it rests on a 
logical mistake. The second revised factivity problem fails because even though the 
contextualist is committed to (LOWC*), it couldn’t be shown that she cannot properly 
state that claim. In particular, the premise (HIGHC*) that was supposed to establish this 
result turns out to be unfounded at least insofar as the contextualist only professes to 
respond to lottery but not to brain in a vat skepticism. We can thus conclude that there is 
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